

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THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

Tranſlated from the GREEK

By Mr. HAMPTON.

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THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the ELEVENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Asdrubal, having entered Italy, is defeated by the Romans. His death and character.

ASDRUBAL was in all respects dissatisfied with the state in which things appeared. But as it was now too late to take other measures, because the Romans were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he was constrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him, in order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in front; increased the depth of his files; and ranged his whole army upon a very narrow ground. He then

took his poſt in the centre of the line, behind the elephants; and moved to attack the left of the enemy: having before determined, that in this battle he would either conquer or die. Livius, leading on his troops with a ſlow and haughty pace, began the combat with great vigour. But Claudius, who commanded on the right, was unable to advance ſo as to ſurround the enemy; being utterly obſtructed by thoſe difficulties of the ground which have before been mentioned, and which had determined Aſdrubal to make his whole attack upon the left. Anxious therefore, and not willing to remain inactive, he had recourſe to the meaſure which the occaſion itſelf ſuggeſted to him. For having drawn away his troops from the right, he led them round the field of battle; and, paſſing beyond the left of the Roman army, attacked the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this moment the ſucceſs of the battle had remained doubtful. For both the Carthaginians and the Romans, well knowing that they had no hopes of ſafety but in victory, maintained the fight with equal bravery. The ſervice alſo, which the elephants performed, had been the ſame to both. For theſe beaſts, being incloſed

cloſed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, ſpread no leſs diſorder among the ranks of the Spaniards, than among thoſe of the Romans. But when Claudius fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement was no longer equal. The Spaniards, preſſed at once both in front and rear, were almoſt all ſlaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants were killed, together with the men that conducted them: and four, which had forced their way through the diſordered ranks, were afterwards taken, but without their leaders. Aſdrubal, who had ſo often diſtinguiſhed himſelf upon former occaſions, diſplayed no leſs courage in this laſt action, and fell in the battle. It would be unjuſt not to pauſe awhile, and give the praiſe that is due to the character of this great commander.

It has already been mentioned, that he was the brother of Annibal; and that the latter, when he began his march towards Italy, left to him the care of the affairs of Spain. The many engagements, which he ſuſtained againſt the Romans in that country; the various difficulties in which he was involved, by the jealouſy of thoſe commanders who were ſent from time to time into Spain from Carthage; how truly he ſhewed himſelf, upon all thoſe occa-

ſions, to be the worthy ſon of Amilcar Barcas; and with what ſpirit and magnanimity he ſupported his misfortunes and defeats; theſe things have been all related in the former books. But his conduct, in the laſt ſcene of this contention, is that which eſpecially deſerves to be remarked, and is moſt worthy to be imitated.

The greateſt part of Generals and of princes, when they are ready to engage in a deciſive action, place continually before their eyes the honour and advantages that may reſult from victory; and conſider only, how they may beſt improve each circumſtance, and in what manner they ſhall uſe the fruits of their ſucceſs; but never turn their view upon the conſequences of a defeat; nor form for themſelves any rule of action in the caſe of a misfortune. And yet the conduct, which the firſt of theſe ſituations may require, is ſufficiently plain and obvious: but the ſecond demands great foreſight. Now, from hence it has happened, that commanders, through the want of this attention, and not having before determiened in what manner they ſhall act upon ſuch occaſions, after the braveſt efforts of their ſoldiers, have often been defeated with diſgrace and ſhame; have diſ-

diſhonoured all their former actions; and loaded the remainder of their lives with reproach and infamy. How many have been loſt by this fatal negligence; and how much one man is in this reſpect ſuperior to another, may be learned with little pains. The hiſtory of paſt times is filled with ſuch examples. But Aſdrubal diſplayed a very different conduct. As long as any hope remained, of performing actions not unworthy of his former glory, he attended to nothing ſo much in every battle, as to the care of his own ſafety. But when fortune had taken from him every future proſpect, and confined him to the laſt deſperate extremity; though he neglected nothing that might ſecure the victory, either in the diſpoſition of his army, or in the time itſelf of the engagement; yet he conſidered alſo with no leſs leſs attention, in what manner, in caſe that he ſhould be defeated, he might ſubmit with dignity to his adverſe fortune, and not ſuffer any thing unworthy of his former actions. Let other commanders then be taught by this example; as, on the one hand, not to fruſtrate the hopes of thoſe who depend upon them, by throwing themſelves unneceſſarily into danger; ſo, on other, never to add diſgrace to their misfortunes, by cheriſhing an immoderate deſire of life.

The Romans, as ſoon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp of the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and ſleeping upon their ſtraw, they ſlaughtered them as victims without reſiſtance. The priſoners were then collected together: and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were brought into the public treaſury. Not fewer than ten thouſand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement; and about two thouſand of the Romans. Some of the Carthaginians that were of eminent rank were taken alive: the reſt were deſtroyed in the action.

When the account of this great ſucceſs arrived at Rome, ſo vehement was the deſire that it might be true, that it was not at firſt believed. But when meſſengers after meſſengers not only confirmed the news of the victory, but reported alſo all the circumſtances of the battle, the whole city was tranſported with extravagant joy. Every ſhrine was then adorned: and every temple filled with libations and with ſacrifices. In a word, ſo flattering were the hopes, and ſo ſtrong the confidence, which poſſeſſed all the people, that even Annibal, whom they had hitherto ſo greatly dreaded, ſeemed no longer to be in Italy.

EX-

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The Diſcourſe of an Embaſſadour, exhorting the Ætolians to put an end to their war with Philip, and to be upon their guard againſt the deſigns of the Romans.

"WITH what earneſtneſs, O Ætolians, king Ptolemy and the cities of Rhodes and Byzantium, of Chios and Mitylene, have endeavoured to perſuade you to conclude a peace with Philip, let the facts themſelves demonſtrate. For this is neither the firſt, nor the ſecond embaſſy that has been ſent to you with that intention. Even from the moment when the war firſt began, we have never ceaſed to follow you; and have taken every occaſion that was offered, to awaken in you an attention to your proper intereſts; being led to this meaſure, not only by the conſideration of thoſe evils, which the Macedonians and yourſelves at this time ſuffer; but by the foreſight of the ruin which will hereafter fall upon our own countries alſo, and indeed upon the whole of Greece. For as a fire, when it has once been kindled, is no longer con-

trouled by him who lighted it; but is directed in its courſe either by the winds that blow, or the combuſtion of the matter with which it is fed; and as it often turns moſt unaccountably the firſt efforts of its rage againſt the perſon himſelf who raiſed it into a flame; juſt ſo it happens in the caſe of war. Once kindled, it firſt conſumes the authors of it; and from thence, ſpreading itſelf upon every ſide, devours without diſtinction every thing that it meets: acquiring ſtill new ſtrength; and being blown as it were into a flame by the folly of the neighbouring people. You now therefore ſee before you all the Greeks of Aſia, and the people of all the iſles, imploring you to put an end to a war, the effects of which they have too great reaſon to fear will extend hereafter to themſelves. Embrace the ſentiments which prudence dictates; attend at laſt to our intreaties; and give a favourable anſwer to our juſt demand. If the war indeed, in which you are now engaged, though attended like all other wars, with preſent diſadvantage, had both been honourable in the firſt intention, and glorious alſo with reſpect to the events that have happened in it, this perſevering obſtinacy might perhaps be excuſed. But, if the motives that led you into it were

moſt

moſt ſhameful; and if the conduct of it has been loaded with diſhonour and reproach; how much does it now deſerve your moſt ſerious conſideration? For my part, I ſhall ſpeak my ſentiments without reſerve: and you, if you are wiſe, will not be offended with this freedom. It is certainly much better, by cenſuring your conduct to preſerve you before it be too late; than to ſooth you with a flattering diſcourſe, which in a ſhort time would be followed by your own ruin, and by that of all the Greeks. Obſerve then the miſtakes into which you have fallen. You pretend that you have taken arms againſt Philip, only to prevent the Greeks from falling under the abſolute dominion of that prince. But the true deſign and tendency of your engagement is to deſtroy all Greece, and to bring it into a ſtate of ſervitude. Your treaty with the Romans very plainly declares, that this is your only purpoſe. That treaty, which ſubſiſted before in writing, and which now is carried into execution. While it was only written, it covered you with ſhame: and now, when it appears in the effects, your diſhonour is become notorious to all mankind. The name then of Philip is only uſed, to cover your true intention. For this Prince can ſuffer nothing

thing from the war. His allies, the people of Peloponneſus, thoſe of Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phocis, the Locrians, the Theſſalians, and the Epirots, have alone any thing to dread from the conditions of your treaty. Theſe are they, againſt whom it is ſtipulated; "that the people and the ſpoil ſhall be allotted to the Romans, and the cities with the territory to the Ætolians." If yourſelves had taken any cities in open war, you neither would have ſet the places in flames, nor have expoſed the free citizens to any injurious treatment. Such cruelty would have been judged too horrible, and worthy only of barbarians. Yet you have made a treaty, which delivers all the reſt of the Greeks into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and expoſes them to the moſt ſhameful outrage. The fatal tendency of this tranſaction was for ſome time unobſerved; but that which has happened to the Oritæ, and to the miſerable people of Ægina, has now ſhewn it in the cleareſt light. For fortune ſeems to have brought your imprudence into open view, like a machine upon the ſtage, to unravel the intricacy of your plot. Such was the commencement, and ſuch to this time has been the event of the preſent war. And what, can it be expected, will

will be the end of it, if all things ſhould ſucceed as you deſire? Muſt it not be the beginning of the worſt of evils, in which all Greece will be involved? For when the Romans ſhall have ended the war in Italy; and this, as Annibal is now ſhut up in a narrow corner of the Brutian diſtrict, muſt very ſhortly happen; it is manifeſt that they will then bring all their power into Greece: on pretence indeed of aſſiſting the Ætolians againſt Philip; but, in reality, with a deſign to add this country to their other conqueſts. If, after they ſhall have become the maſters of it, they treat the people with favour, the whole grace and honour of ſuch indulgence will be their own. If on the contrary they are inclined to uſe ſeverity, they alone will poſſeſs the ſpoils of thoſe that are loſt; and alone will exerciſe the rights of ſovereignty over thoſe that are preſerved. In vain will you then obteſt the Gods. The Gods will not be willing, nor will men be able, to lend you any aſſiſtance.

Theſe then are the fatal conſequences, which you ought to have foreſeen from the beginning. Your honour might then have been preſerved. But ſince the events that lie in the boſom of futurity too often eſcape the eye of human foreſight, yet

now

now at leaſt be warned by thoſe that have already happened, and turn yourſelves to more prudent counſels. With regard to us, as we have omitted nothing that was fit for true friends either to ſpeak or to act in the preſent conjuncture; ſo, with reſpect to the future likewiſe, we have declared our ſentiments with a proper freedom. And we now conjure you with the greateſt earneſtneſs, not to envy both yourſelves, and the reſt of the people of Greece, the bleſſings of liberty and ſafety."

When this diſcourſe was ended, and ſeemed to have made ſome impreſſion upon the people, the embaſſadours from Philip came into the aſſembly; and, without entering into any particular diſcuſſion, ſaid only, that they had received two orders from the king. The firſt, that they ſhould conclude a peace, if the Ætolians would conſent: and the other, that, if this propoſal was rejected, they ſhould immediately depart; having firſt called the Gods to witneſs, and the embaſſadours that were preſent, that the Ætolians, and not Philip, muſt be conſidered as the cauſe of all the evils which ſhould fall hereafter upon Greece.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ſentiments of Philopœmen concerning the brightneſs and neatneſs of arms. The character of this General. He gains a complete victory againſt Machanidas the tyrant of Sparta, in the battle of Mantinea.

UPON this occaſion it was ſaid by Philopœmen: "that the brightneſs of arms very much contributed to ſtrike an enemy with terror; and that great advantage alſo aroſe in action, from having the ſeveral parts of the armour well fitted to the body. That it was much to be wiſhed, that men would transfer that attention to their armour, which they now beſtowed upon their common dreſs; and become as negligent in the care of their dreſs, as they had hitherto been in that of their arms. That ſuch a change would both be ſerviceable to their private fortunes, and be attended likewiſe with manifeſt advantage with reſpect to the public ſafety. If a man therefore, continued he, be preparing him-

himſelf for any military exerciſe, or for an expedition in the field, when he puts on his boots, let him be more careful in obſerving whether they are bright and well fitted to his legs, than in examining his ſhoes or ſandals. When he takes his buckler, his breaſtplate, or his helmet, let him deſire to ſee more ſplendour, and more coſtly ornaments, in theſe parts of his armour, than in his coat or mantle. For when men preferred mere ſhew and oſtentation to things of real uſe, it was eaſy to foreſee, what would be their conduct in the time of danger. In a word, he ſaid, he wiſhed that they would be perſuaded, that an affected nicety in dreſs was worthy only of women, and thoſe perhaps not extremely modeſt: but that a diſplay of ſplendour and of coſtlineſs in arms denoted a man of courage; ambitious of acquiring honour; and determined to employ his utmoſt efforts in the defence of himſelf and of his country."

All the people that were preſent were ſo ſtruck with this diſcourſe, and with the good ſenſe which it contained, that, as ſoon as the aſſembly was diſmiſſed, they began to point out thoſe that were elegantly dreſſed, and forced ſome of them to retire from the Forum. And afterwards, in all their military exerciſes and expe-

expeditions, they were moſt particularly careful to bear in remembrance this advice. Such power is there even in a ſingle exhortation, when delivered by a perſon of high authority, not only to deter men from bad habits, but to lead them into thoſe that are the beſt. When the life eſpecially of the ſpeaker is known to correſpond with his diſcourſe, it is impoſſible not to give the fulleſt credit to his words. And ſuch was the character of Philopœmen. Plain in his dreſs, and frugal in his table, he beſtowed but a very ſlight attention upon the care of his body. In his converſation he was agreeably conciſe, and never gave any offence. In the whole courſe of his life, it was his greateſt ſtudy, always to ſpeak the truth. A few words therefore which he at any time ſpoke, and which ſeemed to fall from him without deſign, were ſufficient to gain an entire credit with thoſe who heard him. The example of his life rendered a long diſcourſe unneceſſary. With ſome ſhort ſentences, ſupported by this credit, and by the opinion which his actions had inſpired, he often overthrew the long and plauſible harangues of thoſe who oppoſed him in the government. But let us now return to the hiſtory.

When

When the aſſembly was diſſolved, the people all returned back to their ſeveral cities; greatly applauding the virtue of the ſpeaker, and the diſcourſe which they had heard: and were perſuaded, that under the adminiſtration of ſuch a governour the ſtate could never ſuffer any loſs. Philopœmen then went round to the ſeveral cities, and inſpected every thing with the greateſt diligence and care. He aſſembled the people together; formed them into troops; and inſtructed them in the military exerciſes. And when he had employed almoſt eight months in completing the neceſſary preparations, he drew together his army to Mantinea, to defend the liberty of all the people of Peloponneſus againſt the Spartan tyrant.

Machanidas, filled with confidence, and conſidering this meaſure as moſt favourable to his own deſires, as ſoon as he heard that the Achæans were ſo near, aſſembled the Lacedæmonian forces at Tegea; harangued them as the occaſion required; and early on the following day began his march towards Mantinea. Himſelf led the right wing of the phalanx. Upon either ſide of the van were the mercenaries, in two bodies, parallel each to the other: and behind theſe, a great number of carriages filled with catapults

tapults and darts. At the ſame time, Philopœmen alſo drew his army, in three diviſions out of the city. The Illyrians, the troops that were armed with coats of mail, the foreign mercenaries, and the light-armed forces paſſed through the gate that led to the temple of Neptune. The phalanx through another gate that looked towards the weſt: and the cavalry of the city through a third that was near to the former. Upon a hill of conſiderable height, that ſtood before the city, and which commanded alſo the temple of Neptune and the road called Xenis, he poſted firſt the light-armed forces; and next to them, on the ſide towards the ſouth, the troops that were armed with mail, and alſo the Illyrians. Next to theſe, and upon the ſame right line, the phalanx, divided into ſeparate cohorts with the uſual diſtances between, was ranged along the border of a ditch, which beginning at the temple of Neptune, was continued through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, as far as to thoſe mountains which are the boundary of the Eliſphaſian territory. Upon the right of the phalanx ſtood the Achæan cavalry, commanded by Ariſtænetus, a citizen

of Dyme. Upon the left was all the foreign cavalry, formed in close order, and without any intervals between the troops. At the head of these was Philopœmen.

When the time of engaging approached, and the enemy appeared in sight, this General, riding through the intervals of the phalanx, exhorted the troops to perform their duty, in few but very forcible words. But the greatest part of what he said was not even heard. For so strong was the affection which the whole army bore towards him, so great was their confidence, and such their ardour to engage, that the soldiers rather seemed to animate their General; and, with a kind of enthusiastick transport, called upon him to lead them against the enemy, and to be assured of victory. As often however as he had power to speak, he in general endeavoured to make them comprehend, that the object of the present contest was, on the part of the enemy, base and ignominious slavery; and, on their own part, glorious and immortal liberty.

Machanidas, as he at first advanced, made a shew of attacking the right of the enemy with his phalanx formed in the oblong square. But when he approached

proached nearer and had gained the diſtance that was proper for his purpoſe, turning ſuddenly the whole body to the right, he extended his front till the right of his line was equal to the left of the Achæans; and at the ſame time diſpoſed his catapults along the whole front at proper diſtances. Philopœmen, perceiving that his intention was, by diſcharging ſtones, and wounding the cohorts as they ſtood, to throw the whole phalanx into diſorder, allowed him not time to effect his purpoſe: but began the action vigorouſly with the Tarentines, who were poſted near the temple of Neptune, upon a ground that was flat and level, and very proper for cavalry. Machanidas was then forced to ſend his own Tarentines alſo to oppoſe them. The charge was violent, and ſuſtained on both ſides with great courage. The light-armed forces came ſoon afterwards to ſupport their reſpective bodies; ſo that all the mercenaries of both armies were in a ſhort time engaged. And as the combatants fought man with man, and without regarding any order, the diſpute was for a long time doubtful. Nor were the reſt of the troops able to diſcern,

to which ſide the duſt was driven; becauſe both parties had changed their ground, and were removed far from the place in which the action was firſt begun. At laſt however, the mercenaries that belonged to the tyrant, who exceeded the others not only in numbers, but in the dexterity alſo which they had acquired in the uſe of their arms, prevailed

It was reaſonable indeed that this ſhould be the iſſue; the ſame which is almoſt always found to happen upon ſuch occaſions. For as much as the citizens who live under a democratical government diſplay greater courage in action than the ſubjects of a tyrant, ſo much on the other hand are the mercenaries, which a tyrant retains in pay, ſuperior to the foreign ſoldiers that ſerve in the armies of a democracy. The reaſon of this difference is, that the people, in the one caſe fight for liberty; and in the other, to be ſlaves: and that the zeal and courage of the mercenaries are rewarded, on the one ſide, with new advantages; and, on the other, tend only to their loſs. For a democratical ſtate, when it has once conquered thoſe who attempt to ſubvert it, no longer employs mercenary troops,

troops, to guard its freedom. But a tyrant, in proportion as his ſucceſſes are increaſed, has ſtill greater need of ſuch aſſiſtance. For, by accumulating injuries, he adds to the number of thoſe whom he has reaſon to fear. The very ſafety therefore of every tyrant depends wholly upon the ſtrength and the attachment of his foreign ſoldiers.

From theſe reaſons then it happened, that the mercenaries of Machanidas, upon this occaſion, maintained the action with ſo great force as well as courage, that not even the Illyrians, nor the heavy forces, which ſupported the Achæan mercenaries were able to ſtand againſt them; but fled in diſorder to Mantinea, though that city was diſtant full ſeven ſtadia from the place of the action. This occaſion afforded alſo a very clear and convincing proof of the truth of a thing which ſome have doubted: that the iſſue of battles is moſt frequently determined by ſkill on one ſide, and by the want of it on the other. A chief, it muſt be acknowledged diſplays no ſmall ability, when, after having gained the advantage in the firſt part of a battle, he conducts the action to the end with the ſame ſucceſs with which it was begun. But his capacity

will be ſeen in a much more exalted point of view, if, when he has been defeated in the beginning, he is ſtill able to retain a preſence of mind; to obſerve the errors which his adverſary commits in the courſe of his ſucceſs; and to turn thoſe errors to his own advantage. For it has often happened, that ſome, when they have ſeemed to have the victory already in their hands, in a ſhort time afterwards have ſuffered an entire defeat: and that others, who have failed in the beginning, by ſome ſudden and dexterous effort have changed the whole fortune of the battle, and obtained an unexpected victory. The two Generals, who commanded in the preſent action, afford very eminent examples of both theſe caſes.

For when the whole body of the Achæan mercenaries was in this manner routed, and the left wing of their army broken and compelled to fly; Machanidas, whoſe duty it was to remain in the place, to finiſh what he had begun, to ſurround the left of the enemy, and to charge their main body both in flank and front, attempted nothing of this kind; but, putting himſelf at the head of his victorious mercenaries, with

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an intemperate and childiſh valour purſued thoſe that fled: as if their own fear alone, after they once were broken, would not have been ſufficient to carry them even to the gates of the city. But the Achæan General, after he had employed all poſſible efforts to ſtop the flight of the troops, calling to the officers by name, and encouraging them to ſtand, when he perceived that they were forced to yield to the ſtrength of the enemy, was not himſelf diſheartened, nor quitted the action in deſpair: but, having poſted himſelf on the wing of his phalanx, as ſoon as the enemy, by their purſuit of thoſe that fled, had left the field clear where the action had paſſed, he turned to the left with his firſt cohorts, and ran in good order to take poſſeſſion of the vacant ground. By this poſition, he both cut off the return of thoſe that were engaged in the purſuit, and at the ſame time commanded the wing of the enemy. He exhorted the phalanx to fear nothing; and to remain in their place, till they ſhould receive the ſignal to charge. At the ſame time he ordered Polybius the Megalopolitan, to collect together all the Illyrians and the mercenaries who had not fled with the

reſt; to poſt them behind the wing of the phalanx; and to obſerve with the greateſt care the return of the enemy from the purſuit.

The Lacedæmonian phalanx, elated by the firſt ſucceſs, without waiting for the ſignal to engage, levelled their ſpears, and advanced towards the enemy. When they came to the bank of the ditch, whether becauſe, as they were now ſo near, there was not time to change their purpoſe, or whether the ditch itſelf, being eaſy in the deſcent, and not having either wood or water in it, appeared contemptible, they continued their way through it without any heſitation. Philopœmen, perceiving that the moment was now come which he had long expected, ordered his phalanx alſo to level their ſpears, and to advance. The Achæans run together to the charge with loud and terrible cries. The Lacedæmonians, who had broken their ranks as they deſcended into the ditch, no ſooner ſaw the enemy upon the bank above them, than they immediately began to fly. But great numbers of them were deſtroyed in the ditch: ſome by the Achæans; and ſome by their own men. Nor was this event to be aſcribed

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to chance, or even to the interpoſition of a lucky moment; but wholly to the ability of the commander. For Philopœmen had covered himſelf with the ditch in front, not with any intention, as ſome ſuſpected, to avoid a battle; but becauſe his great ſkill and judgment had enabled him to foreſee, that, if Machanidas, not regarding the difficulty of the ditch, ſhould lead his phalanx to the charge, the event muſt happen which now had happened: and, if the tyrant, on the other hand, ſtopped by this impediment, ſhould change his purpoſe, and be forced to break the order of his battle, that his ignorance would be then confeſſed; and that he would leave to his enemies the honour of a victory, and carry away the ſhame of a defeat, even without having riſked a general engagement. Such diſgrace, the greateſt indeed that can happen in war, has been the lot of many commanders: who, when they have formed their army, have been deterred from engaging with the enemy, either by the diſadvantage of the ground, the ſuperiority of numbers, or ſome other cauſe; and being forced to break again the order of their battle, have depended wholly upon the rear for victory, or for the opportunity at leaſt of making their retreat

retreat with ſafety. With regard to Philopœmen, his foreſight was proved true by the event: for the Lacedæmonians were completely routed.

When he found then that his phalanx had thus gained the victory, and that all things had ſucceeded moſt glorioufly as he deſired, he now turned his thoughts to the only remaining point, which was, to prevent the tyrant from eſcaping. Knowing him to be intercepted, together with his mercenaries between the city and the ditch, he ſtood expecting his return. Machanidas, at laſt coming back from his inconſiderate purſuit, and ſeeing the flight of his forces, was ſenſible of the miſtake which he had committed, and at the ſame time perceived that all was loſt. He ordered the mercenaries therefore that were near him to form themſelves into a cloſe body, and to force their way through the enemy, who were ſpread looſely over the field, and buſied in purſuing the routed army. Some of his troops obeyed this order, and remained for ſome time with him; conceiving this to be the only expedient by which they might be able to eſcape. But when they came to the bridge that was upon the ditch, and found it guard-

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ed by the Achæans, they immediately loſt all hope; and all of them diſperſed themſelves, and ſought their ſafety by different ways. Machanidas himſelf, laying aſide all thoughts of attempting to eſcape by the bridge, rode along the bank of the ditch, and looked earneſtly for ſome place in which he might paſs it. Philopœmen ſoon diſcerned him by his purple habit, and by the trappings of his horſe. Leaving therefore the care of the bridge to Ariſtænetus; with orders that he ſhould ſpare none of the mercenaries, becauſe they had always been the inſtruments of eſtabliſhing tyranny in Sparta; and taking with him two of his intimate friends, Polyænus the Cypariſian and Simias, he paſſed to the other ſide of the ditch, and rode along the bank oppoſite to the tyrant, with deſign to ſtop him in his paſſage, and thoſe who attended him. For he alſo was followed by two companions; Anaxidamus, and one of the mercenaries. Machanidas, having at laſt found a place that was eaſy of deſcent, ſpurred his horſe, and drove him furiouſly through the ditch. But Philopœmen, in this very moment turning himſelf to meet him, happily wounded him with ſpear; and then, ſhifting the ſpear in his hand, ſtruck

ſtruck him again with lower part of it, and killed him. One of his companions, Anaxidamus, was at the ſame time killed by the two friends who attended Philopœmen; and the other ſought his ſafety in flight. Simias then ſpoiled the bodies; and, having cut off the head of the tyrant, ran to ſhew it to thoſe that were engaged in the purſuit: that the ſoldiers, perceiving that Machanidas was dead, might aſſume new confidence, and follow the flying enemy without any fear even to Tegea. This ſpectacle produced the effect that was deſired; and raiſed ſo great ardour in the army, that they even gained poſſeſſion of Tegea upon their firſt approach. On the following day, they incamped along the banks of the Eurotas, and were maſters of all the open country. Thus the Achæans, who not long before had been unable to drive the enemy out of their own territory, had now all Laconia in their power, and ravaged it without reſiſtance. They had loſt but few of their men in the action but, on the ſide of the Lacedæmonians, four thouſand were killed, and a greater number taken priſoners. All the baggage alſo, and the arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans.

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EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Reflections on the great abilities of Annibal. The cauſe of his failing in his attempt to ſubdue the Romans.

IT is impoſſible to contemplate the length of the time in which Annibal was employed in action; the general battles, as well as little combats, in which he was engaged; the ſieges that were undertaken by him; the revolts of cities that had ſubmitted to him; the difficult conjectures that often preſſed him; and, in a word, the whole extent and greatneſs, both in deſign and execution, of his war againſt the Romans; and not to be ſtruck with admiration of the ſkill, the courage, and the ability of this great commander. How wonderful is it, that, in a courſe of ſixteen years, in which he maintained the war in the very heart of Italy, he ſhould never once diſmiſs his army from the field; and yet be able, like a wiſe and prudent governour, to keep in ſubjection ſo great a multitude, and to con-

fine them within the bounds of their duty, ſo that they neither mutinied againſt him, nor broke into any ſedition among themſelves upon any occaſion. Though his army was compoſed of people of various countries; of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, and Greeks; men who had different laws, different manners, a different language, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common; yet ſo dexterous was his management, that, notwithſtanding this great diverſity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this too he effected in the midſt of very various fortune. For ſometimes he was carried in his courſe by the moſt favourable gales: and ſometimes he was involved in ſtorms. How high as well as juſt an opinion muſt theſe things convey to us of his ability in war. It may be affirmed with confidence, that, if he had firſt tried his ſtrength in the other parts of the world, and had come laſt to attack the Romans, he could ſcarcely have failed in any part of his deſign. But now, as he began, with thoſe with whom he ſhould have ended, the people, that was the firſt object of his conqueſt, was the laſt alſo which he had the power to invade.

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EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The defeat of Asdrubal, the son of Gesco, by Publius Scipio.

ASDRUBAL, having drawn together his army from the several cities in which they had remained during the winter, came and incamped at the foot of a mountain, not far from a city that was called Elinga; and threw up an intrenchment round his camp. In his front was a large plain, very proper for a battle. The number of his forces was seventy thousand foot, and four thousand horse; together with thirty two elephants. At the same time Scipio sent away Marcus Junius, to receive from Colichas the troops which that Spaniard had raised; and which consisted of three thousand foot, and five hundred horse: while himself collected together the rest of the allies, as he advanced in his march towards the enemy. When he arrived near Castalo and Bæcula, he was met by Junius, with the forces which Colichas had sent. He was now involved

involved however in very great perplexity. On the one hand, the Roman forces alone, without the aſſiſtance of the allies, were too few to engage in a general battle. On the other, to place any dependance upon theſe allies, in ſo deciſive an action, appeared to be extremely hazardous and full of danger. After much deliberation therefore, as the neceſſity preſſed him cloſely on either ſide, he at laſt reſolved, that he would employ the Spaniards in ſuch a manner, that they ſhould appear to the enemy to bear a part in the action, but that only the Roman legions ſhould be engaged. Having thus determined, he began his march with all the army, which conſiſted of forty-five thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe: and when he came near to the Carthaginians, and was in ſight, he incamped upon ſome hills that were oppoſite to the enemy. Mago, judging this to be a favourable time for attacking the Romans, before they had completed their incampment, took with him the greateſt part of his own cavalry, together with the Numidians with Maſſaniſſa at their head, and advanced with ſpeed towards the camp, not doubting but that he ſhould find Scipio wholly unprepared

pared. But the Roman General, having foreſeen that this might happen, had placed a body of cavalry, equal to that of the enemy in ambuſcade at the foot of one of the hills. When theſe troops then ſuddenly appeared, the Carthaginians were ſo ſtruck with ſurprize at the unexpected ſight, that many of them as they turned themſelves to fly, were thrown from their horſes. The reſt indeed ſtood firm, and maintained the fight with courage. But being cloſely preſſed, and diſordered chiefly by that dexterity with which the Romans were accuſtomed to quit their horſes in the very time of action; and having loſt alſo many of their men, they were forced to turn their backs after a ſhort reſiſtance. At firſt they retreated in good order. But when the Romans followed cloſely after them, they broke their ranks, and continued their flight in diſorder even to their own camp. This ſucceſs inſpired the Romans with greater eagerneſs to engage; and, on the other hand, depreſſed the ardour of the Carthaginians. During ſome days that followed, they drew out their forces on both ſides in the plain that was between the camps. And having tried

their ſtrength in many little ſkirmiſhes between their cavalry and their light-armed troops, they at laſt reſolved to engage in a general and deciſive action.

Upon this occaſion Scipio employed two ſtratagems. He had remarked, that Aſdrubal always drew out his army at a late hour of the day; and that he placed the Africans in the centre, and the elephants before the Spaniards upon the wings. Himſelf, on the other hand, had been accuſtomed to bring his army into the field at his own time after the other, and to poſt the Romans, oppoſite to the Africans, in the centre, and the Spaniards on the wings. On the day then, in which he had determined to engage, he took in both theſe reſpects juſt the contrary method; and, by that change chiefly, procured to his troops the advantage which they gained againſt the enemy. For ſcarcely had the morning begun to appear, when he ſent orders to the Tribunes and to all the army, that they ſhould immediately take their repaſt, put on their armour, and march out of the camp. The ſoldiers, conceiving what would follow, obeyed the orders with alacrity. He then ſent away the cavalry and the light-armed troops;

troops; commanding them to advance boldly towards the camp of the enemy, and to engage in ſkirmiſhing: and, the ſun being now riſen, he put himſelf at the head of the infantry, and began his march. And when he arrived near the middle of the plain, he then drew up the army in battle, but in an order contrary to that which he before had uſed. For he now placed the Spaniards in the centre, and the Romans upon the wings. The Carthaginians, ſurpriſed by the unexpected approach of the cavalry towards their camp, and perceiving that the reſt of the army was drawn up in battle, and already in fight, had ſcarcely time ſufficient to be armed. Aſdrubal therefore, before the ſoldiers had taken any repaſt, was forced to ſend away in haſte his cavalry and light-armed troops againſt the Roman cavalry; and to draw up his infantry in the uſual order upon the plain, very near to the foot of the mountain.

While the light troops were engaged in ſkirmiſhing, the Roman infantry remained for ſome time quiet in their place. But as the day was now advanced, and no great advantage was gained on either ſide, becauſe the cuſtom of theſe

troops was to retreat when they were preſſed, and then returning again to renew the fight; Scipio called back his men from the engagement, and, having made them paſs through the intervals of the cohorts, ranged firſt the light-armed, and next to them the cavalry, behind the infantry upon each of the wings. He then ordered the whole line to move with equal pace towards the enemy. But when he came to the diſtance of about a ſtadium from them, having directed the Spaniards in the centre to keep their ranks, and to advance ſtill with the ſame pace; he ordered the infantry and cavalry of the right wing to turn to the right, and thoſe of the left to the left. He then took from the right wing three of the foremoſt troops of cavalry, with the accuſtomed number of light-armed in front; and three maniples of infantry, which the Romans call a cohort; while Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius took in the ſame manner as many from the left: and then turning, Scipio with his diviſion to the left, and the others to the right, they led on the troops in a direct line, and with great ſpeed againſt the enemy: the reſt of the wings making alſo the ſame movement, and

and following close in the same line. In this manner, as the wings were brought near to the enemy, while the Spaniards in the centre advanced with a slow pace, and were still at a great distance, Scipio accomplished what he had at first designed, and fell direct upon both the wings of the enemy with only the Roman forces. The movements which were made afterwards by the troops that followed, in order to fall into a right line with those that led, were contrary the one to the other, not only in the two wings, but in the cavalry also and the infantry of either wing. For, in the right wing, the cavalry and the light-armed forces, by turning to the right, fell into the line with those that were before, and attempted to gain the flank of the enemy; while the infantry wheeled to the left, and joined their leaders. In the left wing, the infantry turned to the right; and the cavalry and light-armed to the left. By these movements of the cavalry and light-armed forces, the troops changed their place, so that the right in either wing became the left. This change however Scipio considered as in itself of no great moment. His attention was fixed upon something more im-

portant; which was, to gain the flank of the enemy. And in this he judged right and reaſonably. For though it is neceſſary indeed that a General ſhould know the movements that may be made, it is of much greater moment to be able to apply thoſe movements upon each occaſion to their proper uſe.

As ſoon as the action was begun, the elephants, pierced by the darts of the cavalry and light-armed troops, and preſſed cloſely on every ſide, were not leſs hurtful to their friends than to their enemies For as they were driven from ſide to ſide in great diſorder, they deſtroyed all without diſtinction that were within their reach. At the ſame time the infantry upon the wings of the Carthaginian army was vigorouſly attacked; while their centre, compoſed of the Africans, which were the choiceſt of their troops, remained inactive. For as they dared not, on the one hand, to leave their ſtation and ſuccour the wings, leſt the Spaniards that were in the centre of the Roman army ſhould advance to attack them; ſo neither were they able, on the other hand, to do any thing in their poſt againſt the Spaniards, becauſe the latter

latter were ſtill at too great a diſtance from them. Thus the action was maintained by the wings alone; and, as the whole ſtreſs of the battle lay upon them, was for ſome time maintained on both ſides with equal bravery. But when the ſun had now gained his greateſt height, the Carthaginians, who had been brought haſtily into the field, and before they had taken any repaſt, began to faint under the heat. The Romans, on the other hand, not only were ſuperior in vigour and in ſpirit, but derived alſo another advantage from the prudence of their General, who had oppoſed the ſtrongeſt part of his army to the weakeſt in that of the enemy. Aſdrubal therefore, unable any longer to reſiſt, at firſt retreated ſlowly, and in good order. But after a ſhort time, his whole army, turning their backs together, ran in crouds to the foot of the mountain: and from thence, being ſtill violently preſſed, they fled in diſorder into their camp. And indeed, if ſome deity had not interpoſed to ſave them, they muſt afterwards have been driven alſo out of their intrenchments. But ſuddenly the face of the heavens was changed; and the rain deſcended in ſuch violent and continual torrents, that the Romans were ſcarcely able to return back again to their camp.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The manner in which Scipio ſuppreſſed and puniſhed a ſedition that had happened in the Roman army.

THOUGH Scipio had now gained a ſufficient experience in affairs, he was thrown however by this revolt into a ſtate of great irreſolution and perplexity. Nor was this indeed without good reaſon. For as, in the caſe of the human body, the cauſes of external injuries, of thoſe for example which ariſe form heat and cold, from fatigue or wounds, may either be guarded againſt before they happen, or afterwards be remedied without much difficulty; while the diſorders on the other hand which which are bred in the body itſelf, ulcers and diſeaſes, are neither eaſily foreſeen, nor eaſy to be cured; juſt ſo it happens with reſpect to governments and armies. When they are attacked by any enemy from without, if the neceſſary attention only be employed, it is no hard thing to

to take the meaſures that are requiſite for their ſecurity and defence. But to appeaſe the violence of inteſtine factions, to quell popular tumults and ſeditions, is a work of the greateſt difficulty; and ſuch as requires a very uncommon exertion both of addreſs and prudence. There is one precaution however, which, in my judgment, would be greatly ſerviceable in the caſe of ſtates and armies, as well as in human bodies: and that is, not to ſuffer in any of them a too long continuance in lazineſs and inactivity; eſpecially when they enjoy the bleſſings of plenty and proſperous fortune.

Scipio then, who, beſides that ſteady application to affairs which we before have mentioned, was very ready alſo and dexterous both in thought and action, contrived the following method for remedying the diſorder that had happened. He called together the Tribunes, and told them, that the ſtipends that were demanded ſhould be paid. And, that his promiſe might gain the greater credit, he directed that the taxes, which had been before impoſed upon the cities for the ſupport of the whole army, ſhould be levied publickly and with the greateſt diligence: as if his only intention had

been, to raiſe the ſums that were now required. He ordered the Tribunes alſo to go back again to the revolted troops; and to uſe all intreaties, to engage them to return to their duty, and to come and receive their ſtipends, either ſeparately, if they ſhould chooſe that method, or all together in a body: aſſuring them alſo, that when this was done, he would then conſider in what manner all other things might be adjuſted. Agreeably to this plan, the money was collected without delay. And when Scipio was informed, that the Tribunes had diſcharged alſo their commiſſion, he aſſembled the Council together, to conſider what was moſt proper to be done. The reſult of their deliberations was; that the troops ſhould come all to New Carthage on an appointed day: that a general pardon ſhould then be granted to the multitude: but that the authors of the mutiny ſhould be puniſhed with the laſt ſeverity. Theſe were in number thirty-five.

When the day was come, and the revolted troops were now on their way towards the city, to receive their pardon and the ſtipends that were due, Scipio gave ſecret inſtructions to the ſeven Tribunes who had been before deputed to

them, to meet them as they approached: and that each of them, taking five of the ſeditious leaders, and accoſting them with a ſhew of friendſhip, ſhould preſs them to take a lodging in their quarters, or at leaſt to accept of the entertainment of a ſupper. Three days before, he had ordered the troops that were in the city to furniſh themſelves with proviſions for a conſiderable time; on pretence that they were to march, under the command of Marcus againſt Andobalis who had revolted. The ſeditious, being informed alſo of this order, were filled with ſtill greater confidence. For they perſuaded themſelves, that, as the reſt of the army would be removed, they ſhould have all things in their own power, as ſoon as they ſhould join the General.

When they were now ready to enter the city, Scipio ſent orders to the other troops, that they ſhould begin their march with all their baggage very early in the morning on the following day. But the Tribunes and the Prefects were at the ſame time ſecretly commanded, to ſend the baggage forwards as ſoon as they ſhould come out of the city, but to keep the ſoldiers in arms near the gate; to divide them afterwards into parties

parties at every gate; and to be careful that none of the ſeditious ſhould come out of the city. The Tribunes, who had been appointed to receive the ſeditious leaders, met them as they arrived; and, having accoſted them with much civility, carried them to their houſes. The order given to them was, that they ſhould immediately ſecure the perſons of theſe men; and, when ſupper was ended, ſhould bind them, and keep them ſafe: and that no perſon afterwards ſhould be ſuffered to go out of the houſes; except only a meſſenger from each to acquaint the General that the thing was done. This order was punctually obſerved and executed. On the morrow, when the day appeared, and the ſeditious had already begun to come in crouds towards the Forum, Scipio ordered the aſſembly to be called. As ſoon as the ſignal was made, the ſoldiers ran together, according to their cuſtom; expecting eagerly to ſee again their General, and to hear what he would ſay to them on the preſent occaſion. Scipio then ſent orders to the Tribunes who were without the gates, that they ſhould bring the troops in arms, and ſurround the aſſembly. At the ſame time he preſented himſelf before

fore them; and in the inſtant, by his very firſt appearance, filled them with extreme confuſion. For they had ſuppoſed him to be broken with diſeaſe; and they behold him vigorous and ſtrong. His very aſpect therefore, ſo different from all that they had conceived, ſtruck them at once with ſurprize and terror. He then began his diſcourſe to them in the following manner.

He could not, he ſaid, but wonder, what motives, either of expectation or diſguſt, had led them into this revolt. That men uſually rebelled againſt their country and their leaders, either becauſe they were diſſatisfied with the conduct of thoſe who held the ſupreme command; or were diſpleaſed with the condition of affairs; or laſtly perhaps, becauſe they were ambitious of ſome greater fortune, and had filled their minds with aſpiring hopes. Tell me then, continued he, to which of all theſe cauſes is your revolt to be aſcribed? Is it with me that you are offended, becauſe the payment of your ſtipends has been ſo long delayed? The fault however is not mine: for, during the whole time of my command, your ſtipends have been always fully paid. If it be Rome then

that

that is in fault, and having neglected to diſcharge your former arrears, was it juſt that you ſhould ſhew this reſentment? taking arms againſt your country; and declaring yourſelves the enemies of her who had bred and nouriſhed you? How much better would it have been, to have made me the judge of your complaints; and to have intreated your friends to join together in obtaining for you the relief which you deſired? When mercenary troops indeed, who have no other object but their pay, deſert the ſervice in which they are engaged, ſuch a conduct, in certain circumſtances, may perhaps be excuſed. But in men who fight for themſelves, their wives, and children, this defection is a moſt unpardonable crime. It is no other indeed, than if a ſon, on pretence that his parent had defrauded him in ſettling an account, ſhould go armed to take away the life of him, from whom himſelf had received his being. Or will you ſay then, that I have employed you in more painful duties, or expoſed you more frequently to danger than the reſt; and have given to others the advantages of the war, and the chief part of all the booty? You dare not ſay, that I have ever made this diſ-

distinction: and, if you dare, you cannot shew the proof, To what part of my conduct then can you impute the cause of your revolt? Speak, for I wish to be informed. There is not one among you that is able to declare, not one among you that can even form to himself in thought, the least matter of offence against me. Nor is it again in the condition of affairs, that you can find any reasonable ground of discontent. For when were all things in a more prosperous state? At what time was Rome distinguished by so many victories? At what period were her soldiers flattered with a fairer prospect? But some of you perhaps are diffident of these appearances, and have fixed your hopes upon greater advantages, to be found among our enemies. And who are these enemies? Mandonius and Andobalis? Do not all of you then know, that, when they first joined our army, they broke their treaty with the Carthaginians: and that now again they have no less violated the most solemn oaths, by commencing new hostilities against us? How honourable is it for you to place a confidence in men like these; and to become, for their sakes, the enemies of your country.

You

You had ſurely never any hopes, that with ſuch allies you could render yourſelves the maſters of Spain. Neither aſſiſted by Andobalis, nor ſeparately by yourſelves, would you ever be able to ſtand in the field againſt our forces. What then was your deſign? Let me hear it only from yourſelves. Is it the ſkill, the courage of thoſe leaders, whom you have choſen to command you, that has filled you with this confidence? Or thoſe rods and axes, which are carried in ſolemn ſtate before them; and which it even is ſhameful for me now to mention? No, ſoldiers, theſe are not the cauſes: nor can you offer even the ſmalleſt matter of complaint, either againſt me, or againſt your country. I muſt endeavour then to juſtify your conduct, both to Rome and to myſelf, by thoſe common principles, the truth of which is acknowledged by all mankind. The multitude is eaſily deceived; is impelled by the ſmalleſt force to every ſide; and, in a word, is ſuſceptible upon all occaſions of the ſame agitations as the ſea. For as the latter, though in itſelf it is calm and ſtable, and carries no face of danger, is no ſooner ſet in motion by ſome violent blaſt, than it reſembles the winds them-

themſelves which raiſe and ruffle it; in the ſame manner the multitude alſo aſſumes an aſpect, conformable to the deſigns and temper of thoſe leaders, by whoſe counſels it is ſwayed and agitated. From this conſideration, all the officers of the army and myſelf have reſolved to pardon your offence, and to engage our promiſe, that no remembrance of it ever ſhall remain. But to thoſe who excited you to this revolt we are inexorable. The crime which they have committed, both againſt us, and againſt their country, ſhall be puniſhed with the ſeverity which it deſerves."

As ſoon as he had ended this diſcourſe, the troops that had ſurrounded the aſſembly in arms, upon a ſignal given, claſhed their ſwords againſt their bucklers; and at the ſame time the ſeditious leaders were brought in, bound and naked. And while ſome of them were ſcourged, and ſome beheaded, the whole multitude was ſo ſtruck with terror, both by the danger that incompaſſed them, and by the diſmal ſpectacle that was before their eyes, that not one among them changed his countenance, or uttered a ſingle word; but all of them ſtood fixed in ſilent aſtoniſhment and dread. The leaders, being thus put to death, were

dragged through the midſt of the aſſembly. The General then, and all the officers, gave a ſolemn aſſurance to the reſt, that their fault ſhould never be remembered. The ſoldiers, approaching one by one, renewed their oath before the Tribunes; that they would be obedient to their chiefs, and not engage in any deſigns againſt their country. In this manner Scipio by his great prudence ſtifled a danger in its birth, which might have grown to be extremely formidable; and reſtored again his army to its former ſtate.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The revolt of Andobalis. Scipio marches againſt that prince; defeats him in an engagement; and finiſhes the war in Spain.

SCIPIO, having called together without delay, and in the city of New Carthage, an aſſembly of all the troops, communicated to them the daring deſigns of Andobalis, and his perfidy towards them. Upon theſe topics he ſpoke ſo largely, that the minds of the ſoldiers were ſharpened in the higheſt degree againſt that prince. Having then enumerated the many battles in which the Romans had been engaged, againſt the united forces of the Spaniards and the Carthaginians, with Carthaginian leaders alſo at their head; it would be abſurd, he ſaid, to think, when they had been always conquerors in thoſe actions, that they could fail to obtain the victory againſt the Spaniards alone, commanded by Andobalis. That, upon this account, he would not have recourſe to the aſſiſtance of any of the Spaniards, but would em-

ploy the Romans only in the preſent expedition: that from thence it might be known to all, that it was not by the ſtrength of the Spaniſh forces, as ſome pretended, that the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain; but that the Roman ſpirit alone, and the Roman bravery, had conquered both the Carthaginians and the Spaniards. "Baniſh then, continued he, from among you all diſſenſion: and, if ever you have engaged in any war with confidence, let me exhort you now to aſſume it. With regard to the ſucceſs, myſelf, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, will take ſuch meaſures as ſhall ſecure the victory." This diſcourſe inſpired ſuch ardour into all the army, that by their countenance they ſeemed as if they were already in ſight of the enemy, and waiting only for the ſignal to engage. He then diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

On the following day he began his march: and arriving in ten days upon the banks of the Iberus, he paſſed the river on the fourth day afterwards, and encamped near to the enemy, having before him a valley which ſeparated the two camps. On the next day, having ordered Lælius to hold the cavalry in readineſs

and

and ſome Tribunes to prepare the light-armed forces for action, he drove ſome of the cattle that followed the army into the valley; and, when the Spaniards ran haſtily to ſeize this prey, ſent a part of the light-armed to attack them. The action was ſoon begun; and, as greater numbers advanced on either ſide to ſupport the firſt, a ſharp and general ſkirmiſhing enſued. But Lælius, who ſtood ready with his cavalry, perceiving the occaſion to be favourable, fell ſuddenly upon the enemy; and, having cut off alſo their retreat at the foot of the mountain, deſtroyed a great part of the Spaniards who were diſperſed through the valley. The barbarians, enraged by the loſs which they had ſuſtained, and dreading leſt they ſhould ſeem to be diſheartened, and to have ſuffered an intire defeat, drew out all their army as ſoon as the morning appeared, and reſolved to engage in a general battle. Scipio on his part was no leſs ready. But as he perceived that the Spaniards ſhewed ſo little ſkill and judgment, that they deſcended with all their forces into the valley, and ranged their infantry as well as their cavalry upon the plain, he waited for ſome time, that as great a number of them as

was poſſible might come down. For though he placed great confidence in his cavalry, he depended ſtill more upon his infantry; becauſe the latter, both from their bravery, and from the manner alſo in which they were armed, were far ſuperior to the Spaniards, in cloſe and ſet engagements. When he ſaw then, that as great a number had come down as he deſired, he advanced in order of battle againſt that part of the Spaniſh army which was poſted near to the foot of the mountain; and ſent away four cohorts, drawn up in cloſe order, to attack the infantry in the valley. At the ſame time Lælius, having led his cavalry along the hills that extended from the camp to the valley, fell upon the cavalry of the enemy in their rear, and kept them cloſely engaged. The Spaniſh infantry, being in this manner deprived of the aſſiſtance of the cavalry, by which they had expected to be ſupported, were unable to maintain the fight. The cavalry alſo laboured under no leſs diſadvantage. Confined within a narrow ground, and diſordered by the difficulties of their ſituation, they killed more of their own men than the Romans killed. For they were preſſed in flank by their own infantry; by the Roman

Roman infantry in front; and by the Roman cavalry in their rear. Such then was the courſe of this engagement. The Spaniards who had come down into the valley were almoſt all of them deſtroyed: and the reſt that were drawn up near the foot of the hills ſought their ſafety in flight. Theſe were the light-armed troops, which compoſed about a third part of the army. Among theſe Andobalis found means to eſcape; and fled to a certain fortified place. The war in Spain being thus intirely finiſhed, Scipio returned back to Taraco full of joy: having atchieved for his country a glorious conqueſt, and ſecured to himſelf the honour of a ſplendid triumph. Being then deſirous to be preſent at the election of Conſuls, as ſoon as he had regulated all things in Spain, he committed the care of the army to Marcus and Syllanus, and ſailed away with Lælius and the reſt of his friends to Rome.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

Antiochus concludes a treaty with Euthydemus; and returns from his expedition into the upper provinces of Asia.

EUTHYDEMUS, who was himself a native of Magnesia, endeavoured to justify his conduct, and said, that Antiochus had no reason for attempting to deprive him of his kingdom; since he never had rebelled against him, but had only obtained possession of Bactriana, by destroying the descendants of those who had before revolted. He insisted long upon this point; and intreated Teleas to meditate for him with Antiochus; that hostilities might cease, and that he might be allowed to retain the name of king. He urged, that such a reconciliation was even necessary for their common safety. That those wandering tribes, who were spread in great numbers along the borders of the province, were alike dangerous to them both; and that, if ever they should gain admittance into it, the whole country must inevitably fall into a state of barbarism.

bariſm. With theſe inſtructions he ſent back Teleas to the king.

Antiochus, who had been long deſirous of putting an end to the war, acknowledged the force of theſe reaſons, and declared himſelf willing to accept the peace that was offered. And when Teleas had gone and returned again many times, Euthydemus at laſt ſent his own ſon Demetrius to ratify the treaty. The king received him favourably; and judging by his appearance and his converſation, as well as by a certain air of majeſty that was conſpicuous in his perſon, that the young man was worthy of a kingdom, he promiſed to give him one of his daughters in marriage, and to ſuffer his father to retain the name of king. The reſt of the treaty was expreſſed in writing, and the alliance confirmed by oaths.

After this tranſaction, Antiochus, having firſt diſtributed a large quantity of corn among his troops, and taken the elephants that belonged to Euthydemus, began his march with all his army. Paſſing mount Caucaſus, he came into India, and renewed his alliance with Sophagaſenus the Indian king. In this place he obtained more elephants; ſo that his whole

whole number was now a hundred and fifty: and having furniſhed his army alſo with a new ſupply of corn, he again decamped; but left Androſthenes behind him, to receive the money which the king had engaged to pay. He then traverſed the province of Arachoſia; and, having paſſed the river Erymanthus, and advanced through Drangiana into Carmania, as the winter now approached, he ſent his troops into quarters. Such was the end of the expedition of Antiochus into the upper provinces of Aſia: an expedition, which ſecured to him the obedience not only of thoſe provinces, but of all the maritime cities, and all the princes likewiſe that were on this ſide of mount Taurus; covered his own proper kingdom againſt invaſion, and gave to all mankind the higheſt opinion both of his courage and his love of labour. For from this time, not the people of Aſia only, but thoſe alſo of Europe, conſidered him as a prince that was moſt worthy to reign.

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the TWELFTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The miſtakes of Timæus in his accounts of Africk, and of Corſica. The manner of conducting herds of ſwine in Italy and in Greece.

AFRICK is indeed a country of wonderful fertility. How blameable then is Timæus, who not only neglected to acquire a proper knowledge in theſe matters, but with a childiſh weakneſs, deſtitute of judgement, and truſting to the credit of ancient ſtories, which have been long

long ago exploded, repreſents this whole part of the world as a dry and barren ſand, incapable of producing any fruits. Nor is this country leſs remarkable with reſpect to the animals with which it abounds. For not only horſes and oxen, but ſheep alſo and goats, are found in it in greater numbers, than any other part of the world perhaps can ſhew. Upon this account it is, that many of the inhabitants of this vaſt country, neglecting the cultivation of the lands, live upon the fleſh of their cattle, and among their cattle. Every one alſo knows, that Africk breeds elephants, lions, and leopards, in great numbers, and of a ſurpriſing ſtrength; together with buffaloes, which are extremely beautiful, and oſtriches of an enormous ſize; and that none of theſe animals are found in any part of Europe. But Timæus is ſilent with reſpect to all theſe things; and ſeems indeed as if he had deſigned to give ſuch a deſcription of this country as ſhould be moſt contrary to the truth.

The ſame want alſo of exactneſs and fidelity appears in his account of Corſica. Speaking of this iſland in his ſecond book, he ſays; that the goats, the ſheep, and the oxen, which are found in great

numbers upon it, are all of them wild, as well as the deer, the hares, the wolves, and other animals; and that the inhabitants hunt them with dogs, and pafs their whole lives in that employment. Now it is certain, that there is not any fuch thing in the ifland as a wild goat or ox; nor even a hare, a wolf, or a deer, or any other animal that is wild; except only fome foxes, fome rabbits, and a fort of wild fheep. The rabbit, at a diftance, appears to be a hare of a fmaller fize: but when taken, is found to be very different from the hare, both in figure and tafte. This creature lives chiefly under the ground. It is true indeed that the animals in this ifland all appear to be wild: and the reafon is this. As the ifland is rough and rocky, and covered alfo with woods, the fhepherds are not able to follow their cattle into the places in which they are difperfed: but, when they have found a convenient pafture, and are defirous of bringing them together, they found a trumpet. Upon this fignal, the whole herd immediately run together, and follow the call of their own fhepherd, never miftaking one for another. When ftrangers therefore come upon the ifland, and attempt to take any

of

of the goats or oxen which they ſee feeding by themſelves, the cattle, not uſed to be approached, immediately fly. And if the ſhepherd, perceiving what has happened, at the ſame time ſounds his trumpet, they all run towards him with the greateſt haſte. From hence it is that they are ſuppoſed to be wild: and Timæus, having made only a ſlight and curſory inquiry, has fallen into the ſame miſtake.

That the cattle ſhould be thus obedient to the ſound of a trumpet, is no very wonderful thing. In Italy, thoſe who have the care of ſwine never incloſe them in ſeparate paſtures, nor follow them behind, as the cuſtom is among the Greeks; but go always before them, and from time to time ſound a horn. The ſwine follow, and run together at the ſound: and are ſo taught by habit to diſtinguiſh their own proper horn, that their exactneſs in this reſpect appears almoſt incredible to thoſe who never heard of it before. As the conſumption of theſe animals is very great in Italy, the herds that are raiſed to ſatisfy the demand are alſo very numerous; though fewer indeed than they were in ancient Italy, when the country was poſſeſſed by the Tyrrhe-

Tyrrhenians and the Gauls. At this time however, a thouſand hogs, and ſometimes a greater number, are reared from a ſingle ſow. In the morning they are turned out of their pens, in different troops, according to their breed and age. But when the herds meet together, it is not poſſible to keep them thus diſtinct; or to prevent them from being mingled one with another, either when they leave their pens, or as they feed in the paſtures, or when they return back again at night. The horn therefore was invented, as a method of ſeparating them without any difficulty. For as ſoon as the conductors go to different ſides, and ſound their horns, the herds ſeparate themſelves each from the reſt; and run all of them with ſuch alacrity to the ſound of their own horn, that no violence is ſufficient to ſtop them in their courſe. In Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet together in the foreſts, he who has the moſt numerous herd, whenever he finds a proper opportunity, drives away the cattle of his neighbour, which are thus mingled with his own. Or ſome robber perhaps, who has waited in ambuſcade, carries away a whole herd unperceived;

ceived; if the ſwine, as it often happens, have wandered too far from their conductor, in ſearch of the acorns when they begin to fall. But this is ſufficient upon this ſubject.

EX-

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The account given by Ariſtotle of the Locrians of Italy is confirmed by the cuſtoms and traditions which are found among that people.

I HAVE often viſited the Locrians, and have even performed for them ſome conſiderable ſervice. It was through my requeſt, that they were excuſed from attending the Roman armies into Spain; and from furniſhing the ſuccours which they were bound to ſend to the Romans by ſea, in their war againſt the Illyrians. Upon theſe accounts, conſidering me as a perſon whoſe good offices had exempted them from much fatigue, as well as from great danger and expence, they have always treated me with ſingular reſpect and honour. I ſhould certainly therefore be inclined, rather to ſpeak favourably of this people, than otherwiſe. Yet I cannot heſitate to declare, that the account, which Ariſtotle has delivered to us concerning this colony, is nearer to

the truth, than that which is reported by Timæus. The Locrians themſelves have indeed aſſured me, that their own traditions are more conformable to the account of Ariſtotle, than to that of Timæus. Of this they mention the following proofs.

The firſt is, that all nobility of anceſtry among them is derived from women, and not from men. That thoſe, for example, alone are noble, who draw their origin from the hundred families. That theſe families were noble among the Locrians, before they migrated: and were the ſame indeed, from which a hundred virgins were taken by lot, as the oracle had commanded, and were ſent to Troy. That ſome women of theſe families came with the colony into Italy: and that thoſe who have deſcended from them are ſtill reputed noble, and are called the deſcendants of the hundred families.

Another inſtance is ſeen, in the appointment of the virgin called the Phialephorus. The account which the Locrians give of the inſtitution is this. At the time when they drove the Sicilians out of this part of Italy, the latter had a cuſtom of appointing a young man, who was choſen always from the nobleſt and

the moſt illuſtrious of their families, to lead the proceſſion in their ſacrifices. The Locrians, not having received any religious ceremonies from their own nation, adopted many of thoſe that were uſed by the people with whom they were mixed, and among others this that is here mentioned. But they changed it in one circumſtance. For, inſtead of a young man, they appointed a virgin to perform the office; becauſe nobility among them was derived from women.

The ſame people affirm, that they never had any treaty with the Locrians of Greece, and that there was no account remaining among them of any ſuch treaty: but that they know by conſtant tradition that they had a treaty with the Sicilians, which was executed in the following manner. When they came firſt into the country, and found that the Sicilians were ſtruck with terror, and made no attempt to oppoſe their entrance, they concluded a convention with them in theſe words. "That they would live together as friends, and poſſeſs the country in common, as long as they ſhould tread upon this earth, and carry the heads upon their ſhoulders." But the Locrians, at the time of taking this oath, had put ſome earth within the ſoles of their

ſhoes, and ſome heads of garlick, which appeared not in ſight, upon their ſhoulders. And having afterwards ſhaken the earth out of their ſhoes, and thrown away the heads, they ſeized the firſt favourable opportunity, and in a ſhort time drove the Sicilians out of the country.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

An observation concerning truth and falsehood in History.

TIMÆUS says, that, as a rule, which is perhaps defective either in length or breadth, is still a rule, and deserves to be so called, if it be only strait and even; and, if it wants this chief and most essential property, ought to be called any thing rather than a rule; in the same manner those written memoirs which record events, however faulty they may be in stile and disposition, and however defective in some necessary properties, yet, if the facts be true which are related, deserve to be called a History, and, if these be false, are utterly unworthy of that name. For my part, I am ready to acknowledge, that truth should be considered as the principal and most essential part in all such composition. I have even said in a former part of this work, that as an animal, when deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions, so,

if we take away truth from Hiſtory, what remains will be nothing but an uſeleſs tale. But there are two kinds of falſehood: one, which proceeds from ignorance; and the other from deſign. And as thoſe writers may be excuſed, who offend againſt the truth through ignorance; ſo thoſe on the contrary, who pervert it with deſign, ought never to be pardoned.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The malignity of Timæus cenſured.

WHEN men of ſenſe revenge an injury, they examine in the firſt place, what puniſhment it becomes them to inflict, and not what their enemies deſerve to ſuffer. In the ſame manner alſo, when we throw reproaches upon others, we ought principally to conſider, not what is fit for them to hear, but what is proper for us to ſpeak. For if our own paſſion and reſentment be the rule, we ſhall ſet no bounds to what we ſay; but muſt fall into the moſt unwarrantable exceſs.

Upon this account it is, that I cannot allow any degree of credit to Timæus, in the things which he has reported againſt Democharés. His calumnies are indeed ſo groſs, that they are neither to be admitted, nor excuſed. They ſhew too plainly, that the natural acrimony of his own temper has tranſported him beyond all the bounds of decency. Nor is the account which he has given of Agatho-

cles, how much ſoever that prince may have exceeded all other tyrants in impiety, in any degree more juſtifiable. For in the concluſion of his hiſtory he writes; that Agathocles from his earlieſt youth was a common proſtitute, obedient to the call of the moſt debauched: that he was a jay and a buzzard; ready to act or to ſuffer, with all that offered, in the moſt infamous luſt: and that, when he died, his wife, as ſhe lamented over him, uſed theſe exclamations: "What have not I for you? What have not you for me?" In this inſtance again, not only the ſame ſpirit is diſcernible, which appeared in his cenſure of Democharés; but ſuch an exceſs alſo of rancour, as is indeed aſtoniſhing. For, from the facts which Timæus himſelf has mentioned, it is evident that Agathocles was endowed by nature with very extraordinary talents. To leave the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and to come to Syracuſe at the age of eighteen years; to follow his deſign with ſuch ſucceſs, as in a ſhort time to become maſter of all Sicily; to render himſelf formidable and dangerous to Carthage; and laſtly, to grow old in the ſovereignty which he had gained, and to die with the title of king; are not theſe

moſt

moſt ſignal proofs, that he was born with wonderful abilities, and poſſeſſed all the powers that are requiſite for the adminiſtration of great affairs? The hiſtorian then, inſtead of confining himſelf to thoſe actions which might ſerve to vilify Agathocles, and render him odious in the eyes of poſterity, ſhould have inſiſted likewiſe upon thoſe parts of his conduct that were worthy of praiſe. For this is indeed the proper office of hiſtory. But Timæus, blinded by his own rancourous ſpirit, takes a malignant pleaſure in recounting with exaggeration the defects of this prince, but paſſes haſtily over all his ſhining qualities: and ſeems not to have known, that to ſuppreſs facts in hiſtory, is no leſs a kind of falſehood, than to report what never had exiſtence.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

A law of Zaleucus concerning the occupancy of a thing conteſted. A remarkable inſtitution of the ſame lawgiver.

TWO young men among the Locrians had a conteſt together concerning a ſlave. One of them had for a long time had him in his poſſeſſion. The other, two days only before the ſuit, went into the country, took away the boy by force in the abſence of his maſter, and carried him to his own houſe. The maſter, as ſoon as he was informed of what had happened, went to the houſe, and, getting his ſlave again into his hands, carried him before the judges, and contended, that, upon his giving ſureties, the boy ought to remain with him, till the right ſhould be determined. For the law of Zaleucus, he ſaid, declared; that the thing conteſted ſhould remain, during the ſuit, in the poſſeſſion of him from whom it was taken. The other young man inſiſted on the other hand, that, by this

this very law, the boy ought to be left with him: becauſe he was the perſon from whom he was taken; and that it was from his houſe that he was brought before the judges. The judges, conceiving that there was ſome difficulty in the caſe, went and referred it to the Coſmopolite: and this magiſtrate explained the law in the following manner. He ſaid, that by the words, "from whom it was taken," was to be underſtood the perſon who had laſt held an undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the thing in diſpute for a certain time: but that, if any one ſhould come and take away a thing by force from another, and carry it to his own houſe, and the firſt poſſeſſor ſhould come afterwards and take it from him again, the perſon, from whom it laſt was taken, was not the perſon intended by the law. The young man, againſt whom the judgment was given, was diſſatisfied with this interpretation, and denied it to be the ſenſe of the legiſlator. The Coſmopolite then demanded, whether any one would diſpute with him concerning the intention of the law, in the manner which Zeleucus had preſcribed. The manner was, that the two diſputants ſhould ſpeak, each with a rope round his neck, in the preſence

preſence of a thouſand perſons: and that he, who ſhould be judged to have contended for a wrong interpretation, ſhould be ſtrangled in ſight of the aſſembly. The young man replied, that the condition was not equal. For the Coſmopolite, who was almoſt ninety years old, had only two or three years left to live: but that himſelf, in all appearance, had ſtill the greateſt part of his life before him. This facetious anſwer turned the whole matter into pleaſantry: and the judges gave their ſentence according to the opinion of the Coſmopolite.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The groſs abſurdities of Calliſthenes, in his deſcription of the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

IN order to ſhew the truth of what I have affirmed, I ſhall examine only one ſingle battle: a battle, which is very much celebrated; which happened at no very diſtant time; and, becauſe this alſo is a circumſtance of the greateſt moment, a battle in which Calliſthenes himſelf was preſent. I mean the battle which was fought between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

In the account then which Calliſthenes has given of this battle, he relates; that Alexander had already led his army thro' the paſſes which are called the Pylæ of Cilicia, when Darius, having advanced along the paſſes of the mountain Amanus, and being informed by the people of the country, that his enemy ſtill continued his march forwards into Syria, reſolved to follow him. That when he arrived near the paſſes of Cilicia, he encamped

camped along the river Pyramus: that the ground which he occupied contained a ſpace of only fourteen ſtadia from the ſea to the foot of the mountain: and that the river, falling down the craggy ſides of the mountain, ran obliquely through this ground, and paſſing over the plain, between ſome hills that were rough and difficult of approach, diſcharged itſelf into the ſea. After this deſcription, he ſays; that, when Alexander returned back again with a deſign to engage, Darius and his officers drew up the whole phalanx in order of battle upon the very ground upon which they had encamped; and that they were covered in front by the river, which ran cloſe to the camp: that they poſted the cavalry near to the ſea: next to theſe, in the ſame line, the mercenaries, along the bank of the river: and laſtly the Peltaſtæ, adjoining to the foot of the mountain.

But it is not poſſible to conceive, that theſe troops could have been thus drawn up in order of battle between the phalanx and the river, if the river ran cloſe to the camp: eſpecially if we conſider the numbers of which the ſeveral bodies were compoſed. For the cavalry, as Calliſthenes himſelf affirms, amounted to

thirty

thirty thouſand; and the mercenaries to as great a number. Now it is eaſy to determine, what extent of ground this number of troops would require. The uſual method of drawing up cavalry in the time of action is to range them eight in depth. It is neceſſary alſo to leave a certain ſpace between each of the troops in front, that they may be able to perform their ſeveral motions. A ſingle ſtadium then will contain eight hundred horſe; ten ſtadia eight thouſand; and four ſtadia, three thouſand and two hundred. According to this computation, a body of eleven thouſand and two hundred horſe would have filled the whole extent of fourteen ſtadia. And if the whole thirty thouſand were formed in order of battle, there muſt have been three ſuch bodies, within a very ſmall number at leaſt, drawn up each behind the other. In what place then were the mercenaries ranged? Was it behind the cavalry? But Calliſthenes ſays no ſuch thing. On the contrary he affirms, that the mercenaries were engaged againſt the Macedonians in the very beginning of the action. It is manifeſt therefore, that one half of the ground that has been mentioned, the part that was on the ſide of the ſea, was occupied

occupied by the cavalry; and the other half, which was next to the mountain, by the mercenaries. And from hence we may clearly judge, what muſt have been the depth of the cavalry; and, by conſequence, how very diſtant the river muſt have been from the camp.

Afterwards he relates, that, when the enemy approached, Darius, who was in the centre of the line, called the mercenaries to him from one of the wings. But how was this poſſible? The very part in which the mercenaries were joined to the cavalry was itſelf the centre. If Darius then was among the mercenaries, how, or from whence, or to what place did he call them? He then adds alſo, that the cavalry upon the right wing advanced, and vigorouſly charged the Macedonians: that the latter received them with equal courage; and that the fight on both ſides was maintained with the greateſt bravery. But he forgets that there was a river between this cavalry and the Macedonians; and ſuch a river too, as he had juſt before deſcribed.

Nor is this writer more exact in his account with reſpect to Alexander. He ſays, that this prince firſt carried with him into Aſia forty thouſand foot, and four

four thouſand five hundred horſe: and that, when he was ready to enter Cilicia, a new ſupply arrived from Macedon, of five thouſand foot, and eight hundred horſe. If we take then from theſe three thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe; which is the greateſt number that can be allowed for occaſional and abſent ſervices; there will remain forty-two thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe. With this army Alexander, as the hiſtorian writes, being informed, after he had advanced beyond the Pylæ, that Darius had entered Cilicia, and was at the diſtance of only a hundred ſtadia behind him, immediately returned, and directed his march back again through the paſſes: having the infantry in his van; behind theſe, the cavalry; and the baggage in the rear. As ſoon as he came into the open plain, he ſeparated the army from the baggage, and formed the troops into a phalanx, by thirty-two in depth. At ſome diſtance afterwards, he ranged them by ſixteen in depth: and at laſt, when he was come near to the enemy, by eight.

Now theſe abſurdities are even greater than thoſe that were before remarked. For when a body of troops marches by ſixteen in depth, if we allow the uſual

intervals of ſix feet between every rank, a ſtadium will contain only ſixteen hundred men; ten ſtadia, ſixteen thouſand; and twenty ſtadia, thirty-two thouſand. If Alexander therefore formed his phalanx by ſixteen in depth, he muſt have filled a ſpace of twenty ſtadia, and would ſtill have wanted room for all his cavalry, and for ten thouſand of his foot. Calliſthenes then adds, that when this prince was at the diſtance of forty ſtadia from the enemy, he ordered the phalanx to advance in an extended front towards them. A greater abſurdity than this is ſcarcely to be conceived. For where is the ground, eſpecially in Cilicia, that will admit ſuch a phalanx as is here deſcribed to advance in an extended front againſt an enemy: a ground, containing twenty ſtadia in depth, and forty in length? The impediments alſo, which would inevitably break the order of ſuch a diſpoſition, are too many to be recounted. Calliſthenes himſelf has mentioned one, which is alone ſufficient. For he ſays, that the torrents, which deſcended from the hills, had formed ſo many pits in the plain, that the greateſt part of the Perſians were loſt in thoſe cavities as they fled.

But

But Alexander, perhaps this writer might ſay, was willing to be ready to receive the enemy, in what part ſoever they ſhould come to attack him. But nothing is more unfit for this purpoſe than the phalanx formed in an extended front, if this front be broken and diſunited. And would it not alſo have been much more eaſy, to have ranged the ſeveral parts of this great body in the very order in which they followed each of them the other in the march: inſtead of forming the whole army in a ſingle line, in which there muſt have been many vacancies, and leading it in an extended front to action, over a ground that was covered with buſhes and broken cavities. He ought rather then to have formed a double, or a quadruple phalanx. One part following behind another. For if the ground would have admitted this order in the march, there would have been time ſufficient to draw up the troops in the ſame order in battle: eſpecially as he might have received notice from his ſcouts of the approach of the enemy, even while they were at a conſiderable diſtance from him.

Another fault in this deſcription is, that the hiſtorian, while he repreſents the phalanx as advancing in an extended

front over a plain, forgets to make the cavalry march before; and places them upon the ſame line with the infantry. But the greateſt of all his miſtakes is this which follows. He ſays that Alexander, when he approached the enemy, drew up the phalanx eight in depth. The whole line therefore muſt have been equal in length to forty ſtadia. Or, let it be ſuppoſed, that the men ſtood ſo cloſe together, as even to be wedged one within another. In that caſe, they muſt have covered at the leaſt twenty ſtadia. And yet Calliſthenes had before affirmed, that the whole length of the ground was leſs than fourteen ſtadia: that a part of it, which was neareſt to the ſea, was occupied by one half of the cavalry: that the other half was poſted upon the right: and that between the whole line and the mountain there was left alſo a conſiderable diſtance; that the troops might not fall under a body of the enemy, which was poſted upon the ſides of the mountain. I know indeed, that, in order to oppoſe this body, he here forms a part of the line in the figure called the Forceps. Let us allow then ten thouſand men; which is even a greater number than this purpoſe would require. In that caſe it is evident,

evident, that there would remain, according to Calliſthenes, eleven ſtadia only at the moſt, for the length of the whole line: and that thirty-two thouſand men, contained in a ſpace of this extent, how cloſely ſoever they were crouded, muſt neceſſarily have been formed by thirty in depth. And yet Calliſthenes affirms, that at the time of the action they were ranged by eight. Miſtakes like theſe cannot even be excuſed. For what credit is to be given to things that are impoſſible? When a writer lays down the exact meaſure of the ground, fixes the number of the men, aſcertains the diſtance of one man from another, and gives afterwards an account which is wholly incompatible with all theſe circumſtances; the falſehood is too glaring to be pardoned.

It would be tedious to examine all the errors into which this writer has fallen. One or two more however may juſt be mentioned. He ſays that Alexander took care to draw up his army in ſuch a manner, that he might himſelf be engaged againſt Darius: and that Darius alſo had at firſt the ſame intention with reſpect to Alexander; but that he afterwards altered his deſign. But he neither mentions, how theſe princes knew, in what part of

their reſpective armies they ſeverally intended to engage; nor to what other part Darius retired, after he had changed his purpoſe. How again was it poſſible for the phalanx to advance, in order of battle, up the bank of a river, which was broken and uneven, and covered alſo with buſhes in almoſt every part? Such an abſurdity can never be aſcribed to Alexander; who is acknowledged to have been trained both in the ſtudy and the exerciſe of war from his earlieſt age. It muſt therefore be imputed to the hiſtorian himſelf; who, from a want of ſkill in matters of this kind, was unable to diſtinguiſh what was poſſible to be done from that which was impracticable. But this will be ſufficient concerning Ephorus and Calliſthenes.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

Topics for a diſcourſe in praiſe of peace.

IN the firſt place, he ſays, the aſſembly may be told, that men are wakened in the morning, in the time of war by trumpets, and, in the time of peace, by the crowing of cocks. And again; that Hercules, when he inſtituted the Olympick Games, as a remiſſion after his toil, ſufficiently declared this to be his meaning: that, whenever he had brought miſchief upon any by making war, he was forced to it by neceſſity, and the commands of others; but that willingly he had never done harm to any perſon. To theſe arguments may be added the authority of the poet: who introduces Jupiter, expreſſing his diſpleaſure againſt the god of war, in the following words:

Of all the gods that in Olympus dwell,
Thou art to me moſt hateful: for in ſtrife,
In war, and battles, ever is thy joy †.

† Iliad. B. V. 890.

In another paſſage, the wiſeſt of his heroes thus exclaims:

The man who ſtirs
The bloody horrors of inteſtine war,
No rights of kindred, or of family,
No laws of juſtice knows †.

Of the ſame kind alſo are the ſentiments of Euripides, expreſſed in the following lines:

Parent of wealth, celeſtial Peace,
Thou faireſt of the heavenly train, O why,
Why this delay? Wilt thou again
Theſe longing eyes ne'er viſit? How I fear,
That age, inſenſible and cold,
My trembling limbs will ſeize, e'er I ſhall hail
The moment of thy bleſt return,
With the crown'd banquet, and the choral ſong *.

Again, it may be urged; that war reſembles a diſeaſe, and peace a ſtate of health. In one, the ſick are recovered: but the other deſtroys thoſe that are well. That in peace alſo, the old are buried by

† Iliad. B. I. 63. * Chorus from the Creſphontes.

the young, as the courſe of nature requires: but, in war, the young are buried by the old. And again; that, in the time of war, we are not ſafe within the walls of our cities; but that, in peace, there is full ſecurity, even to the fartheſt limits of the country. The other motives which he mentions are of a like kind with theſe.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

Men converſant in affairs are alone properly qualified for writing Hiſtory.

THERE are two organs given to man by nature, through which all information, and all knowledge of things is derived, the hearing and the ſight; and of theſe, the latter is by much the moſt conformable to truth. For the teſtimony of the eyes, as Heraclitus obſerves, is far more exact than that of the ears. But Timæus, in making his enquiries, had recourſe to the eaſieſt, though the leaſt preferable, of theſe two methods; and never employed his eyes, but only his ears. And even ſtill more; as the knowledge which is gained by hearing is alſo of two ſorts; the one derived from reading books, and the other from interrogating other men; Timæus, as we have already ſhewn, took no pains to obtain the latter. What determined his choice in this reſpect, is not difficult to be diſcovered. The knowledge that is acquired by reading is gained without any danger,

ger, or any kind of toil. If a man will only fix his reſidence in the neighbourhood of a library, or in a city that abounds with written memoirs, he may make his reſearches with perfect eaſe; and, repoſing himſelf with full tranquillity, may compare the accounts, and detect the errors of former writers. But the knowledge which is drawn from perſonal examination and enquiry, is attended with great fatigue and great expence. It is this however, which is the moſt important; and which gives indeed the chief value to Hiſtory. Hiſtorians themſelves are ready to acknowledge this truth. For thus Ephorus ſays; that if it was poſſible for the writers of hiſtory to be preſent at all tranſactions, ſuch knowledge would be preferable to any other. To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of Theopompus: that the experience which is gained in battles renders a man a conſummate General: that practice in pleading cauſes forms the perfect orator: and that the ſame obſervation is juſt with reſpect to the arts of navigation and of medicine. The poet alſo inculcates the ſame truth with ſtill greater force. For deſigning to ſhew, in the perſon of Ulyſſes, what

what kind of qualities would render a man fit for the adminiſtration of affairs, he deſcribes him in the following words:

Sing Muſe the man, for various arts renown'd,
Who wander'd long through may different climes.

And afterwards:

Oft through the deep with heartfelt anguiſh born,
To diſtant nations he his courſe eſſay'd,
Their cities viſited, their manners knew.

And in another place he ſays; that he had experienced

The rage of battles, and the boiſterous wave †.

Now ſuch a man alſo is it, in my judgement, that would alone be able to give a proper figure to hiſtory. It was ſaid by Plato, that human affairs would then be well adminiſtered, when philoſophers ſhould be kings, or kings philoſophers.

† Odyſſ. B. I. 1. and Iliad. B. XXIV. 8.

In

In the ſame manner I would ſay; that Hiſtory would be well compoſed, if thoſe who are engaged in great affairs would undertake to write it; not in a ſlight and negligent manner, like ſome of the preſent age; but regarding ſuch a work as one of the nobleſt and moſt neceſſary of their duties, and purſuing it with unremitted application, as the chief buſineſs of their lives: or if thoſe, on the other hand, who attempt to write, would think it neceſſary to be alſo converſant in the practice of affairs. Till this ſhall happen, there will be no end of miſtakes in hiſtory. Now Timæus never uſed the leaſt endeavours to acquire ſuch practice: but confining his reſidence to a ſingle place, in which alſo he was a ſtranger, he even induſtriouſly renounced an active life; was acquainted neither with politicks, nor war; nor ever expoſed himſelf to the fatigue of viſiting diſtant countries, and of making perſonal inquiries. And yet this man has gained the reputation of being an excellent hiſtorian. I know not, for my own part, upon what ſuch pretenſions can be grounded: eſpecially as he has himſelf acknowledged, that a good hiſtorian ſhould poſſeſs the quali-

qualifications which have been here enumerated. For, in the Preface to his ſixth book, he takes notice of an opinion which ſome perſons had advanced; that the demonſtrative kind of writing required greater genius, greater labour, and a greater ſtock of knowledge, than Hiſtory. This notion, as he ſays, had before given offence to Ephorus: and, becauſe that writer had not been able ſufficiently to refute it, he endeavours to ſtate, and to compare together, theſe two kinds of compoſition. * * * *

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the THIRTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Avarice compared to a dropſy. Deceit and artifice are too generally practiſed in publick affairs. The different conduct of the Achæans: and in ſome degree alſo of the Romans.

AS in the caſe of thoſe who are diſeaſed with a dropſy, no application of liquors from without is ſufficient to remove or allay the thirſt, unleſs the internal diſpoſition of the body be firſt changed by proper remedies; in the ſame manner alſo the deſire of gain is never to

be ſatisfied, unleſs reaſon be employed to correct the vicious inclination in the mind.

There are many who employ that dark and treacherous policy which has now been mentioned: and yet no one will deny, that ſuch a conduct is utterly unworthy of a king. But becauſe arts like theſe are now common in the world, ſome men are willing to ſuppoſe, that the practice of them is become altogether neceſſary in the adminiſtration of public affairs. The Achæans however at all times were diſtinguiſhed by different ſentiments. So far were they from forming any ſecret deſigns againſt their friends, in order to enlarge their power; that they diſdained even to ſubdue their enemies with the aſſiſtance of deceit. In their opinion, victory was neither honourable nor ſecure, unleſs it was obtained in open conteſt, and by the force of ſuperior courage. Upon this account, they eſtabliſhed it as a kind of law among them, never to uſe any concealed weapons, nor to throw darts at a diſtance: being perſuaded, that an open and cloſe engagement was the only fair method of combat. From the ſame reaſon it was, that they not only made a public declaration of war, but

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ſent notice alſo, each to the other, of their reſolution to try the fortune of a battle, and of the place likewiſe in which they had determined to engage. In the preſent times, a General is ſuppoſed to be ignorant in his profeſſion, if he diſcovers his intentions. Among the Romans alone, ſome ſlight traces of the ancient virtue ſtill remain. For they make before hand a denunciation of war: they ſeldom form ambuſcades: and they fight always man to man in cloſe engagement. But in general artifice ſo much prevails, that it is now become the chief ſtudy of men to deceive each other, both in the adminiſtration of civil affairs, and in the conduct of war. And this it was which gave occaſion to theſe reflections.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The designs of Philip against the Rhodians. The character of Heraclides.

PHILIP, being willing to give a proper subject to Heraclides for the exercise of his abilities, commanded him to contrive some method for disabling or destroying the Rhodian fleet; and at the same time sent some ambassadours to Crete, to excite the people of that island against the Rhodians, and prevail with them to join him in the war. Heraclides, whose nature was well adapted to any ill design, received this commission with joy: and, after some time employed in regulating his plan, sailed away to Rhodes. This Heraclides was originally from Tarentum; and was born of vulgar parents, who exercised some mechanical trade. He possessed all the qualities that are requisite to form a daring and licentious profligate. From his earliest age he abandoned himself to the most scandalous prostitution. He had a ready conception,

tion, and a ſtrong memory: was bold and terrible to his inferiors, but a baſe flatterer of thoſe who were above him. He had firſt been forced to leave Tarentum, on account of a ſuſpicion that was entertained againſt him, as if he had deſigned to betray the place to the Romans. Not that he at that time poſſeſſed any authority in the city: but being an architect, under the pretence of making ſome repairs in the walls, he had gotten into his hands the keys of the gate which led into the country. He then took refuge among the Romans; and, while he remained in their camp, entered again into a correſpondence with Annibal, and ſent letters to Tarentum. But being diſcovered, and dreading the conſequences of his treaſon, he fled into Macedon; and, having inſinuated himſelf into the confidence of Philip, gained afterwards ſo great a power over him, that he was almoſt the principal cauſe of the ruin of that mighty kingdom.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The force of Truth.

FOR my part I am perſuaded, that there is not in nature a greater goddeſs, or any that has a ſtronger power over men, than Truth. For, though all unite in oppoſition to her, and though falſehood draws up a whole train of probabilities, and ſets them in array againſt her, ſhe triumphs, I know not how, ſingle and unſupported, and forces her way into the heart. Sometimes her power is inſtantly diſcerned. Sometimes ſhe is obſcured for a while; but appears at laſt in perfect ſplendour, and ſurmounts by her own force alone the falſehood under which ſhe has been oppreſſed.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The cruelty of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta.

THE Lacedæmonian tyrant Nabis, though he had now for three years held the government, was deterred by the ill fortune of Machanides, who had ſo lately been defeated by the Achæans, from attempting any thing of importance; but employed himſelf in forming the deſign, and laying the foundations of a ſevere and laſting tyranny. With this view he ſeemed determined to deſtroy all that were now left in Sparta: driving into baniſhment the citizens that were moſt diſtinguiſhed by their wealth or families; and diſtributing their poſſeſſions and their wives among the chief of thoſe that were attached to his party, and among the mercenaries that were retained in his ſervice. Theſe were all of them aſſaſſins, houſe-breakers, nightly thieves, and robbers. For he ſpared no pains to collect together perſons of this ſort from every quarter: men whoſe crimes had forced them to

abandon their own countries. Of all theſe he was the declared protector and the ſovereign: and, as he had formed them alſo into a guard for his perſon, it was manifeſt that he had determined to maintain his power by wickedneſs and violence. And indeed, not ſatisfied with driving the citizens into baniſhment, he reſolved that they ſhould find no ſafety even in the places to which they fled, nor any retreat ſecure. For ſome were deſtroyed upon the road by meſſengers whom he ſent to overtake them; and others brought back again and killed. In the cities alſo in which they had fixed their abode, having hired by the means of unſuſpected perſons the houſes that were adjoining to thoſe in which any of the exiles lived, he ſent thither ſome Cretans, who made holes in the walls, and, ſhooting arrows through the openings, killed ſome as they were ſtanding, and others as they repoſed themſelves in their own houſes. Thus the unhappy Lacedæmonians were in no time or place ſecure: and in this manner great numbers of them were deſtroyed.

He contrived alſo a machine, if it may be called indeed by ſuch a name; an image of a woman, magnificently dreſſed, and

and formed in a moſt exact reſemblance of his wife. And when his intention was to draw money from any of the citizens, he invited them to his houſe, and at firſt with much civility repreſented to them the danger with which their country was threatened from the Achæans; the number of mercenaries which he was forced to retain in pay for the ſake of the common ſafety; and the great coſt of maintaining the worſhip of the gods, as well as the other articles of public expence. If theſe arguments prevailed, it was ſufficient for his purpoſe. But if all his ſollicitations were without effect, he then uſed to ſay: I want, it ſeems, the power of perſuaſion; but Apega, I believe, will be able to perſuade you. Apega was the name of his wife. Upon theſe words, the image of the woman that has been mentioned immediately appeared. Nabis then, taking her by the hand, raiſed her from her ſeat: and folding afterwards his arms round the perſon whom he had been ſolliciting, brought him near by degrees to the body of the image, whoſe breaſts, hands, and arms were ſtuck full with points of iron, concealed under the clothes; and then, preſſing the back of the pretended woman

with his hands, by the means of ſome ſecret ſprings he fixed the man cloſe to her breaſt, and ſoon forced him to promiſe all that he deſired. But there were ſome alſo who periſhed in this torture, when they refuſed to comply with his demands.

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FOURTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The conduct and exploits of Publius Scipio in Africk. He sets fire to the camps of Asdrubal and Syphax. The Carthaginians draw together a new army: and are defeated in a set engagement. They resolve to recall Annibal from Italy, and to continue the war.

CHAP. I.

WHILE the consuls were employed in these affairs, Publius Scipio, who remained still in Africk, having received information during the winter that the Car-

Carthaginians were getting ready a fleet, reſolved to put his own fleet alſo in order, but not to relinquiſh his deſign of laying ſiege to Utica. He ſtill encouraged alſo in himſelf the hope which he had conceived, that he ſhould be able to bring back Syphax again to the Roman party. With this view, taking advantage of the neighbourhood of the two armies, he urged him by continual deputations; and was perſuaded, that he ſhould at laſt be able to draw him away from his alliance with the Carthaginians. For when he conſidered on the one hand, that it was the nature of the Numidians to paſs ſoon from enjoyment to diſguſt; and, on the other, that they were no leſs ready to break through their engagements to the gods and men; he had ſcarcely any doubt, but that this prince was already ſatiated, not only with his wife, for whoſe ſake he had joined the Carthaginians, but in general alſo with his new allies. But while his mind was thus filled with different cares, and agitated by no leſs various hopes, unable as he was to contend openly in the field againſt the enemy whoſe numbers were far ſuperior to his own, he took the occaſion that was offered, to carry into execution an at-

tempt of a different kind, in the manner which we are now going to relate.

Some of the meſſengers, whom he had ſent to Syphax, informed him at their return; that the tents in which the Carthaginians were lodged during the winter were framed of wood of every kind, and of the branches of trees, without any mixture of earth: that thoſe of the Numidians, who were from the beginning in the army, were compoſed wholly of reeds: that the reſt of the Numidians, who had been drawn lately from the cities, had framed their tents only with branches; and that, though ſome of them were lodged within the intrenchment, the greateſt part remained without. Having conſidered therefore with himſelf, that, if he could ſet fire to the camps, it would be an action not leſs ſurpriſing to the enemy than ſerviceable to his own deſigns, he began to take the meaſures that were neceſſary for that purpoſe. In the courſe of all the deputations, it had ſtill been urged by Syphax, that the Carthaginians ſhould retire from Italy, and the Romans alſo from Africk: and that both of them ſhould retain poſſeſſion of all that they then held between thoſe two countries. To this time, Publius had

had utterly rejected these conditions. But his messengers were now instructed to suggest some little hope to Syphax, that it was not impossible but that his offer might be accepted. The Numidian, softened by this expectation, was more earnest to continue the intercourse that was begun; and suffered the messengers to go and to return, more frequently, and in greater numbers than before. Sometimes they even remained whole days, without being observed, in either camp. Upon these occasions, Publius always sent among his messengers some persons of experienced prudence, and some officers concealed under a vulgar dress, or disguised in the habit of slaves; that they might carefully observe the approaches and the entrances of both the camps. For there were two different camps: one occupied by Asdrubal, with thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse; and another, at the distance of ten stadia from the former, possessed by the Numidians, whose numbers amounted to ten thousand horse, and at this time to about fifty thousand foot. The latter, as it was easiest of approach, was the best suited also to the purpose of being set on fire; because the Numidians, as I have already

said,

ſaid, had framed their tents, not of wood nor of earth, but only of ſtraw and reeds.

When the ſpring then was come, Scipio, having obtained all the information that was requiſite for carrying into execution this deſign againſt the enemy, ſet all his ſhips a-float, and ſtored them with military machines, as if his purpoſe had been to attack Utica on the ſide of the ſea. At the ſame time he ſent away a body of two thouſand foot, who took poſſeſſion again of the hill which commanded the city; and began to fortify it, and to throw up an intrenchment round it with the greateſt diligence. By this meaſure likewiſe he induced the enemy to believe, that he had nothing in view but the ſiege. But his true intention was, to leave theſe men as a body of reſerve; that they might be ready, when the time of the expedition ſhould come, to intercept the garriſon of Utica, if they ſhould ſally out after the departure of the army, and attack the camp that was near, or attempt to inveſt the troops that would be left to guard it. While he was employed in theſe preparations, he ſent alſo again to Syphax, deſiring to be informed, whether he was ſatisfied with the terms that had been propoſed; whether the

Carthaginians alſo were ready to receive them; or whether theſe laſt would not again pretend, that they wanted a longer time to deliberate upon them. He ordered the meſſengers alſo not to return, till they had received an anſwer to each of theſe demands. The Numidian had now no doubt, but that Scipio was ſincere in his deſire of peace: both becauſe he had ordered the meſſengers not to return without an anſwer, and had ſeemed likewiſe more particularly careful to be aſſured of the conſent of the Carthaginians. He ſent therefore immediately to Aſdrubal, informing him of all that had been done, and urging him to accept the peace that was offered: and himſelf in the mean while paſſed his time without any care or caution, and ſuffered the Numidians, who came from time to time to the army, to remain without the intrenchment. Publius on his part alſo affected the ſame ſhew of negligence; but in reality was ſtill moſt intent upon the execution of his deſign.

As ſoon as Syphax had received notice from the Carthaginians that he might finiſh the treaty, he with great joy communicated the anſwer to the Roman deputies, who then returned back to their own

own camp, to inform their General what the king had done. But Scipio immediately ſent them back again to acquaint him, that for his own part he was ſtill firm and earneſt in his deſire of peace: but that his council were of a different opinion, and had reſolved that the war ſhould be continued. His deſign in ſending this meſſage was, that he might not be charged with any breach of faith, if he ſhould commence hoſtilities while the conferences ſtill ſubſiſted for a treaty. This declaration being made, he thought that whatever he ſhould attempt would be free from all reproach and blame.

As Syphax had already conceived the ſtrongeſt hopes of peace, he was much grieved at this unexpected change, and went himſelf to Aſdrubal to acquaint him with the reſolution of the Romans. The two Generals, being thus filled with new diſquietude, deliberated long together, concerning the meaſures that were now proper to be purſued. But both their apprehenſions and their deſigns were very far diſtant from the truth. For they conceived not a thought of any danger threatening them, or of taking any precaution for their own ſecurity: but were intent only on the means of attempting ſome-

thing

thing againſt the enemy; and earneſt to contrive ſome method of drawing them to a battle in the open country.

Before this time Scipio, both by his preparations, and by the orders which he gave, had induced the whole army to believe, that his intention was to take Utica by ſurprize. But now having aſſembled together the ableſt of the Tribunes, and thoſe that were moſt worthy of his confidence, he diſcloſed to them his deſign; commanded them to take their ſupper at the uſual hour; and that, as ſoon as the trumpets ſhould have all ſounded, according to the cuſtom, they ſhould draw the legions out of the camp. For the Roman cuſtom is, to ſound all the trumpets of the army, immediately after ſupper, near the tent of the General; as the ſignal for placing in their reſpective poſts the guards of the night. He then ordered the perſons alſo to be called, who had been employed as ſpies to inſpect the camps of the enemy; compared together and cloſely examined their accounts of the ways and entrances; and took the opinion of Maſſaniſſa concerning all that they reported, becauſe he eſpecially was well acquainted with the country. And when all his meaſures were

were adjuſted, having left a ſufficient body of troops to guard the camp, he began his march towards the enemy, who were at the diſtance of about ſixty ſtadia from him, at the end of the firſt watch; and, arriving near them about the end of the third, he allotted one half of the Romans, and all the Numidians, to Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, and ordered them to attack the camp of Syphax. He exhorted them to behave themſelves like men of courage; to do nothing without due conſideration; and to remember, that, in nightly expeditions, as much as the darkneſs was an impediment to action, ſo much ſhould this diſadvantage be compenſated by valour and by prudence. Taking then the reſt of the army, he advanced, but with a ſlow pace, towards the camp of Aſdrubal. For his intention was, not to attempt any thing on his part, till Lælius ſhould have firſt ſet fire to the Numidian camp.

This General then and Maſſaniſſa, having divided their forces into two bodies, approached the camp of the enemy, and began the work. As the camp ſeemed framed, as I have ſaid, for the very purpoſe of being ſet on fire, no ſooner was the flame thrown by the foremoſt troops,

and had ſeized the firſt tents, than in a moment, becauſe the tents were crouded cloſe together, and the quantity of the matter alſo which fed the conflagration was extremely great, the evil was ſuch as could admit no remedy. Lælius, keeping his troops together, remained in his poſt, and ſtood as a reſerve: while Maſſaniſſa diſtributed his men among all the paſſages, through which he knew that the enemy would endeavour to ſave themſelves from the flames. Not any of the Numidians, nor even Syphax himſelf, had the leaſt ſuſpicion of the truth: but ſuppoſed that the fire had happened by ſome accident. With this perſuaſion, either wakened from their ſleep, or ſtarting, full of liquor, from their nightly revels, they leaped haſtily from their tents. Many of them were trampled down in the crouds that filled the paſſages of the camp. Many were intercepted as they fled, and periſhed in the fire. And the reſt, who eſcaped the flames, fell all under the ſword of the enemy; and were deſtroyed before they knew, either what they were doing, or what they ſuffered.

The Carthaginians, when they beheld from their camp the greatneſs of the fire, and the height to which the flames were raiſed,

raiſed, ſuppoſed alſo that the misfortune had happened by accident. While ſome of them therefore went in haſte to carry aſſiſtance, the reſt, running all out of their tents, ſtood without arms before the intrenchment, and viewed with aſtoniſhment the dreadful ſpectacle. Scipio, perceiving that all things had happened as he deſired, fell upon thoſe that were come out; killed one part, and, purſuing the reſt, at the ſame time threw fire alſo upon their tents. In an inſtant, the ſame ſcene of conflagration and of ſlaughter appeared in the Carthaginian camp, as in that of the Numidians. Aſdrubal uſed no endeavours to extinguiſh the flames. He now clearly perceived that the fire in the Numidian camp had not happened by accident, but from the bold attempt of the Romans. He began therefore only to conſider, by what means he might eſcape with ſafety; though indeed he had but little hopes of being able to accompliſh even that deſign. For the fire had ſpread itſelf with great rapidity, and incircled every part. All the paſſages alſo of the camp were filled with horſes, with beaſts of burthen, and with men: ſome of them half dead, and deſtroyed by the flames; and ſome driven from

their ſenſes by aſtoniſhment and horror. Such diſorder and confuſion, which was ſufficient to appall even the ſtouteſt courage, ſeemed likewiſe to preclude every hope of ſafety. Syphax alſo and his officers were in the ſame condition. The two Generals however at laſt found means to eſcape, with a ſmall body of horſe. But the other thouſands and ten thouſands, of men, of horſes, and of beaſts of burthen, moſt miſerably periſhed in the flames: or thoſe among the men, who eſcaped the violence of the fire, were encountered by a foul and a diſhonourable death. For they not only were without their arms; but ſome, even without their clothes, were cut down by the enemy naked as they fled. In a word, every place was filled with lamentable ſhrieks; with diſordered cries; with frantick conſternation; with confuſed and undiſtinguiſhable noiſe. With all theſe there was a devouring fire, and flames hurled to a tremendous height. Any one of theſe things alone would be ſufficient to ſtrike terror into the human heart: how much more all of them together? It is not poſſible indeed to ſhew any thing like the diſaſter; or to form any image of the greatneſs of it by any compariſon. So much

much do the moſt dreadful accidents that have hitherto been known fall below the horrors of this moſt aſtoniſhing ſcene. And in truth, though Scipio was diſtinguiſhed by a courſe of many glorious actions, there is none, in my judgment, among all that he performed, ſo glorious, or ſo adventurous, as this exploit.

When the morning appeared, and the enemies were all either killed or diſperſed in flight, he exhorted the Tribunes, and purſued without delay after thoſe that had fled. Aſdrubal, though he received notice of his approach, remained for ſome time in the city to which he had retired, truſting to the ſtrength of the place. But when he perceived that the inhabitants were preparing to riſe againſt him, not daring to wait the arrival of the Romans, he again continued his flight with the reſt that had eſcaped. The number of theſe was five hundred horſe, and about two thouſand foot. The inhabitants were then quiet, and ſurrendered themſelves to the Romans at diſcretion. Scipio ſpared the place; but gave two cities that were near to be plundered by the army, and then returned back again to his own camp.

CHAP. II.

THE Carthaginians were heavily affected by this great loſs. The deſigns which they had formed were now entirely fruſtrated; and all their proſpects fatally reverſed. For they had flattered themſelves with the hopes, that they ſhould be able to inveſt the Romans, both by land and ſea, upon the hill adjoining to Utica, which was the ſeat of their winter quarters; and had directed all their preparations to that purpoſe. But now they are not only forced, by a moſt ſtrange and unexpected accident, to leave the enemy in poſſeſſion of all the open country; but have reaſon alſo to fear, that their whole ſtate would ſoon be expoſed to the moſt imminent danger. Their conſternation therefore and their apprehenſions were extreme. As the condition however of affairs required that ſomething ſhould be determined with reſpect to future meaſures, the ſenate met together, but in great perplexity, and was diſtracted by confuſed and different ſentiments. For ſome were of opinion,

pinion, that Annibal ſhould be called home from Italy; as if the only hope that now remained was in that General, and in his army. Some again adviſed, that deputies ſhould be ſent to Publius to obtain a truce, and to enter into conferences for a treaty. But others exhorted the aſſembly to reſume their courage; to raiſe new forces; and to ſend ſome meſſengers to Syphax, who had retired to Abba, a city at no great diſtance, and was employed in collecting together all thoſe that had eſcaped from the late misfortune. And this was the opinion which at laſt prevailed. They ordered Aſdrubal therefore to make new levies; and ſent to Syphax, intreating him to aſſiſt them, and to remain firm to his firſt engagements; at the ſame time aſſuring him, that their General very ſoon would join him with another army.

Scipio was at this time intent on his firſt deſign of forming the ſiege of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax remained in his poſt, and that the Carthaginians were raiſing a new army, he collected together all his forces, and encamped before that city. At the ſame time having made alſo a diſtribution of the ſpoil, he ſent merchants to purchaſe it; which

was done with very great advantage. For the ſoldiers, conſidering the late ſucceſs as a certain aſſurance of the intire conqueſt of all the country, were ready to ſell their ſhares of the booty at the ſmalleſt rates.

Syphax and his friends had at firſt reſolved to continue their retreat, and to return back to their own country. But a body of four thouſand Celtiberians, whom the Carthaginians had juſt now taken into their pay, having met this prince in the neighbourhood of Abba, he was ſo much encouraged by this additional ſtrength, that he remained where he then was, and began to aſſume new confidence. And when his young wife alſo, the daughter, as we have ſaid, of Aſdrubal, joined all her power of intreaty, to prevail with him not to deſert the Carthaginians in the preſent exigency, he at laſt ſuffered himſelf to be perſuaded, and complied with all that ſhe deſired. The Carthaginians themſelves had conceived likewiſe no ſmall hopes from the arrival of theſe ſuccours. Inſtead of four thouſand, it was pretended that ten thouſand Celtiberians were arrived: and that their courage, and the manner in which they were armed would render them invincible.

ble. This report, as it filled every mouth, and was ſpread univerſally among the people, inſpired the troops eſpecially with ſo great confidence, that they were impatient once more to take the field. At the end therefore of thirty days, they came and joined the Numidians and the Celtiberiáns, and incamped in the place that was called the Great Plains; forming all together an army of thirty thouſand men.

As ſoon as it was known in the Roman camp, that the enemy had again taken the field, Publius reſolved to advance towards them. Having given the neceſſary orders therefore to the fleet, and to the troops that were employed in the ſiege of Utica, he began his march with the reſt of the army, diſincumbered of all their baggage; and, arriving on the fifth day in the neighbourhood of the Great Plains, fixed his camp upon a hill, at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia from the enemy. On the next day, he deſcended into the plain, and formed his troops in order, placing his cavalry at the diſtance of ſeven ſtadia before the reſt. In this ſituation both the armies remained during the two following days, and only made trial of their ſtrength in little ſkirmiſhes. But on the fourth

fourth day the Generals, agreeably to their deſign, drew out their forces on both ſides, and ranged them in order of battle. The diſpoſition that was made by Publius was ſimply the common diſpoſition of the Romans. The Haſtati were firſt placed in front; behind theſe the Principes; and laſtly, the Triarii in the rear. Upon the right wing ſtood the Roman cavalry: the Numidians and Maſſaniſſa upon the left. On the ſide of Aſdrubal and Syphax, the Celtiberians were drawn up in the centre, oppoſite to the Roman cohorts; the Numidians upon the left wing; and the Carthaginians upon the right. But the Numidians, even in the firſt onſet, fled from the charge of the Roman cavalry; and the Carthaginians from that of Maſſaniſſa. So much was their courage broken by the late defeats. The Celtiberians alone ſtood firm, and maintained the fight with vigour: having but little reaſon to hope, either that they could eſcape by flight, as they were wholly unacquainted with the country; or that their lives would be ſpared, if they ſhould fall into the power of the Romans. For as Scipio had committed no hoſtility againſt them in the courſe of the war in Spain, they ſeemed clearly

clearly to have violated the laws of good faith and juſtice, by taking arms in favour of the Carthaginians. When the wings however were broken, theſe troops were ſoon ſurrounded by the Principes and the Triarii, and were almoſt all of them deſtroyed in the place, after they had performed the greateſt ſervice for the Carthaginians, not only in the battle, but in ſecuring alſo their retreat. For if the Romans had not been retarded by this obſtacle, but had immediately purſued thoſe that fled, ſcarcely any part of the army would have been able to eſcape. But while they were ſtopped by the brave reſiſtance of theſe troops, Syphax, with his cavalry, found means to retreat to his own kingdom; and Aſdrubal, with the reſt that were ſaved, to Carthage.

The Roman General, as ſoon as he had given the neceſſary orders concerning the priſoners and the ſpoil, called together his Council, to deliberate on the meaſures that were next to be purſued. In this aſſembly it was determined, that Publius, with one part of the army, ſhould go round to the ſeveral cities; and that Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, with the Numidians, and a part alſo of the Roman legions, ſhould follow Syphax, and not allow

allow him time to ſtand, or to make any new preparations. Theſe reſolutions were immediately carried into execution. Among the cities, ſome were ſtruck with terror, and ſurrendered themſelves voluntarily to the Romans: and others, being inveſted by them upon their firſt approach, were immediately taken by ſtorm. Through all the country indeed, ſo grievous were the diſtreſſes which the long continuance of the war had brought upon the people, and ſo heavy the tributes that were impoſed, that all things were ready for a change.

In the city of Carthage, the minds of men, which had before been much diſordered, were now filled with new and greater conſternation. Their whole hopes indeed ſeemed at once to ſink under this ſecond blow, and to give place to voluntary deſpair. There were ſome however, among the firmeſt of the ſenators, who adviſed; that they ſhould ſend a fleet to Utica, and endeavour to raiſe the ſiege of that city, by attacking the Roman fleet, which was wholly unprepared for an engagement; and that Annibal alſo ſhould be recalled from Italy, and a trial be made of that reſource without any farther delay. They inſiſted, that both theſe meaſures,

measures, as far as it could reasonably be judged, would be productive of very salutary consequences. But it was urged by others, that the times would not now bear any such remedy. That their present business was to fortify the city, and to put it into a condition to sustain a siege. That if the citizens would only agree in sentiments, chance itself would afford many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. At the same time they advised, that a consultation likewise should be held concerning peace; and that they should seriously consider, by what kind of treaty, and upon what conditions, they might be delivered from the present evils. After long and vehement debates, all these opinions were adopted by the senate. As soon therefore as the assembly was dissolved, the messengers that were to be dispatched to Annibal set sail for Italy: the commander of the naval forces went on board of the fleet: and the rest employed themselves in putting the city into a state proper for defence: and in holding constant deliberations together, concerning each particular measure that was fit to be pursued.

The Roman army, having marched through all the country, and not met with

with any reſiſtance, was loaded with an immenſe boody. Publius therefore reſolved to ſend away the greateſt part of the ſpoil to be ſtored in his firſt camp; and, when he had thus lightened the army, to march and inveſt Tunis, and to encamp in the very ſight of the Carthaginians; being perſuaded, that by this boldneſs he ſhould ſtrike them moſt effectually with terror and diſmay.

The Carthaginians, having completed in few days their naval forces, together with the neceſſary ſtores, were juſt now ready to ſail out to ſea, and to carry into execution the deſign that has been mentioned. On the arrival of Publius at Tunis, the garriſon fled from the place, and relinquiſhed it to the Romans. Tunis is ſituated at the diſtance of a hundred and twenty ſtadia from Carthage; and may be ſeen from almoſt every part of the city. It has already been mentioned, that both art and nature had concurred in making it a place of very uncommon ſtrength. But ſcarcely had the Romans finiſhed their encampment, when they diſcovered the Carthaginian fleet directing their courſe towards Utica. Publius therefore, being apprehenſive that the conſequences would be fatal to his own

fleet, which neither expected ſuch an attempt, nor was prepared againſt it, immediately decamped, and marched alſo towards Utica with the greateſt haſte. On his arrival, perceiving that his decked ſhips were well fitted indeed for the purpoſe of raiſing machines, and carrying them near the walls, and, in a word, for every other uſe that is requiſite in a ſiege, but were in no reſpect prepared for an engagement upon the ſea; conſidering alſo on the other hand, that the Carthaginians had employed the whole time of winter in preparing their fleet for this very deſign; he reſolved not to engage in a naval action: but, having drawn up the decked ſhips cloſe to the ſhore, he covered them with a line of the tranſport veſſels, which were ranged by two and by three in depth. * * * *

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FIFTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Scipio ſends ambaſſadours to Carthage, to demand a reſtitution of ſome veſſels which had been taken by the Carthaginians during the truce. The perfidious attempt of the Carthaginians againſt the Ambaſſadours. The war is renewed on both ſides. The preparations of Annibal and Scipio. The interview between theſe two Generals. The battle of Zama.

CHAP. I.

PUBLIUS was in no ſmall degree diſturbed by this perfidious action. Not only his own proviſions were loſt, but

the enemy alſo were at the ſame time furniſhed with a very plentiful ſupply. But the chief cauſe of his concern was, that the Carthaginians, in making this attempt, had been guilty of an open violation of the late ſolemn treaty. And that the war again was kindled. He ſent therefore Lucius Servilius, Lucius Bæbius, and Lucius Fabius, ambaſſadours to Carthage, to complain of this tranſaction; and at the ſame time to acquaint the Carthaginians, that he had received letters from Rome, with an account that the treaty had been ratified by the Roman people. When the ambaſſadours arrived, and were introduced firſt into the ſenate, and afterwards into an aſſembly of the people, they diſcourſed on the whole ſtate of affairs with very great boldneſs. They began with telling the Carthaginians; "that when the ambaſſadours who had been deputed by them to the Roman camp arrived at Tunis, and were admitted to appear before the council, they not only made libations to the Gods, and adored the earth, as the cuſtom is among other men; but proſtrated themſelves alſo in an abject manner upon the ground, and kiſſed the feet of all the aſſembly. That afterwards, when they aroſe again, they made

made a voluntary confeſſion of their guilt; and acknowledged, that they from the firſt had violated the treaties which ſubſiſted between the Carthaginians and the Romans. That they were ſenſible therefore, that the latter might moſt reaſonably inflict upon them every evil. That they implored them however, in the name of the common fortune of mankind, not to puniſh them with too great ſeverity; but rather to ſuffer their inconſiderate folly to become a laſting monument of the Roman generoſity and virtue." The ambaſſadours then added: "That Scipio and all the members of the council, who remembered this tranſaction, were now ſtruck with ſurprize, and not able to conceive what confidence it was, that had induced the Carthaginians to forget all which they had at that time ſpoken, and to violate again their treaties and their oaths. That it ſeemed indeed moſt probable, that the return of Annibal, and of the army that was with him, had encouraged them in this bold deſign. That nothing however could be more abſurd and ſenſeleſs. For do not all men know, continued they, that it is now the ſecond year, ſince Annibal, compelled to retire from every part of Italy into the neigh-

bourhood of Lacinium, has been confined, and as it were beſieged in that narrow ſpace; and has now brought away his forces with the greateſt difficulty. But if he had even returned with conqueſt, and was ready to engage us; victorious as we have been againſt you in two ſucceſſive battles; you ought ſurely to entertain very doubtful expectations of ſucceſs; and, while you flatter yourſelves with the proſpect of a victory, to take alſo into your conſideration the poſſible chance of another defeat. And if the latter ſhould be the event, what Gods will you then invoke; or what arguments will you employ in your diſtreſs, to draw the compaſſion of the conquerours towards you; when your perfidiouſneſs and your raſh attempt ſhall have rendered you alike unworthy of the protection of the Gods and of men?"

The ambaſſadours after this diſcourſe retired. There were but few among the Carthaginians, who adviſed any adherence to the treaty. The greateſt part, not only of thoſe who directed the adminiſtration of the government, but of the reſt alſo of the members of the council, beſide that they were diſſatisfied with the conditions which the Romans had impoſed,

poſed, were incenſed alſo by the boldneſs of the ambaſſadours. Add to this, that they were unwilling to loſe the veſſels that had been taken, and the ſupplies with which they were ſtored. But the chief and moſt prevailing reaſon was, that they had conceived the greateſt hopes, that with the aſſiſtance of Annibal they ſhould now draw the victory to their ſide. The reſolution therefore of the aſſembly was, that the ambaſſadours ſhould be ſent back without any anſwer. But the chief perſons alſo in the government, having determined to leave no means untried that might ſerve to rekindle the war, concerted between themſelves the following project. Pretending that ſome care at leaſt ſhould be taken, that the ambaſſadours might return back to their own camp with ſafety, they prepared two triremes to attend them. At the ſame time, they ſent orders to Aſdrubal, who commanded their fleet, that he ſhould hold ſome veſſels in readineſs not far from the Roman camp: and, as ſoon as theſe triremes ſhould have left the Romans, that he ſhould bear down upon the veſſel in which the ambaſſadours ſailed, and ſink it. For the Carthaginian fleet was at this time ſtationed along thoſe parts of

the coaſt that were near to Utica. They then ſuffered the ambaſſadours to depart; having firſt ordered thoſe that attended them in the triremes, that, as ſoon as they ſhould have paſſed beyond the mouth of the river Macar, which was the place from whence the camp of the enemy might be diſcerned, they ſhould there leave the Romans, and return. Agreeably to theſe inſtructions, the commanders of the triremes, when they arrived at the appointed place, ſaluted the Romans, and directed their courſe back again to Carthage. The ambaſſadours had no ſuſpicion of any ill intention; and only were diſſatisfied, becauſe it ſeemed that the Carthaginians ſhewed ſome contempt towards them in leaving them ſo ſoon. But as they held on their courſe alone, they were ſuddenly attacked by three triremes, which had been prepared for the deſign. As theſe veſſels however could not pierce with their beaks the Roman quinquereme, becauſe the latter eaſily withdrew itſelf from the ſtroke; ſo neither were the men able to throw themſeves on board, becauſe the Romans reſiſted all their efforts with the greateſt bravery. The Carthaginians therefore, ſhifting their ſhips from ſide to ſide, and

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continuing the fight from every quarter, killed and wounded a great number of the Romans: till the latter, perceiving that ſome ſoldiers from their own camp, who had been foraging near to the coaſt, were drawn together upon the ſhore, and ready to aſſiſt them, drove their veſſel cloſe in to the land. The greateſt part of the men that were on board had been killed in the action; but the ambaſſadours were moſt ſtrangely and unexpectedly preſerved. Thus was the war reſumed with greater violence than before, and with a more implacable rage. For the Romans, incenſed by this perfidious action, were now moſt earneſt in their deſire to bring the Carthaginians into an intire ſubjection. The Carthaginians on the other hand, being conſcious of their guilt, reſolved to attempt and ſuffer every thing, rather than fall into the power of the Romans. When ſuch was the diſpoſition on both ſides, it was manifeſt, that the conteſt could only be decided by a battle. The minds of all men therefore, not in Italy alone and Africk, but in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia, were held in ſuſpenſe, and diſtracted by an anxious expectation of the event.

As Annibal was at this time in great want of cavalry, he ſent to a certain Numidian named Tychæus, whoſe territory was contiguous to that of Syphax, inviting him to ſeize the very moment of his ſafety, and to join him with his forces. For he could not but know, that if the Carthaginians ſhould be ſuperior in the war, he might ſtill be able to hold poſſeſſion of his kingdom: but, if the Romans on the other hand ſhould remain the conquerours, the ambition of Maſſaniſſa would ſoon deprive him not only of his dominions but of his life. Tychæus was prevailed on by theſe reaſons, and came and joined him, as he deſired, with a body of two thouſand horſe.

Publius, having regulated all things that were neceſſary for the ſecurity of the fleet, left the command to Bæbius, and himſelf led the army round the country to reduce the cities: not ſuffering any to ſurrender upon terms of voluntary ſubmiſſion as before; but taking all of them by ſtorm, and ſending the inhabitants into ſlavery; that he might ſhew more ſtrongly the reſentment which he had conceived againſt the enemy on account of their late perfidy. He ſent alſo continual meſſengers to Maſſaniſſa; to inform

form him of the manner in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty; and urging him to draw together as large a body of forces as he was able to raiſe, and to join him with the greateſt haſte. For Maſſaniſſa, as we have already mentioned, as ſoon as the treaty was concluded, taking with him his own troops, together with ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, and ſome Roman deputies which he had obtained from Scipio, had gone from the camp, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the aſſiſtance of the Romans to add that of Syphax alſo to his own dominions. And this deſign he had now completely executed.

CHAP. II.

ABOUT this time it happened, that the ambaſſadours, returning back from Rome, arrived at Utica, where the fleet of the Romans lay. Bæbius ſent away immediately the Roman ambaſſadours to Publius: but detained thoſe of Carthage; whoſe minds, dejected as they were upon other accounts, were now filled

filled with apprehenſions of the greateſt danger. For having heard of the late wicked attempt of the Carthaginians againſt the Roman ambaſſadours, they expected to ſuffer all the vengeance that was due to ſo baſe an action. When Publius was informed, that both the ſenate and people had readily confirmed the treaty, and were diſpoſed alſo to concur with him in every meaſure, he was filled with no ſmall joy. He then ordered Bæbius to diſmiſs the Carthaginian ambaſſadours with all civility. This reſolution was, in my judgement, very wiſe and commendable. For as he knew that his country had always paid the moſt ſecret regard to the rights of ambaſſadours, he conſidered only what was fit for the Romans to do upon ſuch an occaſion, and not what the Carthaginians deſerved to ſuffer. Suppreſſing therefore his own anger, and the reſentment that was due to the late tranſaction, he endeavoured to maintain, as the Poet expreſſes it, "the glorious deeds of his progenitors:" and by this conduct he broke the ſpirit of all that were in Carthage, and even of Annibal himſelf; when they ſaw their own baſeneſs oppoſed and conquered by ſuch generous virtue.

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The Carthaginians, impatient to behold their cities waſted and deſtroyed, ſent ſome meſſengers to Annibal, intreating him not to admit any longer delay, but to advance towards the enemy, and to bring things to a deciſion by a battle. This General anſwered, that they ſhould attend to their own buſineſs: that it belonged to him alone to chuſe the time for repoſe, and the time for action. But, after ſome days, he began his march from Adrumetum, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Zama; a city, which ſtood at the diſtance of about five days journey from Carthage towards the weſt. From this place he ſent three ſpies, to examine into the ſituation and condition of the Roman camp. Theſe men were diſcovered by the enemy, and were carried to the General. But ſo far was Publius from puniſhing them, as the cuſtom is upon ſuch occaſions, that he ordered a Tribune to attend them, and to ſhew them diſtinctly every part of the camp. When this was done, he aſked the men, whether the Tribune had faithfully executed his order. And when they anſwered, that he had; having furniſhed them with proviſions, and ſome troops alſo to conduct them, he ordered them to

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go back, and report to Annibal the exact account of all that had happened to them. The Carthaginian General, ſtruck with the magnanimity and boldneſs of the action, conceived, I know not how, a deſire to enter into a conference with Scipio; and ſent a herald to acquaint him, that he ſhould be glad to hold ſome diſcourſe with him on the ſtate of affairs alone. Publius, when he had received this meſſage, told the herald, that he accepted the offer; and that he would ſend notice to Annibal of the time and the place in which they might meet. On the following day, Maſſaniſſa arrived at the camp, and brought with him ſix thouſand foot, and about the ſame number of horſe. Scipio received him with great favour; and congratulated him upon his ſucceſs, in having prevailed upon all the ſubjects of Syphax to receive him as their prince. He then put the army in motion, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Margarus; in a poſt which, beſide other advantages, had water within the throw of a dart. From this place he ſent notice to the Carthaginian General, that he was ready to engage into a conference with him. On receiving this meſſage, Annibal alſo decamped; and,

approaching to the diſtance of no more than thirty ſtadia from the Romans, fixed his camp upon a hill, which, though in other reſpects well ſituated, was rather too far removed from water. And indeed the ſoldiers were upon this account expoſed to very great hardſhip.

On the following day, the two Generals came out from their ſeveral camps with a ſmall body of horſemen: and afterwards, leaving theſe, they advanced forwards, and approached each other, attended only by an interpreter. Annibal firſt ſaluted Scipio, and began in the following manner:

"Well would it have been, if the Romans had never coveted any thing beyond the extent of Italy, nor the Carthaginians beyond that of Africk; but had both of them remained contented with the poſſeſſion of thoſe fair empires, which nature itſelf ſeems indeed to have circumſcribed with ſeparate bounds. But ſince we engaged in war againſt each other, firſt to acquire the ſovereignty of Sicily, and afterwards that of Spain; ſince at laſt, like men infatuated by fortune, we advanced ſo far together in our preposterous courſe, as to bring even the ſafety of our own native ſeats into alternate

nate danger; that danger which you have ſo lately known, and to which we alſo at this moment are expoſed; what now remains, but to endeavour, by ourſelves, to deprecate the anger of the Gods, and find ſome means, if it be poſſible, of putting an end to this moſt obſtinate contention. I for my part, who have ſeen in the courſe of a long experience the great inconſtancy of fortune, with how ſlight a turn ſhe effects on either ſide the greateſt changes, and that ſhe ſports with us continually as with children, am moſt ready to conſent to a peace. But much do I fear, that you, Publius, who ſtill are in the flower of your age, whoſe deſigns both in Spain and Africk have all been attended with ſucceſs, and who have never hitherto been driven back again in your courſe by any adverſe blaſt, will be inclined to different ſentiments, and not be moved by my perſuaſions, how worthy ſoever they may be of credit. Yet conſider only and obſerve, at leaſt in one example, the inſtability of human affairs. An example, not drawn from diſtant times, but which is preſent now to your eyes. In a word, view it in me who am before you. I am that Annibal, who after the battle of Cannæ was maſter of almoſt

the whole of Italy; and, having advanced not long afterwards in to the very neighbourhood of Rome, fixed my camp within forty ſtadia only of the city, and deliberated with myſelf in what manner I ſhould diſpoſe of you and of your country. Behold me now, returned back again to Africk, and holding a conference with you a Roman, concerning my own ſafety, and that of all the Carthaginians. Let this example incline you to embrace moderate ſentiments; and to judge in this conjuncture, as it becomes a man to judge: that is, to chooſe always the greateſt good, and the leaſt of evils. And ſurely no man of ſenſe would ever voluntarily meet the danger to which you are now expoſed. For if you ſhould gain the victory in the preſent battle, you will add but little either to the reputation of your country, or your own. But, if you ſhould be conquered, the whole fame and glory of all your former actions will be for ever loſt. What then is the purpoſe of this diſcourſe? It is to inform you, that the countries which have been the objects of our wars, Sardinia, Sicily, and Spain, ſhall be yielded to the Romans: and that the Carthaginians at no future time ſhall attempt to recover by arms the poſſeſſion of

of thoſe territories. To the Romans likewiſe ſhall belong all the iſlands, which lie between Sicily and Africk. Theſe conditions, while they leave Carthage in ſecurity, are at the ſame time, in my opinion, highly honourable, both to yourſelf and to all the Romans."

Here Annibal ended his diſcourſe: and Scipio anſwered in the following words:

"It was well known, he ſaid, that the Carthaginians, and not the Romans, were the cauſe both of the war of Sicily, and of that of Spain: that Annibal himſelf was moſt perfectly acquainted with this truth: and that the Gods alſo had born teſtimony to it, by turning the ſucceſs to the ſide, not of thoſe who had unjuſtly attacked, but of thoſe who had taken arms in their own defence." He then added likewiſe; that no man was more ſtrongly impreſſed than himſelf, with a juſt ſenſe of the inſtability of fortune, and the uncertain courſe of human affairs. "But with reſpect, continued he, to the terms which you offer; if, before the Romans had come into Africk, you had retired from Italy, and propoſed to us the ſame conditions of peace, you would not perhaps have been diſappointed in your hopes. At this time, when you

you have been forced moſt reluctantly to abandon Italy, and we on the other hand have paſſed over into Africk, and have rendered ourſelves the maſters of all the open country, it is clear that the ſtate of affairs is very conſiderably changed. But, beſide this difference, there is ſomething alſo of much greater moment. When your countrymen were defeated, and ſued for peace, we refuſed not to accede to their requeſt. A treaty was framed in writing; which, beſide thoſe conceſſions which you have now propoſed, contained alſo the following articles. That the Carthaginians ſhould reſtore without ranſom all the Roman priſoners; ſhould deliver up to us their decked ſhips; ſhould pay a ſum of five thouſand talents; and, in the laſt place, that they ſhould give hoſtages for the performance of all that was impoſed. Such were the conditions, to which we on both ſides gave conſent. We then deputed jointly ſome ambaſſadours to Rome, to lay the treaty before the ſenate and the people: on our part intimating, that we approved of the conditions; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, requeſting even with entreaty that they might be accepted. They were accordingly admitted by the ſenate, and

were ratified by the people. But no ſooner had the Carthaginians obtained what they deſired, than they annull at once the whole treaty by an action of the groſſeſt perfidy. After ſuch a conduct, what remains to be done? Put yourſelf in my place, and anſwer. Shall we releaſe them now from all the heavieſt of the conditions that were before impoſed? This would indeed be an admirable method, by beſtowing a reward upon their treachery, to teach them to deceive in future times the perſons by whom they have been obliged. Or think you, if they could obtain their wiſh, that they would hold themſelves indebted to us for the favour? They before obtained what with the moſt earneſt ſupplication they deſired. And yet no ſooner had they conceived ſome faint hopes from your return, than they again diſcloſed their enmity, and renewed hoſtilities againſt us. If you had added therefore ſome conditions ſtill more rigorous, the treaty might have been once more carried before the Roman people. But ſince you have detracted even from thoſe that were admitted, the terms which you now propoſe cannot ſo much as be referred to their conſideration. To what then tends

alſo my diſcourſe? It is to acquaint you; that you either muſt ſubmit yourſelves and your country to us at diſcretion, or muſt conquer us in a battle." After theſe diſcourſes, which left no hopes of an accommodation, the two Generals parted from each other, and retired.

On the following day, as ſoon as the dawn appeared, they drew out their forces on both ſides, and prepared to engage: the Carthaginians, for their own ſafety and the poſſeſſion of Africk; the Romans, for the ſovereignty of the whole, and for univerſal empire. Is there any one that can forbear to pauſe at this part of the ſtory, or remain unmoved by the relation? Never were there ſeen more warlike nations: never more able Generals, or more completely exerciſed in all the art and diſciple of war: never was a greater prize propoſed by fortune, than that which was now laid before the combatants. For it was not Africk alone, or Italy, that waited to reward the conquerours; but the entire dominion of the whole known world. And this indeed was not long afterwards the event. Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following manner. He placed in the firſt line the Haſtati, leaving intervals be-

tween the cohorts. In the ſecond, the Principes: but poſted their cohorts, not, as the Roman cuſtom was, oppoſite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former line, and at a conſiderable diſtance from them, on account of the great number of elephants that were in the Carthaginian army. Laſt of all, in the third line, he drew up the Triarii. Upon the left wing he ſtationed Caius Lælius, with the cavalry of Italy; and Maſſaniſſa and the Numidians upon the right. The intervals of the firſt line he filled with companies of the light-armed troops: who was ordered to begin the action; and, if they ſhould find themſelves too violently preſſed by the elephants, that the ſwifteſt of them ſhould retire through the ſtrait intervals, to the rear of all the army; and the reſt, if they ſhould be intercepted on their way, direct their courſe to the right or left, along the open diſtances that were between the lines. When his diſpoſition was thus completed, he went round to all the troops, and harangued them in few words, but ſuch as the occaſion ſeemed to require.

"Remember, ſaid he, your former victories; and ſhew now a courage worthy of yourſelves and of your country. Let

Let it be ever preſent to your view, that, by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will become the maſters of all Africk, but ſecure to Rome the undiſputed ſovereignty of the reſt of the world. If, on the other hand, you ſhould be conquered, they who fall bravely in the action, will obtain an honour far more glorious than any rights of ſepulture, the honour of dying for their country: while thoſe that ſhall eſcape, muſt be condemned to paſs the remainder of their lives in the extremity of diſgrace and miſery. For Africk will afford no place of ſafety; and, if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition muſt be, your own reaſon will eaſily inſtruct you to foreſee. But may none of you ever know it by experience. When fortune then, continued he, has offered to us upon either ſide ſo noble a prize, univerſal empire or a glorious death, how loſt muſt we be both to honour and to ſenſe, if we ſhould reject theſe the greateſt of goods, and chooſe, through a deſire of life, the moſt inſupportable of evils. When you advance therefore againſt the enemy, carry that reſolution with you into action, which is ſure always to ſurmount the ſtrongeſt reſiſtance. Be de-

termined either to conquer or to die. Retain not ſo much as a thought of life. With ſuch ſentiments, the victory cannot fail to be your own."

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Annibal, on his part, having placed the elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army, formed his firſt line of the mercenaries; who were a mixed multitude of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearics, and Mauruſians, and amounted together to about twelve thouſand men. Behind theſe were the Carthaginians and the ſubject Africans. The third line was compoſed of the troops which he had brought with him from Italy; and was placed at the diſtance of more than a ſtadium from the ſecond line. The cavalry was poſted upon the wings: that of the Numidian auxiliaries upon the left; and the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He ordered the officers who commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries, to exhort ſeverally their own ſoldiers, and to encourage them to be aſſured of victory, ſince they were now joined by Annibal and his veteran forces. The leaders of the Carthaginians were inſtructed on the other hand, to lay before their view the fatal conſequences

quences of a defeat; and to enumerate all the evils, to which their wives and children would be expoſed. And while theſe orders were obeyed, he himſelf going round to his own troops, addreſſed them with the greateſt earneſtneſs, and in words like theſe.

"Remember, ſoldiers, that we have now born arms together during the courſe of ſeventeen years. Remember in how many battles we have been engaged againſt the Romans. Conquerours in them all, we have not left to the Romans even the ſmalleſt hope, that they ever ſhould be able to defeat us. But beſide the other innumerable actions in which we always obtained the victory, remember alſo, above all the reſt, the battle of Trebia, which we ſuſtained againſt the father of that very General who now commands the Roman army; the battle of Thraſymene, againſt Flaminius; and that of Cannæ, againſt Æmilius. The action, in which we are now ready to engage, is not to be compared with thoſe great battles, with reſpect either to the number, or the courage of the troops. For turn now your eyes upon the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer; they ſcarcely make even a diminutive part of

the numbers againſt which we were then engaged. Nor is the difference leſs with reſpect to courage. The former were troops whoſe ſtrength was intire, and who had never been diſheartened by any defeat. But theſe before us are either the children of the former, or the wretched remains of thoſe very men whom we ſubdued in Italy, and who have ſo often fled before us. Loſe not then, upon this occaſion, the glory of your General, and your own. Preſerve the name which you have acquired: and confirm the opinion which has hitherto prevailed, that you are never to be conquered."

When the Generals had thus on both ſides harangued their troops, and the Numidian cavalry for ſome time had been engaged in ſkirmiſhing againſt each other, all things being now ready, Annibal ordered the elephants to be led againſt the enemy. But the noiſe of the horns and trumpets, ſounding together on every ſide, ſo affrighted ſome of theſe beaſts, that they turned back with violence againſt their own Numidians, and threw them into ſuch diſorder, that Maſſaniſſa diſperſed without much difficulty that whole body of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian army. The

reſt

reſt of the elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces of the Romans in the ſpace that was between the armies, ſuffered much in the conflict, and made great havock alſo among the enemy: till at laſt, having loſt all courage, ſome of them took their way through the intervals of the Roman army, which afforded an open and ſafe paſſage for them, as Scipio wiſely had foreſeen; and the reſt, directing their courſe to the right, were chaſed by darts from the cavalry, till they were driven quite out of the field. But as they occaſioned likewiſe ſome diſorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lælius alſo ſeized that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian Cavalry: and having forced them to turn their backs, he followed cloſely after them; while Maſſaniſſa on his ſide was purſuing the Numidian cavalry with no leſs ardour.

And now the heavy-armed forces on both ſides advanced to action with a ſlow and ſteady pace: thoſe troops alone excepted, which had returned with Annibal from Italy; and which remained ſtill in the ſtation in which they at firſt were placed. As ſoon as they were near, the Romans, ſhouting all together, according to their cuſtom, and rattling their ſwords

againſt their bucklers, threw themſelves upon the enemy. On the other ſide, the Carthaginian mercenaries advanced to the charge with confuſed and undiſtinguiſhable cries. For as they had been drawn together, as we have ſaid, from different countries, there was not among them, as the poet expreſſes it,

> One voice, one language found:
> But ſounds diſcordant as their various tribes *.

In this firſt onſet, as the combatants were ſo cloſely joined, that they were unable to make uſe of their ſpears, or even of their ſwords, and maintained the action hand to hand, and man to man; the mercenaries, by their boldneſs and dexterity, obtained at firſt the advantage, and wounded many of the Romans. But the latter, aſſiſted by the excellence of their diſpoſition and the nature of their arms, preſſed forward, and ſtill gained ground; being ſupported alſo by the reſt of their own army, who followed and encouraged them from behind. The mercenaries on the other hand were neither followed nor

* Iliad. IV. 437.

ſup-

ſupported. For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to aſſiſt them in the action, but ſtood like men who had loſt all courage. At laſt therefore the ſtrangers turned their backs: and, thinking themſelves manifeſtly to have been deſerted by their own friends, they fell, as they retired, upon the Carthaginians that were behind, and killed them. The latter however fell not, without a brave and vigorous defence. For being thus unexpectedly attacked, and compelled to fight both with their own mercenaries and with the Romans, they exerted their utmoſt efforts, and engaging with a frantick and diſordered rage, made a promiſcuous ſlaughter of friends and enemies. Amidſt this confuſion, the Haſtati alſo were ſo preſſed that they were forced to break their ranks. But the leaders of the Principes, perceiving the diſorder, brought up their troops cloſe behind to ſupport them: ſo that, in the end, the greateſt part of the Carthaginians and the mercenaries were deſtroyed in the place; partly by themſelves, and partly by the Haſtati. Annibal would not ſuffer the reſt that eſcaped to be received into the third line towards which they fled; but ordered the foremoſt ranks

to

to point their ſpears againſt them as they approached. They were forced therefore to retire along the wings into the open plain,

As the whole ground, that was between the forces which now remained, was covered with blood, and ſlaughter, and dead bodies, the Roman General was in no ſmall degree perplexed; being apprehenſive that this obſtacle would prevent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it ſeemed to be no eaſy thing, to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks, over bleeding and ſlippery carcaſes, thrown one upon another; and over arms, which were ſcattered in confuſion, and prepoſterouſly intermingled with the heaps of the dead. Having ordered the wounded however to be carried into the rear of the army, he called back the Haſtati from the purſuit, and drew them up in order as they returned, in the forepart of the ground upon which the action had paſſed, and the oppoſite to the centre of the enemy. He then commanded the Principes and the Triarii to cloſe their ranks; to form a wing on either ſide; and to advance over the dead. And when theſe troops, having ſurmounted all the intermediate obſta-

cles,

cles, were come into the ſame line with the Haſtati, the action was then begun on both ſides with the greateſt eagerneſs and ardour. As the numbers were nearly equal; as the ſentiments, the courage, and the arms on both ſides were the ſame; the battle remained for a long time doubtful. For ſo obſtinate was the contention, that the men all fell in the place in which they fought. But Lælius and Maſſaniſſa, returning back from the purſuit of the routed cavalry, arrived moſt providentially in the very moment in which their aſſiſtance was chiefly wanted, and fell upon the rear of Annibal. The greateſt part therefore of his troops were now ſlaughtered in their ranks. And, among thoſe that fled, a very ſmall number only were able to eſcape; as they were followed cloſely by the cavalry through an open country. Above fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action. But, on the ſide of the Carthaginians, more than twenty thouſand were killed; and almoſt an equal number taken priſoners. Such was the battle between Annibal and Scipio: the battle which gave to the Romans the ſovereignty of the world.

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had for ſome time purſued thoſe that

that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned back to his own camp. Annibal, with a ſmall number of horſemen, continued his retreat without ſtopping, and arrived ſafe at Adrumetum: having performed, upon this occaſion, all that was poſſible to be done by a brave and experienced General. For firſt, he entered into a conference with his enemy; and endeavoured by himſelf alone to terminate the diſpute. Nor was this any diſhonour to his former victories: but ſhewed only, that he was diffident of fortune: and willing to ſecure himſelf againſt the ſtrange and unexpected accidents which happen in war. In the battle afterwards, ſo well had he diſpoſed things for the action, that no General, uſing even the ſame arms, and the ſame order of battle as the Romans, could have engaged them with greater advantage. The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken; becauſe the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready always to preſent a front to their enemies, on which ſide ſoever they appear. For the cohorts by a ſingle movement turn themſelves together, as the occaſion requires, towards the ſide from whence the attack is made.

Add

Add to this, that their arms alſo are well contrived, both for protection and offence: their bucklers being large in ſize; and their ſwords ſtrong, and not eaſily injured by the ſtroke. Upon theſe accounts, they are very terrible in action, and are not to be conquered without great difficulty. But Annibal oppoſed to each of theſe advantages the moſt effectual obſtacles that it was poſſible for reaſon to contrive. He had collected together a great number of elephants, and ſtationed them in the front of his army; that they might diſturb the order of the enemy, and diſperſe their ranks. By poſting the mercenaries in the firſt line, and the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to diſable the Romans by fatigue, before the battle ſhould be brought to the laſt deciſion; and render their ſwords uſeleſs by continual ſlaughter. As he had thus placed the Carthaginians alſo between two lines, he compelled them to ſtand; and, as the poet has ſaid,

Forced them by ſtrong neceſſity to fight,
However loth *.

* Iliad. IV. 30.

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In the laſt place, he drew up the braveſt and the firmeſt of his troops at a diſtance from the reſt: that, obſerving from afar the progreſs of the action, and poſſeſſing their whole ſtrength as well as their courage intire, they mght ſeize the moſt favourable moment, and fall with vigour upon the enemy. If therefore, when he had thus employed all poſſible precautions to ſecure the victory, he was now for the firſt time conquered, he may very well be pardoned. For fortune ſometimes counteracts the deſigns of valiant men. Sometimes again, according to the proverb,

A brave man by a braver is ſubdued.

And this indeed it was, which muſt be allowed to have happened upon the preſent occaſion.

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EXTRACT the SECOND.

The Carthaginians in the moſt abject manner ſue for peace. The conditions upon which it is granted by Scipio. The ſentiments of Annibal, and his behaviour in the ſenate of Carthage upon this occaſion.

WHEN men, in lamenting the wretchedneſs of their fortunes, exceed in their actions all the cuſtomary forms of grief, if their behaviour ſeems to be the effect of genuine paſſion, and to ariſe only from the greatneſs of their calamities, we are all ready to be moved by the ſtrangeneſs of the ſight, and can neither ſee nor hear them without commiſerating their condition. But if theſe appearances are feigned, and aſſumed only with an intention to deceive, inſtead of compaſſion, they excite indignation and diſguſt. And this was now what happened, with reſpect to the Carthaginian ambaſſadours. Publius told them in few words; "That, with regard to themſelves, they had clearly no pretenſions to be treated with gentleneſs or favour:

ſince, by their own acknowledgement, they had at firſt begun the war againſt the Romans, by attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaties; and now lately again had violated the articles of a convention, which they had ratified in writing, and bound themſelves by oaths to obſerve. That the Romans, however, as well upon their own account, as in conſideration alſo of the common condition and fortune of humanity, had reſolved to diſplay towards them upon this occaſion a generous clemency. That ſuch indeed it muſt appear to themſelves to be, if they would view all circumſtances in a proper light. For, ſince fortune, having firſt precluded them, by the means of their own perfidious conduct, from every claim to mercy or to pardon, had now thrown them wholly into the power of their enemies; no hardſhips which they ſhould be forced to ſuffer, no conditions which ſhould be impoſed, no conceſſions which ſhould be exacted from them, could be conſidered as rigorous or ſevere: but rather it muſt appear to be a matter of aſtoniſhment, if any article of favour ſhould be yielded to them." After this diſcourſe he recited firſt the conditions of indulgence which he was willing to grant;

grant; and afterwards thoſe of rigour, to which they were required to ſubmit. The terms which he propoſed to them were theſe:

"That they ſhould retain all the cities which they held in Africk, before the beginning of the laſt war which they had made againſt the Romans; and all the lands likewiſe which they had anciently poſſeſſed, together with the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them. That from the preſent day all hoſtilities againſt them ſhould ceaſe. That they ſhould be governed by their own laws and cuſtoms; and not receive any garriſon from the Romans." Such were the articles of favour: the others, of a contrary kind, were theſe:

"That the Carthaginians ſhould reſtore all that they had taken unjuſtly from the Romans, during the continuance of the truce. That they ſhould ſend back all the priſoners and deſerters, that had at any time fallen into their hands. That they ſhould deliver up all their long veſſels, ten triremes only excepted; and likewiſe their elephants. That they ſhould not make war at any time upon any ſtate out of Africk: nor upon any in Africk, without the conſent of the Ro-

mans. That they ſhould reſtore to king Maſſaniſſa the houſes, lands, and cities, and every thing beſides, that had belonged to him, or to his anceſtors, within the limits which ſhould hereafter be declared. That they ſhould furniſh the Roman army with corn ſufficient for three months; and pay alſo the ſtipends of the troops, till an anſwer ſhould be received from Rome, confirming the conditions of the treaty. That they ſhould pay ten thouſand talents of ſilver, in the courſe of fifty years; bringing two hundred Euboic talents every year. That, as a ſecurity for their fidelity, they ſhould give a hundred hoſtages: which ſhould be choſen by the Roman General out of all their youth, between the age of fourteen and of thirty years."

As ſoon as Publius had finiſhed the recital of theſe articles, the ambaſſadours returned back in haſte to Carthage, and reported the terms that were propoſed. Upon this occaſion, when one of the ſenators was going to object to the conditions, and had begun to ſpeak, Annibal, it is ſaid, ſtepped forwards, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his ſeat. And, when the reſt of the ſenate appeared to be much diſpleaſed

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at an action so injurious to the customs of that assembly, he again stood up, and said, "That he might well be excused, if his ignorance had led him to offend against any of their established forms. That they knew, that he had left his country when he was only nine years old; and had now returned to it again at the age of more than forty-five. He intreated them therefore, not so much to consider, whether he had violated any custom, as whether he had been moved by a real concern for the distressed condition of his country. That what he had felt upon that account was indeed the true cause of his offence. For that it appeared to him to be a most astonishing thing, and altogether preposterous, that any Carthaginian, not ignorant of all which their state in general, as well as particular men, had designed against the Romans, should not be ready to worship his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now found himself treated by them with so great clemency. That if the Carthaginians had been asked but a few days before, what their country must expect to suffer, if they should be conquered by the Romans, they would not have been able to make any answer: so great, so excessive

ſive were the calamities which were then in proſpect. He begged therefore, that they would not now bring the conditions into any debate, but admit them with unanimous conſent: offering ſacrifices at the ſame time to the gods; and joining all together in their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the Roman people." This advice appeared to be ſo ſenſible, and ſo well ſuited to the preſent exigency, that the ſenate reſolved to conſent to a peace upon the terms which have been mentioned; and immediately ſent away ſome ambaſſadours to conclude the treaty.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The unjuſt deſigns of Philip and Antiochus againſt young Ptolemy: with a reflection on the manner in which thoſe princes afterwards were puniſhed.

IT is ſtrange to conſider, that, as long as Ptolemy lived, Philip and Antiochus were ready always to ſupport him, though he wanted not their aſſiſtance: and yet no ſooner was he dead, and had left an infant ſon, than theſe princes, whoſe duty it was, according to the laws of nature, to maintain the child in the poſſeſſion of his kingdom, combined together to ſhare his dominions between themſelves, and to deſtroy the helpleſs orphan. Nor did they even endeavour, like other tyrants, to cover the ſhame of this proceeding, ſo much as with the ſlighteſt pretext: but proſecuted their deſign with ſuch barefaced and brutal violence, as made the ſaying very applicable to them, which is commonly uſed concerning fiſhes; that the deſtruction of the ſmall, though they are all of them of

the ſame kind, is the life and nouriſhment of the great. We need only to turn our eyes indeed upon the treaty that was made between the two kings upon this occaſion: and we ſhall behold, as in a glaſs, the ſtrongeſt picture of their avowed impiety, their ſavage inhumanity, and their ambition extended beyond all bounds. If any one however ſhould be diſpoſed to cenſure fortune, and indeed with good ſhew of reaſon, for admitting ſuch injuſtice in the courſe of human affairs; he will judge perhaps more favourably, when he conſiders, that afterwards ſhe puniſhed both theſe princes in the manner which their actions merited, and expoſed them as a memorable warning, to deter all thoſe who in future times might be inclined to follow their example. For while they were practiſing all the arts of treachery againſt each other, and tearing away by pieces the dominions of the infant king; this deity, having raiſed up the Romans againſt them, inflicted upon them, with the moſt exact meaſure of juſtice, thoſe very evils which they had unjuſtly meditated againſt others. Subdued, each of them in his turn, they were at firſt compelled to ſubmit to the impoſition of a tribute,

tribute, and to receive orders from the Romans. And in the end, before any long time had elapſed, the dominions of Ptolemy were eſtabliſhed again in full ſecurity: while, on the other hand, the kingdom and the ſucceſſors of Philip were intirely ſubverted and deſtroyed; and thoſe of Antiochus very nearly alſo involved in the ſame calamities.

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EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The Cianians, a people of Bithynia, are conquered and carried into ſlavery by Philip. Reflections on the cauſe of their misfortune, and the conduct of the king.

THESE great calamities indeed, in which the Cianians were involved, ought not to be aſcribed ſo much to fortune, or even to the unjuſt deſigns of others againſt them, as to their own want of wiſdom, and the wrong adminiſtration of their government. For as they raiſed continually the very worſt men into the poſts of honour, and puniſhed all thoſe that oppoſed their meaſures, for the ſake only of enriching themſelves with the ſpoils of the plundered fortunes, they threw themſelves, as it may be ſaid, with their own free conſent, into all that wretchedneſs which is the neceſſary reſult of ſuch a conduct. Examples of this kind are frequent and notorious: and yet men, I know not how, never ceaſe to fall into the ſame imprudence. They

ſeem not to entertain even the ſmalleſt diffidence upon ſuch occaſions; but are worſe in this reſpect than animals that are deſtitute of reaſon. For theſe, not only if they have extricated themſelves before with difficulty from any trap or ſnare, but even if they have ſeen any other animal in danger, are not eaſily led to the like again, but ſuſpect the very place, and diſtruſt every thing that is before their eyes. But men are ſtrangers to all this caution. Though they have heard that many have been loſt by the ill conduct that has now been mentioned; though they ſee others periſhing through the ſame imprudence; allure them only with the proſpect of enriching themſelves with the ſpoils of others, they catch greedily at the bait, which they are aſſured has been in all times fatal to thoſe who have taſted it, and purſue thoſe very meaſures which are acknowledged to have been pernicious to every government.

Philip, when he had ſo well ſucceeded in this deſign, and rendered himſelf maſter of the city, was elated with no ſmall joy. He thought that he had performed an honourable and a glorious action. For he had brought the ſpeedieſt ſuccour to his ſon-in-law in his diſtreſs: he had

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ſtruck a terror into all thoſe that were inclined to oppoſe him: and had gained, as he ſuppoſed, by the faireſt means, a very great booty in priſoners and in money. But the circumſtances that were oppoſite to theſe he never once conſidered, though they were indeed ſufficiently notorious. For firſt, he had aſſiſted his ſon-in-law, not when he was unjuſtly attacked, but when he had himſelf made war upon his neighbours in direct breach of treaties. In the next place, by involving a Grecian city, without any juſt cauſe, in the moſt dreadful calamities of war, he confirmed the opinion which before was entertained concerning his inhuman treatment of his allies: and taught all poſterity to conſider him, upon both theſe accounts, as a man who paid no regard to the moſt ſacred obligations. Thirdly, this action was a very groſs inſult upon the ambaſſadours, who had come to him from the cities, in order to reſcue the Cianians from their danger. For while they were encouraged to remain, and were ſoothed by him with daily conferences, they were forced to be ſpectators of thoſe very evils, which they had wiſhed moſt earneſtly not to ſee. Add to all this, that the Rhodians now held him in

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ſo great abhorrence, that they would not ſo much as ſuffer the name of Philip to be any more mentioned among them. Indeed chance itſelf conſpired to raiſe againſt him this averſion. For when his ambaſſadour, in a ſtudied diſcourſe which he addreſſed to the people in the theatre at Rhodes, was endeavouring to diſplay the great generoſity of his maſter; who, though he had at this time the city of the Cianians almoſt wholly in his power, was willing, as he ſaid, to yield it as a favour to the Rhodians, and to refute by ſuch indulgence the calumnies of thoſe that oppoſed his intereſts, as well as to give alſo a moſt ſignal proof of his affection towards their ſtate; it happened that a certain man arrived from the fleet, and related in what manner the Cianians had been carried into ſlavery, and the whole cruelty that had been exerciſed upon the occaſion. Theſe news, being reported to the aſſembly by the firſt magiſtrate, at the very time when the ambaſſadour was delivering his harangue, ſtruck all the people with ſuch aſtoniſhment, that they were ſcarcely able to believe that Philip could be guilty of ſo black a perfidy. And yet this prince, when by his treacherous conduct he had been falſe rather

to himſelf than the Cianians, was ſo deſtitute of judgment, as well as loſt to all ſenſe of duty, that, inſtead of feeling remorſe and ſhame, he on the contrary boaſted of the action, as if it had been a glorious and a great exploit. From this time therefore, the Rhodians regarded him as an enemy; and reſolved to hold themſelves in readineſs to begin hoſtilities againſt him. Nor was the reſentment leſs, which the Ætolians conceived againſt him upon the ſame account. For he had juſt before compoſed his differences with that people. And yet, in the very moment almoſt when he was extending his hands towards them, when not even any pretence could be urged to cover ſuch a conduct, of the three cities, Chalcedon, Lyſimachia, and Cianus, which had lately been received into a confederacy with them, he forced the two former to ſeparate themſelves from the alliance, and carried the inhabitants of the latter into ſlavery, though an Ætolian governour at that very time commanded in the place. With reſpect to Pruſias, though he was pleaſed that his deſign had been attended with ſucceſs, yet was he on the other hand no leſs

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diſſatisfied, when he found that all the advantages of the conqueſt were poſſeſſed by another, and that nothing remained for himſelf but the bare ground of a ruined city. He was forced however to bear what he had no power to remedy.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The lamentable deſtruction of Agathocles, the guardian of young Ptolemy, together with all his family, in a popular inſurrection at Alexandria. His conduct and character. Some obſervations on the manner of relating tragical events in Hiſtory.

CHAP. I.

AGATHOCLES, having ordered the Macedonians firſt to be aſſembled, appeared before them, bringing with him the young king, and attended by his ſiſter Agathoclea. For ſome time he pretended, that his tears flowed ſo faſt that he was not able to ſpeak. But when he had often wiped his face with his mantle, and ſeemed to have ſtopped the violent courſe of his grief, lifting up the child, "Receive, ſaid he, O Macedonians, this young prince, whom his father, when he was dying, delivered indeed into the arms of my ſiſter, but intruſted to your fidelity. The affection of my ſiſter can now but

but little avail. His preſervation depends upon you alone: in your hands reſts all his fortune. It was notorious long ago to all men of judgment, that Tlepolemus was forming deſigns too high for his condition. He has now fixed the day, and even the hour, in which he has determined to aſſume the royal diadem. I aſk not, continued he, that you ſhould give credit to me alone; but to thoſe who have ſeen the truth, and who are juſt now come from being witneſſes of the tranſaction." With theſe words, he introduced to them Critolaus, who declared, that he had ſeen the altars ready, and the victims which the people had prepared for the celebration of the ceremony. But the Macedonians were ſo far from being moved with compaſſion towards him from this diſcourſe, that they did not even attend to what he ſaid: but began to ſneer and to whiſper together; and inſulted him with ſo much ſcorn, that he ſcarcely knew in what manner he at laſt withdrew himſelf from the aſſembly. He then called together, in their proper aſſemblies, the other bodies of the ſoldiery: and was received with the ſame ill treatment by them all.

During the time of this confuſion, many of the troops arrived continually from the armies that were in the upper provinces; and began to urge their kindred and their friends, to apply ſome remedy to the diſorders of the ſtate, and not ſuffer themſelves any longer to be inſulted by ſuch unworthy governours. The people were the more eaſily engaged in this deſign, and began to fear that even the leaſt delay might be attended with dangerous conſequences, becauſe Tlepolemus was maſter of the port of Alexandria, and had it in his power to ſtop all the proviſions that ſhould be coming to the city. Agathocles alſo himſelf helped greatly at this very time to provoke the rage of the multitude, as well as to incenſe Tlepolemus. For, as if he had been willing that the whole city ſhould know that a difference ſubſiſted between this General and himſelf, he took Danae, who was the ſtep-mother of the former, from the temple of Ceres, and, having dragged her through the ſtreets with her face uncovered, threw her into priſon. This action ſo exaſperated the minds of all men, that they no longer communicated their diſcontent in private confidence, and with ſecrecy, as before: but fixed

fixed up writings in the night in every part of the city; and in the day-time aſſembled together in parties, and declared aloud their deteſtation of the government.

Agathocles, perceiving this diſpoſition of the people, began now to apprehend ſome fatal conſequences. Sometimes he reſolved that he would endeavour to eſcape by flight. But as he had been ſo imprudent as not to have made any of the neceſſary preparations for ſuch a purpoſe, he was forced to deſiſt from that deſign. Sometimes again, he was beginning to form aſſociations of his friends; and ſeemed determined to make at leaſt one deſperate attempt: to deſtroy one part of his enemies; to ſeize the reſt; and afterwards avowedly to uſurp the tyranny. While he remained in this ſtate of ſuſpenſe, one of his guards, whoſe name was Mœragenes, was accuſed of betraying all his ſecrets to Tlepolemus, through the means of a correſpondence with Adæus, the governour of Bubaſte. Agathocles immediately gave orders to his ſecretary Nicoſtratus, that he ſhould take this man, and force him by every kind of torture to declare the truth. He was ſeized accordingly; and, being conducted by Ni-

coſtratus into a remote apartment of the palace, was at firſt interrogated, as he ſtood, concerning the facts with which he was charged: and when he refuſed to confeſs any thing, he was ſtripped. The guards, ſome of them were preparing the inſtruments of torture, and others, with rods in their hands, were taking off his clothes; when a ſervant came running into the apartment, and, having whiſpered ſomething to Nicoſtratus, in his ear, retired again with the greateſt haſte. Nicoſtratus immediately followed him; ſpeaking not a word, but ſmiting continually his thigh. The ſituation in which Mœragenes now found himſelf was very ſingular and ſtrange. The rods were already raiſed to ſtrike him, and the inſtruments of torture lay ready at his feet; when the attendants, upon this departure of Nicoſtratus, ſtood motionleſs, and, looking one upon another, expected his return. After ſome time, as he came not back, they all gradually withdrew themſelves from the apartment. Mœragenes, being thus left alone, paſſed through the palace unobſerved, and came, naked as he was, into a tent of the Macedonians that was near. It happened that the ſoldiers were aſſembled together to take their

their dinner. He related to them all that had been done, and the ſurpriſing circumſtances of his eſcape. Though the ſtory appeared to be almoſt incredible, yet when they ſaw that he was ſtill naked, they could not doubt of the truth. Taking occaſion therefore from this accident, he began now with tears to intreat the Macedonians, not only to afford protection to himſelf, but to take the meaſures alſo that were neceſſary for the preſervation of the king, or rather indeed for their own ſafety. For the deſtruction of them all was imminent and certain; unleſs they would ſeize the moment, when the hatred of the people againſt Agathocles, and their deſire of vengeance, were at the greateſt height. And this, he ſaid, was now that moment: and nothing was wanting, but that ſome perſons ſhould begin the enterprize. The ſoldiers were raiſed into fury by this diſcourſe; and conſented to all that was propoſed. They went firſt into the tents of the other Macedonians; and afterwards into thoſe of the reſt of the army. For they were all contiguous one to the other, and ſtood together on the ſame ſide of the city. As the diſpoſition to revolt had long been general, and waited only

to be called into action, no ſooner was this ſpirit ſet in motion, than it ſpread every way like a raging flame: ſo that, before four hours had paſſed, all orders and ranks of men, both in the camp and in the city were united in the ſame deſign. An accident alſo at this time happened, which tended greatly to facilitate the ſucceſs of the undertaking. Some ſpies were brought to Agathocles, together with a letter which had been written by Tlepolemus to the army. The purport of the letter was, that Tlepolemus was preparing to join the army: and the ſpies declared, that he was now ready to come. On receiving theſe news, Agathocles ſeemed to be bereaved at once of all his underſtanding. For, inſtead of preparing himſelf for action, or taking any of the meaſures which ſuch an exigency required, he calmly retired to his repaſt, and indulged himſelf in all the pleaſures of his table in the uſual manner.

But Oenanthe, oppreſſed with grief, went into the temple of Ceres and Proſerpine, which was now opened for the celebration of an annual ſacrifice. At her firſt entrance, ſhe fell upon her knees, and ſupplicated the protection of the Goddeſſes with the moſt ſoothing prayers.

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She then ſate down near the altar, and was quiet. Many of the women who were preſent beheld her grief and her dejection with a ſecret pleaſure, and ſaid nothing. The relations only of Polycrates, and ſome others of rank, not knowing the cauſe of her diſorder, came near to her, and were beginning to comfort her. But Oenanthe cried out with a loud voice; "Approach me not, wild beaſts as you are; I know you very well; you are enemies to our intereſts, and are praying the Goddeſſes to inflict upon us the worſt of evils: but I hope on the contrary, that they will force yourſelves to feed upon your own children." With theſe words, ſhe ordered her attendants to drive them from her, and even to ſtrike thoſe that ſhould refuſe to retire. The women therefore all left the temple; lifting up their hands to heaven, and imploring the Gods, that Oenanthe herſelf might feel thoſe curſes which ſhe had imprecated upon others. And as the men already had determined to revolt, this reſentment of their wives, being now ſpread through every houſe, added new ſtrength to the rage with which they were before inflamed.

As ſoon as night was come, in the whole city nothing was to be ſeen but tumult, lighted torches, and people running to and fro in every part. For ſome aſſembled themſelves together in the Stadium with loud cries: ſome animated the reſt: and ſome, running every way in diſorder, ſought for houſes and ſecret places in which they might lie concealed. All the open ſpaces that were near to the palace, the ſquare, the ſtadium, and the court that was round the theatre of Bacchus, were now filled with an innumerable multitude of people of every kind; when Agathocles, who had not long left his table, was awakened from ſleep, full of wine, and informed of what had happened. Immediately collecting all his kindred, Philo only excepted, he went to the king; and, after ſome few words of lamentation, took him by the hand, and carried him up into the gallery that was between the Mæander and the Palæſtra, and which led to the entrance of the theatre. He faſtened behind him the two firſt doors, and paſſed on to the third, with only two or three guards, the king, and his own family. The doors were framed in the manner of an open lattice; and were faſtened with double bars.

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The numbers of the people that were drawn together from all parts of the city were now ſo great, that not only the open places, but the ſteps alſo and the roofs of the houſes were covered with them. A confuſed noiſe and clamour was heard, from the voices of women and children mingled with thoſe of the men. For ſuch is the cuſtom at Alexandria, as well as at Carthage, that, in tumults of this kind, the children are no leſs active than the men. When the day fully appeared, amidſt the many undiſtinguiſhable cries, it was heard however above all the reſt that they called for the king. The Macedonians therefore, now firſt advancing together in a body from their tents, took poſſeſſion of the gate of the palace, which was the place of the royal audience. And, after ſome little time, being informed to what part the king had retired, they went round to the place, forced open the firſt doors of the gallery, and, as they approached the ſecond, demanded the child with loud cries. Agathocles, perceiving that the danger was ſo near, intreated the guards to go, and to declare to the Macedonians; "that he was ready to lay down the guardianſhip of the king, and all his other power: to diveſt himſelf of all his

his honours; and even to abandon all that he poſſeſſed. That he deſired only that his life might be ſpared; and that ſmall allowance yielded to him, which would be neceſſary for his ſupport. That when he ſhould have thus gone back again to his firſt condition, it would no longer be in his power, whatever might be his will, to do harm to any perſon." But the guards all refuſed to be employed in this ſervice; till at laſt it was undertaken by Ariſtomenes: the ſame who held afterwards the chief adminiſtration of the government. This man was an Acarnanian by birth; and having, as he advanced in life, obtained the ſupreme direction of affairs in Ægypt, he governed with a very high reputation both the king and kingdom; and demonſtrated indeed no leſs ability in maintaining himſelf in that exalted ſtation, than he had ſhewn before in flattering Agathocles during the time of his proſperity. For he was the firſt, who at a banquet had preſented to Agathocles alone of all the gueſts a golden crown: an honour, never accuſtomed to be paid to any but kings. He had the courage alſo to be the firſt, who wore a portrait of Agathocles in a ring. And when he had a daughter born, he gave her

her the name of Agathoclea. But this may be ſufficient to mark his character.

This man then, having received the orders before mentioned, went out thro' a little wicket, and came to the Macedonians. He had ſcarcely ſpoken a few words, and begun to declare the intentions of Agathocles, when the ſoldiers attempted in the inſtant to ſtrike their darts through his body. But ſome perſons, having covered him with their hands, and appeaſed that firſt fury, ordered him immediately to return, and to tell Agathocles, that he ſhould either bring out the king, or not dare to come out himſelf. When they had thus diſmiſſed him, they advanced againſt the ſecond door of the gallery, and forced it open. Agathocles, perceiving both by the anſwer that was brought, and by this new violence, with what rage the Macedonians were inflamed, extended now his hands through the lattice of the fartheſt door. Agathoclea likewiſe ſhewed her breaſts, which ſhe ſaid had ſuckled the king. With the moſt ſuppliant words that could be uttered, they begged that at leaſt their lives might be ſpared. But when neither their prayers nor their intreaties any thing availed,

availed, they at laſt ſent out the child, together with the guards.

The Macedonians, when they had received the king, ſet him immediately upon a horſe, and conducted him to the Stadium. As ſoon as he appeared, the people broke together into the loudeſt ſhouts of acclamation and applauſe. They ſtopped the horſe, took down the king, and conducted him to the ſeat in which their kings were accuſtomed to be ſeen. But the joy which the multitude ſhewed was ſtill mingled with grief. For while they rejoiced that they had gotten the king into their poſſeſſion, they were grieved on the other hand, that the guilty perſons were not taken, and brought to ſuffer a juſt puniſhment. They demanded therefore with continual clamour, that the authors of all the evils ſhould be delivered up to the public vengeance. As the day was now far advanced, and the people ſtill wanted the objects upon which they might vent their rage, Soſibius, who was the ſon of Soſibius, and was at this time one of the royal guards, had recourſe to an expedient, the beſt indeed that could be deviſed, with reſpect both to the king and the public peace. Perceiving that the commotion was not likely

likely to be appeaſed, and that the young prince alſo was uneaſy at ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded by perſons unknown, and terrified by the noiſe of a rude multitude, he went and aſked him, whether he conſented that thoſe who had been guilty of crimes againſt his mother and himſelf ſhould be delivered up to the people. And when he anſwered, that he conſented; Soſibius ordered ſome of the guards to declare this reſolution to the people, and at the ſame time carried the king to his own houſe which was near, to give him ſome refreſhment. As ſoon as the intentions of the king were known, the whole place again reſounded with ſhouts of approbation and of joy.

During this time Agathocles and Agathoclea had retired ſeverally to their own apartments. Some of the ſoldiers from their own voluntary motion, and others urged by the people, ſoon went in ſearch of them. But the firſt beginning of the ſlaughter that enſued was occaſioned by the following accident. One of the paraſites and ſervants of Agathocles, whoſe name was Philo, came drunk into the Stadium; and, ſeeing what was the diſpoſition of the people, told thoſe who ſtood near him, that, as ſoon as Aga-

thocles ſhould appear, they would change their ſentiments, as they had done before. Upon hearing theſe words, ſome began to revile him, and others puſhed him: and, when he attempted to defend himſelf, they tore his clothes; and ſome ſtruck the points of their ſpears into his body. He was then dragged along, ſtill breathing, and with many inſults, thro' the midſt of the multitude. As the people had now taſted of blood, they were impatient to ſee the others brought out. In a ſhort time afterwards, Agathocles came firſt, loaded with chains. As ſoon as he appeared, ſome perſons ran towards him, and inſtantly killed him. In this they performed the office, not of enemies, but of friends: for they ſaved him from the more dreadful death which his crimes deſerved. After Agathocles, Nico was brought out; then Agathoclea naked, with her ſiſters; and afterwards all the reſt of their kindred. Laſt of all, Oenanthe alſo was torn from the temple, and was brought naked on horſeback into the Stadium. All theſe were now abandoned to the fury of the multitude. Some bit them with their teeth; ſome pierced them through with weapons; and ſome tore out their eyes. And as each of them fell,

fell, they were divided limb from limb till they were all torn into pieces. For the anger of the Ægyptians always is attended with moſt terrible cruelty. At the ſame time likewiſe, the young women who had been educated with Arſinoe, being informed that Philammon had come three days before to Alexandria from Cyrene, with a deſign to kill the queen, ran to his houſe: and, having forced their entrance, they murthered him with clubs and ſtones; ſtrangled his ſon who was an infant; and then dragged his wife naked into the ſtreets, and killed her. In this diſmal manner periſhed Agathocles, Agathoclea, and all their kindred.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

I AM not ignorant indeed, with what pains ſome writers, in order to ſtrike their readers with aſtoniſhment, have heightened this tranſaction into a moſt portentous ſtory; and loaded it with a detail of ſtudied obſervation, exceeding even the relation itſelf in length. Some of them, aſcribing every thing that happened to the ſole influence of fortune, attempt to paint in the ſtrongeſt colours the inconſtancy of that Goddeſs, and to ſhew how difficult it is for men to ſecure themſelves againſt her power. Others again, when they have repreſented all the circumſtances to be indeed aſtoniſhing, endeavour afterwards to aſſign ſome probable cauſes of ſo wonderful an event. For my own part, I have reſolved not to undertake the taſk of making any ſuch reflections. For I cannot diſcover that Agathocles was diſtinguiſhed either by his military ſkill and courage; or that he poſſeſſed in any conſiderable degree that happy dexterity in the adminiſtration of civil affairs which might deſerve to be imitated;

imitated; or laſtly, that he ever excelled in that talent of courtly intrigue, that refined and crafty policy, by the means of which Soſibius and many other miniſters preſerved through their lives a ſupreme influence over thoſe princes who ſucceſſively intruſted them with the management of their affairs. He was indeed in all reſpects the very reverſe of theſe. For it was only the incapacity and weakneſs of Philopator, which firſt raiſed him, with the aſtoniſhment of all men, into high authority. And when afterwards he had the faireſt opportunity, upon the death of that prince, to maintain himſelf in his exalted ſtation, he in a ſhort time threw away, by the mere want of ſpirit and ability, both his power and his life. The ſtory of a man like this needs no enlargement; nor affords any room for ſuch reflections as might be drawn from the fortunes of that other Agathocles and Dyonyſius, the two tyrants of Sicily; and of ſome beſides, who acquired a name by their ability and great exploits. The latter of the two here mentioned derived his origin from the very loweſt of the people. The former left the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, as Timæus has ſaid of him in

the way of reproach, and came young to Syracuſe. And yet each of them, in his time, raiſed himſelf to be the tyrant of that renowned and opulent city. Afterwards, they became the ſovereigns of all Sicily; and were maſters likewiſe of many of the parts of Italy. Agathocles alſo formed ſtill greater deſigns. For he even invaded Africk: and at laſt died in the full poſſeſſion of all his honours. And from hence, it is ſaid, when Publius Scipio, the firſt conquerour of Carthage, was aſked what perſons he judged to have been the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their ſkill in government, and their wiſdom in conducting the boldeſt enterprizes, he anſwered, Dionyſius and Agathocles. Theſe then are the men, from whoſe actions an Hiſtorian may take a fair occaſion to ſtop his readers with reflections; to remind them of the power of fortune; to remark the courſe of human affairs; and, in a word, to inculcate many uſeful leſſons. But others, like the Agathocles, whoſe fate we have deſcribed, are very unfit to be made the ſubjects of ſuch diſcourſe. Upon this account, I have related without any enlargement the bare circumſtances of his fall. But there was alſo in-

deed another reaſon, which determined me with no leſs weight, to reject all amplification in the recital of this ſtory. Thoſe changes of fortune, which are dreadful and aſtoniſhing, ſhould be exhibited in a ſingle view, and ſo far only as that they may be barely known. To keep them afterwards in ſight, and to exaggerate them in a long deſcription, not only is attended with no advantage, but muſt even be painful to thoſe to whom they are ſhewn. In every thing that is offered to the eyes or ears, the deſign ſhould always be, to convey either ſome utility, or ſome pleaſure. All Hiſtory eſpecially ſhould be directed conſtantly to theſe two ends. But an exaggerated deſcription of aſtoniſhing accidents is certainly neither uſeful nor pleaſing. It cannot be uſeful, ſince no one would wiſh to imitate what is contrary to reaſon: nor pleaſing, becauſe none can be delighted either with the ſight or the relation of ſuch events as are repugnant both to nature and to the common apprehenſions of men. We may deſire indeed once, and for the firſt time only, to ſee or to hear of ſuch diſaſters; for the ſake of being aſſured, that ſome things may happen which we conceived

to be impoſſible. But when we have this aſſurance, any lengthened repetition, forced upon us, only fills us with diſguſt. An hiſtorian therefore ſhould be contented barely to relate, what may ſerve for imitation, or may be heard with pleaſure. An enlarged deſcription of calamity, which exceeds thoſe bounds, may be proper indeed for Tragedy, but not for Hiſtory. Some indulgence however may be allowed perhaps to thoſe hiſtorians, who, becauſe they neither have conſidered the works of nature, nor are acquainted with the general courſe of things in the world, are ready to regard the events which themſelves have ſeen, or which they have greedily received from others, as the greateſt and moſt wonderful that have happened in any age. Miſled by this perſuaſion, and not ſenſible of the miſtake into which they have fallen, they ſet themſelves to relate with large exaggeration tranſactions, which have not even the praiſe of novelty, ſince they have before been recounted by others, and from which their readers alſo never can derive either advantage or delight.
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THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SIXTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The naval engagement between Attalus and Philip, near the iſland of Chios.

PHILIP was now filled with great perplexity, and began to be extremely anxious with reſpect to the event. His progreſs in the ſiege had in no degree anſwered his expectation: and the enemy alſo were lying at anchor near him, with a greater number of decked ſhips than his own. As there was therefore no room left for choice, he ſuddenly ſailed away with all his fleet. This motion occaſioned no ſmall ſurprize in Attalus; who ex-

pected that the king would ſtill have continued the work of his mines againſt the city. But Philip had perſuaded himſelf, that, by getting firſt out to ſea, he ſhould be ſecure from being overtaken by the enemy; and, directing his courſe along the coaſt, might be able to arrive ſafe at Samos. He was however very greatly diſappointed in his hopes. For Attalus and Theophiliſcus no ſooner ſaw that he was getting out to ſea, than they reſolved immediately to follow him. Their fleet was not formed in order: for they had expected, as we have ſaid, that Philip would ſtill have perſiſted in the ſiege. They exerted however their whole ſkill in rowing; and, when they had overtaken the enemy, Attalus attacked the right, which was alſo the van of their fleet, and Theophiliſcus the left. Philip, finding himſelf thus intercepted in his courſe, gave the ſignal to his ſhips upon the right; commanding them to turn their prows towards the enemy, and to engage with vigour: and himſelf with ſome boats retired to the little iſlands that were in the middle of the ſtrait, deſigning to obſerve from thence the progreſs of the battle. His fleet conſiſted of fifty-three decked ſhips; beſides open veſſels, ſuch

ſuch as boats and long gallies, which were in number one hundred and fifty. Some others were left at Samos, which he had not been able to get ready. On the ſide of his enemies were ſixty-five decked ſhips, including thoſe ſent by the Byzantines; and, beſide theſe, nine biremes, and three triremes.

The veſſel in which Attalus ſailed began the combat: and the neareſt of the ſhips on both ſides, without waiting for any ſignal, immediately engaged each with the other as they approached, Attalus, having attacked an octireme, laid open the ſide by a fortunate ſtroke below the ſurface of the water; ſo that the veſſel ſunk at laſt to the bottom, though the men upon the deck maintained the fight for ſome time with the greateſt bravery. Another veſſel that belonged to Philip, carrying ten banks of oars, and which was the firſt ſhip in the fleet, was loſt by a very ſtrange accident. A bireme, having fallen under the prow of this large ſhip, was ſtruck by the latter with ſo great violence, that all the art of the pilot was not able to draw out the beak, which was fixed faſt in the middle of the hulk of the little veſſel, juſt below the uppermoſt bank of the oars. At this very time two

quinqueremes came up; and ſtriking their beaks into both the ſides of the large ſhip, which was ſo fixed in its poſition by the little veſſel that was ſuſpended from it that it was not able to move, ſunk it to the bottom, together with all that were on board. Among theſe was Democrates, the chief commander of the fleet. About the ſame time likewiſe, Dionyſidorus and Dinocrates, two brothers and commanders on the ſide of Attalus, were engaged, with circumſtances not leſs ſingular, the one with a ſeptireme, and the other with an octireme of the enemy. Dinocrates, who attacked the latter, having raiſed the prow of his veſſel, received a ſtroke in the part that was above the water, and at the ſame time ſtruck his own beak ſo deep into the lower part of the octireme, that he was not able to draw it back, tho' he many times attempted it by lightening his ſtern. In this ſituation, he was ſo cloſely attacked by the Macedonians, that he found himſelf in the greateſt danger. But Attalus, perceiving what had happened, bore down upon the octireme; and by the violence of the ſhock ſeparated the two veſſels, and ſet Dinocrates free. The Macedonians were all killed after a brave reſiſtance; and the veſſel remained

mained in the power of the conquerours. Dionyſidorus on his part, bearing down upon the ſeptireme, miſſed his ſtroke; and, as he fell againſt the enemy, loſt all the banks of his oars upon the right ſide of his veſſel, and all the battlements of his deck. The Macedonians attack him on every ſide with loud ſhouts and cries. The veſſel was ſoon ſunk, together with all that were on board. Dionyſidorus alone, and two others, ſaved themſelves by ſwimming to a bireme that was near. Among the reſt of the ſhips that were engaged, the conteſt was more equal. The advantage which Philip had in the number of his ſmall veſſels was balanced by the ſtrength of the decked ſhips on the ſide of Attalus. And, tho' the hopes of ſucceſs were the moſt promiſing on the ſide of Attalus, the vigour of the Macedonians in the right of the fleet rendered the victory at this time doubtful.

The Rhodians, when they firſt ſailed out to ſea, were at a very great diſtance behind the enemy, as we before have mentioned. But as they far exceeded them in the ſwiftneſs of their courſe, they ſoon reached the rear of the Macedonian fleet; and began to attack the veſ-

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ſels in ſtern, as they were ſailing from them, and to break their banks. The Macedonians were then forced to turn, and aſſiſt the ſhips that were thus attacked. And when the reſt of the Rhodian veſſels were come up, and had joined Theophiliſcus, the whole fleets on both ſides turned their prows, the one againſt the other, and amidſt the ſound of trumpets, and the noiſe of animating cries, engaged in ſet battle with the greateſt ardour. The action however would have been determined in a very ſhort time, and with little difficulty, if the Macedonians had not intermingled ſome ſmall veſſels among their decked ſhips, and by that meaſure fruſtrated in various manners the efforts of the Rhodian fleet. For no ſooner was the order of battle broken by the firſt ſhock, and the ſhips mingled together in confuſion, than theſe ſmall veſſels, falling in among the reſt, either ſtopped them in their courſe, or prevented them from turning, and employing with advantage their proper ſtrength; and, by obſtructing ſometimes the working of the oars, ſometimes by attacking the prow, and ſometimes again the ſtern of the larger ſhips, rendered the ſkill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers alike

alike unſerviceable. When any of the ſhips were engaged beak with beak, the Rhodians indeed diſplayed their ſuperior art. For ſetting their own veſſels low upon the prow, while they received the ſtroke of the enemy above the water, they at the ſame time ſtruck the adverſe ſhips below it, and made ſuch breaches as were irreparable. It was but ſeldom however that they availed themſelves of this advantage. Deterred by the vigour which the Macedonians ſhewed, in maintaining the fight hand to hand againſt them from their decks, they in general declined the danger of a cloſe engagement: and choſe rather to run through the fleet of the enemy, and to break the oars; and then, returning again, to direct their ſtrokes againſt the ſtern of the veſſels, or againſt the ſides, as they were turning themſelves obliquely from them; and either pierced them with their beaks, or carried away ſome part that was neceſſary for the working of the ſhip. By this method they deſtroyed a very great number of veſſels in the Macedonian fleet.

There were three Rhodian quinqueremes, that were diſtinguiſhed in a very remarkable manner in this engagement. One of theſe was the veſſel in which Theophiliſcus

philiſcus ſailed, who was the commander of the fleet. Philoſtratus was captain in the ſecond. The third had Nicoſtratus on board, and was commanded by Autolychus. The laſt of theſe ſhips had ſtruck one that belonged to the enemy with ſo great violence, that the beak was left ſticking in the veſſel. The ſhip that was ſtruck ſoon ſunk with all the men: and the other, while the water flowed in faſt at the prow, was ſurrounded on every ſide by the enemy. Autolychus defended himſelf for ſome time with the greateſt courage: till, being covered with wounds, he at laſt fell with his arms into the ſea. The reſt that were on board maintained the fight with no leſs bravery, till they were all likewiſe killed. At this time Theophiliſcus advanced towards them. Not being able to ſave the veſſel, which was already filled with water, he ſtruck two ſhips of the enemy, and forced out all that were on board. But being ſoon ſurrounded by a very great number both of light and heavy veſſels, he loſt the greateſt part of his men after a brave reſiſtance. And having himſelf alſo received three wounds, and being preſſed by the moſt imminent danger, he at laſt with great difficulty ſaved his ſhip through the

aſſiſtance

aſſiſtance of Philoſtratus, who had the courage to take his place in the action. Being then joined by ſome other veſſels, he returned once more to fight: and, tho' the ſtrength of his body was much weakened by his wounds, yet ſuch was the vigour of his mind, that he diſtinguiſhed himſelf by more glorious efforts, and by a courage more aſtoniſhing than before.

In this battle there were properly two actions, at a great diſtance one from the other. For the right of the fleet of Philip, which was attacked by Attalus, having kept their courſe cloſe along the ſhore, as they had at firſt deſigned, was not far diſtant from the continent of Aſia: while his left, which had turned to ſupport the ſhips in the rear, had approached the iſland Chios, and was engaged with the Rhodian fleet. The ſucceſs of Attalus againſt the right had been almoſt complete; and this prince, as he purſued his victory, was now come near to thoſe little iſlands, where Philip was ſtationed, expecting the event of the battle; when he perceived, that one of his own quinqueremes, which had advanced too far beyond the reſt, was ſtruck by a Macedonian veſſel, and was ready to ſink. He haſtened

haſtened therefore with two quadriremes to ſave this ſhip. And when the enemy, as he approached, declined the combat, and retired towards the land, he purſued with the greateſt eagerneſs, and was earneſt to render himſelf maſter of the Macedonian veſſel. Philip, perceiving that the king was ſo far ſeparated from the reſt of his fleet, took four quinqueremes, three biremes, and ſome boats that were near, and ſtood ready to intercept him in his return. Attalus, finding his return cut off, and being filled with the greateſt apprehenſions for his ſafety, was at laſt forced to run his ſhip cloſe in to the land, and eſcaped ſafe to Erythræ, with the reſt that were on board; while the veſſel, and all the royal furniture, fell into the hands of Philip. An artifice indeed, which he had employed upon this occaſion, very greatly facilitated his eſcape. He had ordered his moſt ſplendid furniture to be brought out, and placed upon the deck of the ſhip. When the Macedonians therefore firſt entered from their boats, and ſaw many rich goblets, a veſt of purple, and all the utenſils which accompany the regal pomp; inſtead of following the purſuit, they ſet themſelves to pillage what was before them, and by that delay gave

gave full time to the king, to continue his flight with ſafety to Erythræ.

Though Philip had been by much the greateſt ſufferer in the whole of the engagement, yet ſo much was he elated with this ſucceſs, that he ſailed back again into the open ſea, and began with great diligence to draw together his ſhips, and to encourage his men, as if he had now clearly obtained the victory. And indeed when his enemies on the other ſide perceived, that he was followed by the royal veſſel bound faſt to his own, they were all ready to believe that Attalus had periſhed. Dionyſidorus among the reſt was filled with that perſuaſion. He made the ſignal therefore for bringing together the ſhips of his own fleet: and, having ſoon collected them into a body, he ſailed away to the ports of Aſia without any danger. At the ſame time alſo, the Macedonian ſhips that were engaged againſt the Rhodians, having for a long time ſuffered greatly in the action, withdrew themſelves ſeparately from the fight, under the pretence of carrying aſſiſtance to ſome other part of the fleet. The Rhodians, when they had bound faſt to the ſtern of their own ſhips one part of the veſſels which they had taken, and broken the

the reſt into pieces, directed their courſe to Chios. In the engagement againſt Attalus, Philip had loſt one veſſel of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of ſeven, and one of ſix; together with ten other decked ſhips, three biremes, and twenty-five boats. Theſe veſſels were all deſtroyed, together with the men that were on board. In the engagement againſt the Rhodians, ten of his decked ſhips were deſtroyed, and forty boats: two quadriremes were alſo taken, and ſeven boats, with all their men. On the ſide of Attalus, one bireme and two quinqueremes were ſunk; and the royal veſſel was taken. Two quinqueremes of the Rhodians were deſtroyed, and ſome triremes; but none of their veſſels taken. No more than ſixty men were killed on the ſide of the Rhodians; and about ſeventy in the fleet of Attalus. But on the ſide of Philip, three thouſand of the Macedonian ſoldiers, and ſix thouſand of the naval forces loſt their lives. Two thouſand alſo of the Macedonians and their allies were taken priſoners. Among theſe, ſeven hundred were Egyptians. Such was the end of the naval battle near the iſland of Chios.

When

When the action was finiſhed, Philip aſſumed to himſelf, upon two accounts, the honour of the victory. The firſt was, that he had forced Attalus to run his veſſel in to the land, and had made himſelf maſter of the ſhip: and the other, becauſe he had caſt anchor, after the engagement, near the promontory Argennum, and taken his ſtation in the very midſt of the wrecks of the fleets. On the next day likewiſe, he endeavoured by his actions to ſupport the ſame pretenſion. With this deſign, and in order to perſuade men ſtill more ſtrongly that he remained the conquerour, he collected together the wrecks of all the ſhips, and took up the bodies of his own men that were to be diſtinguiſhed among the dead. But it very ſoon appeared, that this was not his own opinion. For while he was employed in this very work, Dionyſidorus and the Rhodians, having joined their fleets together, came ſailing towards the place where he was, and ſtood for ſome time before him in order of battle. And when he declined the engagement, they returned unmoleſted back to Chios.

In reality, this prince had never at any time before ſuffered ſo great a loſs in a ſingle action, either by land or ſea.

He felt himſelf very deeply affected with the misfortune; and was forced to abate much of his former ardour. He endeavoured indeed, by every method, to conceal his ſentiments from others: but the very face of things alone rendered even this attempt impracticable. For, beſide other circumſtances, the objects that preſented themſelves on every ſide, after the engagement, ſtruck all with horrour who beheld them. So great had been the ſlaughter, that the whole ſtrait at the time was covered with blood; and was filled with dead bodies, with arms, and wrecks of the ſhips. And for many days afterwards, theſe objects were ſeen mingled together, and thrown in heaps upon the ſhores. So dreadful a ſpectacle not only ſtruck Philip with confuſion, but filled all the Macedonians with extreme diſmay. Theophiliſcus, who ſurvived only one day after the battle, wrote an account of the action to his country; appointed Cleonæus in his own ſtead commander of the fleet; and then died of his wounds: having merited immortal honour, not only by his courage in the engagement, but on account of the reſolution alſo which he had ſhewn in conducting the whole deſign. For unleſs his

ſpirit

ſpirit had determined him to be thus early in attacking Philip, ſo univerſally was that prince at this time dreaded, that the preſent opportunity would have been wholly loſt. But he not only reſolved to begin the war againſt him, but obliged his country alſo to ſeize the favourable moment: and forced Attalus likewiſe, not to waſte his time in preparations, but to enter immediately into action, and to try the fortune of a battle without any delay. It was not without good reaſon therefore, that the Rhodians after his death decreed ſuch honours to his memory, as were moſt proper to encourage, not thoſe alone who were then alive, but the men alſo of future times, to render upon great occaſions the moſt effectual ſervice to their country.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The reaſon why men often abandon their deſigns.

WHAT was it then which forced him to ſtop at once in the midſt of this purſuit? It was nothing indeed but the mere nature of things. For we often ſee, that men, while they contemplate objects at a diſtance, and attend only to the great advantages that would follow from ſucceſs, engage eagerly in deſigns which are impoſſible to be accompliſhed. The violence of their deſires precludes altogether the exerciſe of their reaſon. But when the time of execution is come, and the difficulties which appear upon a nearer view are found to be abſolutely unſurmountable, their thoughts are ſuddenly bewildered and perplexed; their underſtanding becomes confuſed; and the attempt is then abandoned with the ſame precipitation with which it had before been undertaken.

EX-

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Philip renders himself master of Prinassus by a stratagem.

AFTER some attacks, which the strength of this little city rendered fruitless; Philip desisted from the attempt; and, leading his army through the country, destroyed the citadels, and plundered the villages that were near. He then went and encamped before Prinassus: and having in a short time finished his blinds, and completed the other preparations that were necessary for a siege, he began to undermine the wall of the city. But when he found that the rockiness of the soil rendered this work altogether impracticable, he had recourse to the following stratagem. He ordered the soldiers to make a great noise under ground in the day-time, as if they were employed in digging the mines, and in the night to bring earth from distant parts, and to lay it along the mouths of the pits that were opened; that the besieged, on seeing a large quantity of earth, might be

ſtruck with apprehenſions of their danger. At firſt however, the inhabitants diſplayed a great ſhew of bravery, and ſeemed determined to maintain themſelves in their poſt. But when Philip informed them by a meſſage, that the wall was undermined to the length of four hundred feet; and that he left it to their choice, whether they would now retire with ſafety, or, remaining till he ſhould ſet fire to the props, be then all deſtroyed amidſt the ruins of the place; they gave an entire credit to his account, and delivered up the city.

EX-

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The ſituation of Iaſſus. The judgment of the author concerning wonderful ſtories.

IASSUS in Aſia is ſituated upon the gulph, which is terminated on one ſide by the temple of Neptune in the Mileſian territory, and on the other by the city of Mindus; and which by many is called the Bargylietic gulph, from the cities of the ſame name which are ſpread round the innermoſt parts of it. The inhabitants of Iaſſus boaſt that they were originally a colony from Argos: but that afterwards their anceſtors, when they had ſuffered a great loſs in the Carian war, received a new colony of Mileſians, which was brought to them by the ſon of Neleus, the firſt founder of Miletus. The city contains ten ſtadia in circumference. There is a report which is firmly credited among the inhabitants of the Bargylian cities; that no ſnow or rain ever falls upon the ſtatue of the Cindyan Diana, though it ſtands in the open air.

The people of Iaſſus affirm the ſame thing alſo concerning their ſtatue of Veſta: and both theſe ſtories are related as facts by ſome hiſtorians. For my own part, I know not how it is, that I am ſtill forced in the courſe of my work to take ſome notice of ſuch traditions, which are ſcarcely to be heard with patience. It is certainly a proof of a moſt childiſh folly, to relate things, which, when they are brought to be examined, appear to be not only improbable, but even not poſſible. When a writer affirms, for example, that certain bodies, though placed in the light of the ſun, project no ſhade, what is it but a plain indication of a diſtempered brain? And yet Theopompus has declared that this happens to thoſe who are admitted into the temple of Jupiter in Arcadia. Of the ſame kind are the ſtories that have now been mentioned. I muſt confeſs indeed, that, when things of this ſort tend only to preſerve in vulgar minds a reverential awe of the divinity, writers may ſometimes be excuſed, if they employ their pains in recounting miracles, and in framing legendary tales. But nothing which exceeds that point ſhould be allowed. It is not eaſy perhaps to fix in every

every inſtance the exact bounds of this indulgence; yet neither is it abſolutely impoſſible. My opinion is, that ignorance and falſehood my be admitted in a ſmall degree; and, when they are carried farther, that they ought to be exploded.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

Scipio returns to Rome. His Triumph. The death of Syphax.

NOT long after this time Publius Scipio returned back to Rome from Africk. As the greatneſs of his actions had raiſed in men a very high and general expectation, he was ſurrounded by vaſt crouds upon his entrance, and received by the people with the greateſt marks of favour. Nor was this only reaſonable, but an act alſo of neceſſary duty. For they who not long before had not ſo much as dared to hope, that Annibal ever could be driven out of Italy, or the danger be removed from their own perſons and their families, now ſaw themſelves not only freed from the apprehenſion of any preſent evils, but eſtabliſhed alſo in a laſting and firm ſecurity, by the intire conqueſt of their enemies. Upon this occaſion therefore, they ſet no bounds to their joy. On the day likewiſe in which he entered the city in triumph, as the objects that

were viewed in the proceſſion repreſented moſt clearly to the ſenſes of the people the dangers from which they had eſcaped, they ſtood as in an ecſtaſy of paſſion, pouring out thanks to the Gods, and acknowledgements to the author of ſo great a deliverance. Among the reſt of the priſoners Syphax alſo, the Maſſæſylian king, was led along a captive in the proceſſion: and after ſome time he died in priſon. When the ſolemnity of the triumph was finiſhed, there was afterwards in Rome, during many days, a continual ſucceſſion of games and ſpectacles; the expence of which was defrayed by Scipio, with a generoſity which was worthy of him.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The prudent conduct of Philip after his defeat.

THERE are many men indeed, who may be obſerved to begin an action well, and even to redouble their ardour as they advance, till they have made a very conſiderable progreſs: but to conduct an enterprize completely to the end, and, even when fortune obſtructs them in their courſe, to ſupply by prudence whatever may have been defective in alacrity and vigour, is the portion only of a few. In this view, as the inaction of Attalus and the Rhodians, after their late victory may juſtly be cenſured; ſo, on the other hand, the magnanimity and the royal ſpirit, with which Philip perſiſted ſtill in his deſigns, deſerves not leſs to be applauded. Let it be remarked however, that it is not my meaning to apply this commendation to the general character and conduct of this prince; but that I am ſpeaking only of the attention which he

he exerted upon the preſent occaſion. Without this diſtinction, I might be charged perhaps with inconſiſtency; in having not long before applauded Attalus and the Rhodians, and cenſured Philip, and delivering now a contrary judgment. But for this very purpoſe it was, that I obſerved expreſsly in the beginning of my work, that an Hiſtorian often is obliged to applaud and to condemn the ſame perſons, as different occaſions may require. For the revolutions of affairs, and ſudden accidents as they ariſe, are frequently ſeen to change the intentions of men from good to bad, or from bad to good. And even without the impreſſion of external circumſtances, the natural inconſtancy of the human mind ſometimes determines men to a right courſe of action, and ſometimes to that which is altogether wrong. The force of one or other of theſe cauſes was now clearly viſible in Philip. For though this prince ſuffered no ſmall concern from his late defeat, and was apt, almoſt at all times, to be hurried along by violence and paſſion, yet upon this occaſion he accommodated himſelf with a moſt aſtoniſhing prudence to the exigency of the times. By this conduct he was again enabled to reſume

reſume the war againſt the Rhodians and king Attalus; and in the end accompliſhed all that he propoſed. Such an inſtance of his prudence deſerved not to paſs altogether without remark. For ſome men, like bad racers, abandon their deſigns, when they are arrived even almoſt at the end of their courſe: while others, on the contrary, obtain a victory againſt their rivals, by exerting in that very moment more ſtrenuous efforts than before.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The ſituation of Seſtus and Abydus. The ſiege of this laſt city: and the deſperate reſolution of the citizens.

IT would be needleſs to enter into a long deſcription of the ſituation of Seſtus and Abydus, or to enumerate the conveniences which they poſſeſs. For theſe cities are ſo ſingularly placed, that there is ſcarcely any one, unleſs among the moſt vulgar of mankind, who has not acquired ſome knowledge of them. But it will not be unuſeful upon the preſent occaſion, to turn the attention of the reader to a general view of their poſition. And indeed whoever will compare and lay together what I am going to ſay, may obtain from thence a juſter notion of theſe two cities, than even from an examination of the ground upon which they ſtand.

As it is not poſſible then to ſail from the Ocean, or, as it is called by others, from the Atlantick, into our ſea, without paſſing through the ſtrait of the Pillars

lars of Hercules; ſo neither is there any way of ſailing from our ſea into the Propontis and the Pontus, unleſs through the paſſage that lies between Seſtus and Abydus. In one reſpect indeed, theſe ſtraits are very differently formed. For that of the Pillars of Hercules is much larger than the Helleſpont, and contains ſixty ſtadia in breadth; whereas the other, between Seſtus and Abydus, has no more than two. But in making this difference, Fortune ſeems to have acted not altogether without deſign. One reaſon of it, as far as we are able to conjecture, ſeems to be, that the exterior ocean is by many degrees larger than our ſea. To this we may add, that the ſtrait of Abydus is better adapted, upon this account, to the neceſſities of thoſe who live upon it. For as both ſides of it are covered with inhabitants, the narrowneſs of the paſſage ſerves as a kind of gate for their mutual intercourſe. For this purpoſe, they ſometimes throw a bridge over the ſtrait, and paſs from one ſide to the other on foot. At other times, veſſels are ſeen ſailing continually upon it. But the ſtrait of the Pillars of Hercules is very rarely uſed, and only by a few. For the people that live on both ſides, in the extreme borders

ders of Africk and of Europe, have but little communication one with another, and ſcarcely any knowledge of the exterior ſea. The city Abydus is incloſed alſo on either ſide by the promontories of Europe; and has a harbour, which affords a ſafe ſhelter to the ſhips that are ſtationed in it againſt every wind. But without the entrance of the harbour, it is not poſſible for any veſſel ever to caſt anchor, on account of the rapidity and violence with which the waters are carried through the ſtrait.

This was the city, to which Philip was now laying ſiege both by land and by ſea. On the ſide of the latter, he had blocked the place cloſely by piles planted croſſways: and, by land, had carried an entrenchment round the walls. The greatneſs of the preparations that were made, the variety of the works that were contrived, the ſkill and artifice that were employed in carrying into execution every uſual method either of attack or of defence; theſe, however memorable, are not the things that are moſt worthy of admiration upon the preſent occaſion. But the generous reſolution and the extravagant ſpirit, which appeared in the beſieged, were ſo ſingular and aſtoniſhing, that this

ſiege, upon that account alone, deſerves more than any other to be tranſmitted to poſterity in laſting characters. At firſt, repoſing an intire confidence in their own ſtrength, they ſuſtained all the attacks of Philip with the greateſt firmneſs: diſabling the machines that were advanced againſt the city from the ſea, by ſtones thrown from their Baliſtæ; or deſtroying them by fire; ſo that the Macedonians were ſcarcely able to withdraw even their ſhips from the danger. On the ſide of the land likewiſe, they repulſed the king in his approaches with ſo great vigour and ſucceſs, that for ſome time they ſeemed to hope, that they ſhould force him to deſiſt from his attempt. But when they ſaw the outer wall of the city fall down; and that the Macedonians had brought their mines very near alſo to the wall which had been raiſed within the other, to ſupply the place of that which had fallen; they then ſent Iphiades and Pantacnotus to treat with Philip, and offered to ſurrender the city to him upon theſe conditions: that the troops which they had received from Attalus and the Rhodians ſhould be diſmiſſed with an aſſurance of ſafety; and the free citizens be allowed to depart to what places ſoever they

they ſhould chooſe, with the garments that were upon their bodies. But Philip ordered the deputies to go back again and tell the beſieged, that they either muſt ſurrender at diſcretion, or continue to defend themſelves with courage.

The Abydenians, when they had received this anſwer, met together in council, and, with minds agitated by deſpair, deliberated on the meaſures which they now ſhould take. They reſolved firſt, that the ſlaves ſhould be made free; that they might aſſiſt without reſerve in the defence of the city. In the next place, that all the women of the city ſhould be aſſembled together in the temple of Diana; and all the children, with their nurſes, in the Gymnaſium. That all their gold and ſilver likewiſe ſhould be laid together in the Forum: and, in the ſame manner, all their valuable veſtments, in the Rhodian quadrireme, and in the trireme of the Cyzicenians. Theſe things, being thus decreed, were carried into execution with one conſent. They then called together another aſſembly: and, having choſen fifty of the oldeſt men, who were judged to be moſt worthy of ſuch a truſt, and who had ſtrength ſufficient alſo to accompliſh all that was propoſed,

they made them ſwear in the preſence of all the citizens, that, as ſoon as the enemy ſhould become maſters of the inner wall, they would kill the women and the children; ſet fire to the two veſſels; and throw the gold and the ſilver into the ſea. After this, the prieſts being called, all the reſt of the citizens were engaged likewiſe by a ſolemn oath, that they would either conquer, or die fighting in the defence of their country. And to conclude the whole, having ſlain ſome victims in ſacrifice, they obliged the prieſts and prieſteſſes to pronounce upon the burning entrails, dire execrations againſt thoſe who ſhould neglect to perform what they had ſworn. When all was finiſhed, they no longer endeavoured to countermine the enemy; but reſolved only, that, as ſoon as the wall ſhould fall, they would exert their utmoſt efforts upon the breach, and continue fighting till they ſhould all expire.

And now may it not be ſaid, that both the deſperate reſolution of the Phocæans, which has before been mentioned, and the magnanimous ſpirit alſo of the Acarnanians, were ſurpaſſed by the daring courage which the Abydenians ſhewed upon this occaſion? For when the Phocæans

cæans entered into a like determination with reſpect to their families, they had ſtill ſome hopes of ſaving themſelves by a victory; having an opportunity of engaging the Theſſalians in a ſet battle. The Acarnanians likewiſe had in their power the ſame reſource. For when they only expected an invaſion from the Ætolians, they paſſed in their council a ſimilar decree. We have before given a particular account of theſe tranſactions. But the Abydenians, already encloſed on every ſide, and having no means of ſafety remaining in their power, choſe rather to periſh, every man, together with their wives and children; than to live with the certain expectation of ſeeing their children and their wives fall into the hands of their enemies. The conduct therefore of Fortune, with regard to this laſt people, may well be charged with ſome injuſtice. She compaſſionated the diſtreſſes of the others, retrieved their affairs by a victory, and reinſtated them in ſafety when they had almoſt loſt all hope. To the Abydenians alone ſhe ſhewed no favour. The men all loſt their lives; the city was taken; and the children with their mothers came alive into the power of the enemy. For as ſoon as the inner wall fell down, the

citizens, in obſervance of their oaths, all mounted the breach, and oppoſed the entrance of the enemy with ſo great fury, that Philip, though he ſent continually, even till night came on, freſh troops to the aſſault, was at laſt forced to deſiſt, and began to apprehend that the whole deſign was irrecoverably loſt. For the foremoſt of the Abydenians not only advanced with a frantick kind of deſperation over the dead bodies of the enemy; nor were contented to employ their ſpears and their ſwords alone with a moſt aſtoniſhing force; but, when their weapons were rendered uſeleſs, or were torn by violence out of their hands, graſping the Macedonians cloſe, they threw ſome of them with their armour upon the ground; broke the ſpears of others; and, catching the fragments from them, turned the points againſt their faces, and againſt the other parts of their bodies that were uncovered; and by theſe means threw them into extreme conſternation and diſmay. But when the night had put an end to the combat, the greateſt part of the citizens being left dead upon the breach, and the reſt diſabled by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus, having aſſembled together a ſmall number of the oldeſt men,

men, prevailed with them to abandon that moſt glorious and moſt admirable determination which they ſo lately had embraced, and to conſider only their own preſent ſafety. They reſolved therefore to ſave the women and the children alive; and, as ſoon as the day ſhould appear, that they would ſend the prieſts and prieſteſſes, dreſſed in their holy habits, to implore the mercy of Philip, and to deliver the city to him.

At the very time of this tranſaction, Attalus, having heard that the Abydenians were beſieged, ſailed through the Ægean ſea to Tenedos: and Marcus Æmilius, who was the youngeſt of the Roman ambaſſadours, came to Abydus. For the ambaſſadours that were ſent from Rome, having received alſo at Rhodes the notice of this ſiege, and becauſe they had orders likewiſe to obtain an interview with Philip, ſtopped their journey to the other kings, and ſent Æmilius to Abydus to confer perſonally with that prince. The Roman, being admitted into his preſence, declared to him the orders of the ſenate: "that he ſhould not make war upon any of the people of Greece, nor invade any of the dominions that belonged to Ptolemy; and that he ſhould engage to make

an equitable compenſation for the loſſes which Attalus and the Rhodians had unjuſtly ſuſtained. That, if he would comply with theſe conditions, he might ſtill remain in peace: if otherwiſe, that the Romans would declare war againſt him." The king endeavoured to convince the ambaſſadour, that the Rhodians had firſt attacked him. But Æmilius, interrupting him; "And what, ſaid he, did the Athenians? what, the Cianians? what, at this moment, the unhappy Abydenians? did either of theſe firſt attack you?" Philip, after ſome heſitation, told him; that for three reaſons he would excuſe the haughtineſs of this addreſs. Firſt, becauſe he was a young man, not yet experienced in affairs: in the next place, becauſe he was the handſomeſt man of his age; which indeed was true: and, laſtly, becauſe he was a Roman. He then added, that it was his earneſt wiſh, that the Romans would ſtill confine themſelves within the bounds of their treaties, and lay aſide all thoughts of war. But if they determine otherwiſe, we ſhall then, continued he, invoke the aſſiſtance of the gods, and defend ourſelves againſt them with our utmoſt ſtrength. After this diſcourſe they ſeverally retired. The king

then took poſſeſſion of the city; and without any difficulty ſeized all the treaſure, which the Abydenians had before collected, and laid together in heaps. But how great was his aſtoniſhment, when he ſaw the numbers of the perſons that deſtroyed themſelves, together with their wives and children, with the moſt eager fury. Some ſtabbed, ſome ſtrangled themſelves; ſome plunged themſelves alive into wells; and others threw themſelves headlong down from the roofs of the houſes. Filled with grief at this diſmal ſight, he ordered proclamation to be made, that he would allow three days to thoſe who ſhould chooſe to hang, or otherwiſe deſtroy themſelves. But the Abydenians had before determined their own fate, and adhered inflexibly to their firſt purpoſe. They conſidered themſelves as guilty of a kind of treaſon againſt thoſe brave citizens, who had periſhed in the defence of their country: nor would any among them ſubmit to live, except thoſe whoſe hands were tied, or who were reſtrained by ſome other kind of force. The reſt, with their whole families, without any delay, embraced a voluntary death.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The expedition of Philopœmen againſt Nabis.

PHILOPOEMEN, having firſt computed the reſpective diſtances of all the Achæan cities, and conſidered alſo, which of them lay along the ſame roads in going towards Tegea, wrote letters to them all, and ſent them in different parcels, to the cities that were at the greateſt diſtance from that place: the parcels being ſo compoſed, that each of theſe cities, together with the letter addreſſed to itſelf, received thoſe likewiſe that were written to the reſt of the cities which ſtood upon the ſame road. The firſt letter was addreſſed to the chief magiſtrate of the city, and contained the following words: "As ſoon as you have received this letter, aſſemble together in the Forum all the men of military age with their arms. Let them be furniſhed with proviſions, and with money for five days: and, when they are formed into a body, conduct them to the next city. On your arrival there, deliver the letter that is addreſſed alſo to the chief

chief magiſtrate of that city; and let the contents of it in like manner be obeyed." This ſecond letter contained the ſame orders as the former; and was different only in the name of the next city to which the troops were to be conducted. The ſame method was obſerved through all the cities: and the reſult of this management was, that, as no one was able to conjecture what was the deſign and object of the expedition, ſo neither had the troops themſelves any farther knowledge of their march, than that they were going to the next city; but remaining ſtill in a ſtate of doubt and ignorance, joined themſelves each to the others, and continued to advance. As the firſt and moſt diſtant cities were not all ſituated at an equal diſtance from Tegea, care had been alſo taken, that the letters ſhould not be delivered to them all at once; but at different times, proportioned to their reſpective diſtances. And from hence it happened, that, when neither the Tegeans, nor the troops themſelves, had conceived any expectation of ſuch an accident, the Achæans all arrived at Tegea in the ſame moment in arms, and entered the city together by all the different gates. The deſign of Philopœmen was, to elude by this

this contrivance the obſervation of thoſe ſpies and gatherers of news, which Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, had diſperſed through the country.

Having thus formed his project, on the day on which the Achæans were expected to arrive, he ſent away a ſelect body of troops from Tegea; with orders, that they ſhould conceal themſelves during the night in the neighbourhood of Selaſia, and early on the following day make incurſions into the Lacedæmonian territory. That, if the Spartan mercenaries ſhould be drawn together to oppoſe them, they ſhould then retreat towards Scotita; and in all other things obey the orders of Didaſcalondas of Crete, to whom he had communicated his whole deſign. This meaſure being carried into execution, he directed the Achæans to take their ſupper at an early hour, and then led them out of Tegea. Having continued his march all night with the greateſt haſte, he arrived at break of day, and took his poſt ſecretly in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The Spartan mercenaries that were ſtationed in Pellene, having received notice in the morning from their ſcouts, that ſome troops of the enemy were making incur-

incurſions in the country, immediately ſallied out, and attacked them with their accuſtomed vigour. The Achæans obſerved their orders and retreated. The mercenaries purſued with the greateſt eagerneſs: till, being at laſt arrived at the place where the reſt of the Achæans lay concealed, they were ſuddenly ſurrounded by them, and were all either killed or taken priſoners.

THE

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SEVENTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Conferences between Philip, Flaminius, and the deputies of the allies. They all send ambassadours to Rome. The Roman senate resolves that the war shall be continued against Philip.

CHAP. I.

WHEN the day appointed for the conference was come, Philip sailed from Demetrias in an armed sloop, accompanied with five boats, and came into the Malian gulph. He was attended by his two

two ſecretaries, Apollodorus and Demoſthenes, both Macedonians; by Brachyllus of Bœotia; and by Cycliadas an Achæan, who had been forced to fly out of Peloponneſus, for the reaſons that have before been mentioned. On the other ſide, with Titus Flaminius, came the king Amynander; Dionyſodorus, on the part of Attalus; and deputies alſo from the other ſtates and cities. On the part of the Achæans appeared Ariſtænetus and Xenophon: for the Rhodians, Aceſimbrotus, their chief naval commander: and, in the name of the Ætolians, Phæneas, their Prætor, with many others that were employed in the adminiſtration of the government. When they were all come near together upon the coaſt of Nicæa, Flaminius ſteered his veſſel cloſe in to the land, and went and ſtood upon the ſhore. But Philip, though he alſo approached the land, ſtood aloof at ſome little diſtance from it: and, when the former called to him to come on ſhore, he anſwered from his ſhip that he would not do it. The other aſked him, who it was that he feared? I fear no one, ſaid Philip, except the Gods: but I have juſt reaſon to be diſtruſtful of many that are here preſent, eſpecially of the Ætolians. Flaminius

minius was surprised, and said, that the opportunity was the same, and the danger equal to all. The danger is by no means equal, replied Philip; for if Phæneas were to be killed, the Ætolians might find many other Prætors; but, if the same thing should happen to me, the Macedonians would at this time be left without a king. This beginning gave no small offence to all that were present. He was desired however by the Roman General to speak what he had to say upon the subject of their meeting. Philip answered, that it belonged not to him to speak, but to the Roman. That for his own part therefore he only desired Flaminius to declare, upon what conditions he might be suffered to remain in peace. The conditions, replied Flaminius, are clear and simple. I order you to relinquish every part of Greece: to send back all the prisoners and deserters to their respective countries: to restore to the Romans the places which you have conquered in Illyria since the treaty of Epirus; and to Ptolemy all the cities which you have taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Then turning himself towards the other deputies, he bade them declare the orders which they had re-

ceived from their ſeveral ſtates. Dionyſodorus began the firſt; and demanded in the name of Attalus, that Philip ſhould deliver to that prince all the ſhips and men which he had taken in the engagement near the iſland of Chios; and reſtore alſo, in the ſame condition as before, the Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, which he had plundered and deſtroyed. Next to him, Aceſimbrotus on the part of the Rhodians required, that the king ſhould reſtore the diſtrict of Peræa, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garriſons from Iaſſus, and the cities of Bargylia and Euromea; allow the Perinthians to be united as before in the ſame common government as the Byzantines; and, in the laſt place, that he ſhould deliver up Seſtus and Abydus, together with all the ports and places of traffick which he poſſeſſed in Aſia. After the Rhodians, the Achæans demanded likewiſe the reſtitution of Argos and of Corinth. Laſt of all, the Ætolians inſiſted alſo, as the Romans had done, that Philip ſhould relinquiſh every part of Greece; and to this they added, that he ſhould reſtore unhurt the cities which had been before aſſociated with them in their government.

Theſe

Theſe demands were made by Phæneas the Ætolian Prætor. But there was a certain Alexander, ſurnamed the Iſian, who was conſidered among the Ætolians as a very able ſpeaker, and well verſed alſo in affairs. This man then began to ſpeak. "It was not, he ſaid, to be expected, that Philip would now employ any greater ſincerity in making peace, than he had at any time ſhewn ſpirit in making war. That in conferences and negotiations, his endeavour was always to lay ſnares; to watch for ſome advantage; and to act even upon ſuch occaſions a hoſtile part. That his manner of making war was alike contrary to juſtice, and void of courage. That he never dared to look his enemies in the face, but fled always before them: pillaging and burning the cities in his flight; and depriving the conquerours by this diſhonourable method of the juſt fruits of their victory. How different, continued he, was the conduct of the former kings of Macedon? They engaged continually in ſet battles in the open field; and ſcarcely at any time deſtroyed or overthrew the cities. Such was the manner in which Alexander maintained his war in Aſia againſt Darius, and atchieved the conqueſt of that

mighty empire. The ſame was the conduct of his Generals who came after him, when they contended together for the ſame Aſia againſt Antigonus. The ſame was that of all the ſucceeding princes to the time of Pyrrhus. Eager always to encounter with their enemies in the field, they employed every effort to determine their diſputes by arms: but ſpared the cities, that the conquerours might poſſeſs them, and gain ſubjects by whom they might be honoured. And indeed, to relinquiſh the war itſelf, and only to deſtroy thoſe things for the ſake of which it is made; what is it but the work of the very ſtrongeſt madneſs? Yet this is the manner in which Philip acts. For ſince the time of his retreat, which was made with ſo great haſte through the paſſes of Epirus, he has deſtroyed in Theſſaly, among the people who are his allies and friends, more cities than their enemies have at any time deſtroyed." Many other things were urged by him in ſupport of the ſame charge. And he then concluded his diſcourſe, with demanding of Philip; for what reaſon, when Lyſimachia was confederated with the Ætolians, and governed by an Ætolian Prætor, he had driven out that magiſtrate, and placed a Mace-

Macedonian garriſon in the city? Upon what pretences, even while himſelf was allied by treaty with the Ætolians, he had carried the Cianians into ſlavery, who were aſſociated alſo with the Ætolian ſtate? And laſtly, by what ſhew of right he now held poſſeſſion of Echinus, of the Pthian Thebes, of Pharſalus and of Lariſſa?

As ſoon as he had ended, Philip approached nearer to the land; and, ſtanding forwards in his ſhip, "This is in truth, ſaid he, an harangue very worthy of an Ætolian, a declamation proper only for the ſtage. For who does not know, that no man ever willingly occaſions the deſtruction of his allies: but that in certain conjunctures the leaders of armies are forced to take many meaſures that are repugnant to their inclinations." He was ſtill ſpeaking, when Phæneas, who was very near-ſighted, roughly interrupted him, and told him that he was wandering from the ſubject; for that he ought either to conquer in the field, or to receive the law from the conquerours. "Without doubt, replied Philip, turning himſelf quick towards him; even a blind man can ſee that." For this prince had a ſtrong propenſity to raillery: and even

at this time, when his affairs were in no very proper condition for jeſting, he was not able to reſtrain his natural inclination. Afterwards, addreſſing his diſcourſe again to Alexander; "You demand of me, ſaid he, for what reaſon I poſſeſſed myſelf of Lyſimachia? It was to prevent the Thracians from taking advantage of your negligence to deſtroy that city: the very thing which happened afterwards; when the war forced me to withdraw the troops, which I had placed there, not as a garriſon, but as a defence only againſt thoſe invaders. Nor was it I that made war upon the Cianians. But when Pruſias had declared war againſt them, I aſſiſted him indeed in conquering their city. If there was any crime in this proceeding, to yourſelves alone the guilt muſt be imputed. For how often have we demanded of you, both myſelf and all the ſtates of Greece, an abrogation of the law, which allows you to take ſpoils from the ſpoils? But you have always anſwered, that you would ſooner ſeparate Ætolia from Ætolia, than relinquiſh that law." Flaminius was aſtoniſhed, not being able to conceive the meaning of theſe words. Philip therefore explained it by informing him, that it was the cuſtom of this people

people not only to pillage the lands of thoſe with whom they were at war; but that when any other perſons, even thoſe that were the allies and friends of the Ætolians, were engaged in war againſt each other; the latter held it to be lawful for them to join their arms, though without any public decree, both to the one and the other of the contending parties, and to ravage the lands of both. That upon ſuch occaſions they knew not any difference between enmity and friendſhip: for that their neighbours, all equally without diſtinction, whenever any contention aroſe among them, were ſure to have the Ætolians for their enemies? "With what ſhew of juſtice then, continued he, do they now urge it as a crime, that, when I was indeed in friendſhip with the Ætolians, but at the ſame time was allied to Pruſias, I ſcrupeled not to attack the Cianians, in ſupport of my ally? But that which is moſt inſufferable is, that theſe men now aſſume to themſelves an equality with the Romans; and, like them, command the Macedonians to relinquiſh the whole of Greece. This language, haughty indeed as it is, may be born however from the Romans; but from the Ætolians it is intolerable. And tell

me, I pray you, what is this Greece, from which I am commanded to retire? By what limits is it to be circumſcribed? For a great part even of the Ætolians are not Greeks. The countries of the Agræans, the Apodotæ, the Amphilochians; theſe are no parts of Greece. May I be allowed to retain poſſeſſion of theſe?" Flaminius ſmilled at this pleaſantry. "But enough has been ſaid, continued Philip, upon the ſubject of the Ætolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, it would be thought more reaſonable by any equitable judge, that they ſhould reſtore to me the ſhips and the men which they have taken from me, than that I ſhould reſtore their ſhips to them. But, if ſuch be your pleaſure Alexander, I will reſtore the diſtrict of Peræa to the Rhodians, and to Attalus thoſe of his ſhips and men which are ſtill preſerved. The Nicephorium and the Temple of Venus, ſince they already are deſtroyed, it is not in my power, unleſs by one way only, to reſtore. I will ſend ſome plants to the place, and ſome gardeners alſo, who ſhall cultivate the ground, and make the trees grow that have been cut down." Flaminius laughed again at this droll conceit: and Philip, paſſing next to the Achæans, enume-

enumerated all the acts of kindness which they had received from Antigonus, and from himself. He then recounted also the many and great honours which this people had conferred upon the kings of Macedon. And having, in the last place, recited the decree, by which they had renounced the friendship of the Macedonians, and embraced the party of the Romans, he from thence took occasion to inveigh largely against their ingratitude and their breach of faith. In conclusion he said, that he was willing however to restore Argos to them; but that with respect to Corinth, he would deliberate concerning it with Flaminius.

Having in this manner finished his discourse to all the rest, he now addressed himself, as he expressly declared, to Flaminius and the Romans: and desired to be informed, what places and what cities of Greece he was commanded to relinquish; those only which he had conquered, or the others also which had been transmitted to him from his ancestors. As Flaminius made no answer, Aristænetus immediately rose up to speak on the part of the Achæans, and Phæneas for the Ætolians. But the day being now almost closed prevented any farther debate.

Philip

Philip then requeſted, that he might receive all together in writing the conditions upon which peace might be obtained. He was left, he ſaid, alone, without a ſingle perſon, by whom he might be adviſed: and that he wiſhed to retire, and to conſider with his beſt attention the conceſſions that were exacted from him. Flaminius had heard with pleaſure the railleries which this prince had mingled with his diſcourſe: and not being willing that it ſhould be ſaid, that he had nothing to reply, he now rallied Philip in his turn. "You do well indeed, ſaid he, to complain that you are left alone: how can it be otherwiſe; when you have put all thoſe to death, who might at this time have aſſiſted you with the beſt advice?" The king forced a kind of reluctant ſmile, and made no reply. The demands of the ſeveral ſtates were then given to him in writing, and were the ſame that have been mentioned. After this the aſſembly ſeparated; having appointed a ſecond meeting in the ſame place on the following day.

On the next day then Flaminius came again to the place. All the reſt alſo were preſent, Philip only excepted, who did not appear. But when the day was ſo far advanced,

advanced, that there remained but little expectation of his coming, he at laſt arrived juſt in the evening, attended by the ſame perſons as before. The conditions, he ſaid, were ſo perplexing, and ſo full of difficulty, that he had waſted the whole day in the conſideration of them. But the others believed, that his deſign in coming ſo late was, that the Ætolians and Achæans might not have time ſufficient to accuſe him. For he had obſerved, when he retired from the former conference, that they were both ready to enter into farther altercation, and to renew their complaints againſt him. And this indeed appeared to be the truth, when now, upon his firſt approach, he deſired to be allowed a ſeparate conference with Flaminius; that, inſtead of ſkirmiſhing any more together with words, ſome end might at laſt be put to their diſputes. As he urged this requeſt with repeated earneſtneſs, Flaminius, when he had firſt aſked the opinion of the reſt, and received their conſent for him to hear what the king would offer, took with him the Tribune Claudius, and, having directed the other deputies to retire to a little diſtance from the ſhore, ordered Philip to come upon the land. The king accordingly

left his ſhip, attended by Apollodorus and Demoſthenes; joined Flaminius; and conferred with him for a very conſiderable time. What paſſed on both ſides upon this occaſion, it is not eaſy for me to ſay. But Flaminius, after Philip had departed from him, informed the reſt; that the king was ready to ſurrender to the Ætolians Pharſalus and Lariſſa, but not Thebes; and to the Rhodians the diſtrict of Peræa, but not the cities of Iaſſus and Bargylia: that he would reſtore to the Achæans both Argos and Corinth: would deliver to the Romans all the places in Illyria, and all the priſoners: and to Attalus, the ſhips which he had taken from him in the late engagement, together with the men likewiſe that were at this time in his hands. Theſe offers were rejected at once by all the aſſembly. They demanded that Philip ſhould firſt conſent to the condition which they all required; that of relinquiſhing the whole of Greece. Unleſs this was done, the conceſſions which he was diſpoſed to make to particular ſtates would be vain and ineffectual. Philip, perceiving that the conteſt was likely to be vehement, and being apprehenſive that he ſhould again be forced to hear himſelf accuſed, deſired that the aſſembly

aſſembly might be deferred to the morrow: that the day was already cloſed: and that he would either bring himſelf to yield to the conditions that were exacted from him, or prevail with the others to accept the terms which he had offered. Flaminius conſented to this requeſt, and appointed the ſhore near Thronium for the place of the third conference.

On the following day they all met together at an early hour. Philip, having firſt in a ſhort diſcourſe, intreated all that were preſent, and Flaminius above the reſt, not to obſtruct the concluſion of the peace, when it was manifeſt that the greateſt part were inclined to conſent to ſome accommodation, ſaid that he wiſhed indeed, if it was poſſible, that all their differences might be adjuſted among themſelves. But, if this was not to be accompliſhed, he then deſired, that he might be allowed to ſend ambaſſadours to Rome. That he either would engage the ſenate to yield to him the matters in diſpute; or would ſubmit to every thing which they ſhould otherwiſe enjoin. The deputies all at once rejected this propoſal, and cried out that the war muſt be continued. But Flaminius ſaid, that he very well knew that Philip never would perform

perform the conditions that were demanded of him. That their compliance however with this requeſt would bring no injury to their affairs. That the conditions themſelves, as they had been now propoſed, could not otherwiſe be ratified, than by the authority of the ſenate: and that the preſent time was the moſt commodious for informing themſelves of the inclinations of that aſſembly. For as the armies would not be able to attempt any thing during the winter, by employing that ſeaſon of inaction in ſending deputies to Rome, they would advance, and not retard, the end which they all deſired. As it appeared from this diſcourſe, that Flaminius himſelf was not unwilling to refer the matter to the ſenate, the reſt readily concurred in this deſign, and conſented that Philip ſhould ſend ſome ambaſſadours to Rome. At the ſame timeit was determined, that ambaſſadours ſhould be deputed likewiſe from the other ſtates, to lay their pretenſions before the ſenate, and ſupport their accuſations againſt the king.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

FLAMINIUS, having in this manner brought the conferences to an end moſt favourable to his own intentions, and the ſame which he had from the firſt deſigned, applied himſelf now to finiſh what remained of the work; and, while he took ſuch meaſures as were neceſſary for his own ſecurity, was careful not to leave any handle of advantage to Philip. Granting therefore to him a truce for two months, he commanded him to ſend his ambaſſadours to Rome within that time, and immediately to withdraw his garriſons from Phocis and from Locris: at the ſame time taking alſo every other precaution that was requiſite, to prevent the allies from receiving any injury from the Macedonians during the continuance of the truce. He gave theſe orders in writing to Philip: and then made haſte to finiſh what more particularly regarded his own deſign. He firſt engaged Amynander to go immediately to Rome: well knowing

knowing that this prince, who was of a flexible and pliant diſpoſition, would eaſily be directed by his friends in the city; and that the title alſo of king would raiſe the public expectation, and give ſplendour to the negotiation. He then deputed thither, on his own part, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of his wife; Quintus Fulvius; and Appius Claudius, whoſe ſurname was Nero. On the part of the Ætolians were ſent Alexander the Iſian, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicæarchus of Trichonium, Polimarchus of Arſinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, and Nicomachus of Acarnania. The exiles that had been driven from Thyreum, and had taken refuge in Ambracia, ſent alſo in their name Theodotus of Pheræ; who, after his baniſhment from Theſſaly, had fixed his reſidence in Stratus. The Achæans deputed Xenophon of Ægium; king Attalus, only Alexander: and the Athenians, Cephiſodorus.

When theſe Ambaſſadours arrived at Rome, the ſenate had not finally determined the allotment of the provinces to the magiſtrates of the year; but were making it the ſubject of their deliberation, whether both the Conſuls ſhould be ſent into Gaul, or one of them be charged

ed with the war againſt the king of Macedon. But after ſome time, when the friends of Flaminius were at laſt aſſured that both conſuls would remain in Italy, on account of the apprehenſion of a Gallic war; the deputies were then introduced into the ſenate, and declaimed with great acrimony againſt Philip. Their diſcourſes were in general the ſame which they had made in the late conferences with the king. But the opinion which they chiefly laboured to impreſs upon the ſenate was, that as long as Philip ſhould hold Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias in ſubjection, the Greeks could never entertain ſo much as a thought of being free. That this was acknowledged by Philip himſelf, who uſed to call theſe places the fetters of Greece: and that no declaration ever was more true. For, while a royal garriſon remained in Corinth, the people of Peloponneſus would be afraid to move. That the Locrians, the Bœotians, and the Phocæans, muſt in the ſame manner loſe all courage, if the king ſhould retain poſſeſſion of Chalcis, and the other parts Eubœa. And laſtly, if the Macedonians were allowed to hold Demetrias, that the Theſſalians and Magneſians could never hope to obtain even the

ſmalleſt portion of freedom. That the offer therefore that was made by Philip, to relinquiſh any other places, was merely an empty ſhew, contrived only to elude the preſent danger: for, if he ſtill ſhould be permitted to remain maſter of thoſe three cities, he would be able to bring the Greeks again into ſubjection, at any time that he ſhould chooſe. Upon this account, they requeſted of the ſenate, either that the king might be forced to make an immediate ceſſion of thoſe places; or otherwiſe, that things might remain in their preſent ſtate, and the war be continued with vigour againſt him. That the war indeed was at this time very nearly finiſhed: ſince the Macedonians had been already twice defeated; and that their ſupplies by land were all exhauſted. To theſe reaſons they in the end added alſo their intreaties; and implored the ſenate, not to diſappoint the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themſelves of the honour of a glorious name.

When theſe and other things of the ſame kind had been urged by the deputies from the ſeveral ſtates, the ambaſſadours of Philip were ready alſo to make a long harangue, but were ſtopped in the very be-

beginning of it. Being aſked if they would relinquiſh Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they anſwered, that they had received no inſtructions concerning thoſe places. They were loaded therefore with reproaches from every ſide, and were forced to be ſilent. It was then decreed, that both the Conſuls ſhould be ſent into Gaul, as we before have mentioned; and that the war ſhould be continued againſt Philip, and Flaminius be intruſted with the affairs of Greece. And thus all things happened as Flaminius had deſired. Nor was his ſucceſs upon this occaſion ſcarcely in any degree to be aſcribed to chance, but chiefly to his own foreſight and prudent management. For there was not in all Rome a man more dexterous, or that ſhewed greater wiſdom and ability, either in the conduct of public affairs, or in the advancement of his own particular intereſts. And yet he was at this time very young: not more than thirty years old. He was the firſt alſo of the Romans that led an army into Greece.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

A reflection on the depravity of mankind.

IT ſeems that men, who in the practice of craft and ſubtlety exceed all other animals, may with good reaſon be acknowledged to be more depraved than they. For other animals are ſubſervient only to the appetites of the body, and by them are led to do wrong. But men, who have alſo ſentiments to guide them, are guilty of ill conduſt, not leſs through the abuſe of their acquired reaſon, than from the force of their natural deſires.

EX-

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The difference between the Roman Paliſade and that of the Greeks. The motions of the Macedonian and Roman armies. The battle of Cynoſcephalæ, between Philip and Flaminius. The Macedonian Phalanx compared with the arms and order of battle of the Romans.

CHAP. I.

FLAMINIUS had not yet been able to diſcover, in what place the Macedonians were encamped. But being aſſured that they had entered Theſſaly, he ordered all his ſoldiers to cut pales for the entrenchment, and to carry them with them, that they might be ready for uſe whenever occaſion ſhould require. This is a labour, which in the diſcipline of the Grecian armies is conſidered as impracticable: but the Romans perform it without much difficulty. For the Greeks, in their marches, ſcarcely can ſupport the

toil of carrying their own bodies. But the Romans, when they have ſlung their ſhields by the leathern braces behind their ſhoulders, take their Javelins in their hands, and are able at the ſame time to carry the pales. What renders the taſk indeed the eaſier is, that theſe pales are very different from thoſe that are uſed by the Greeks. For the Greeks eſteem thoſe to be the beſt, which have many, and very large branches all around the trunk. But the Romans chooſe thoſe that have only two or three branches, or four at the moſt; and thoſe alſo, upon one ſide of the trunk, and not ſpringing alternately from both. By this method, the carriage of them is rendered altogether eaſy: for three or four of them may be laid cloſe together, and be carried by a ſingle ſoldier. In this way alſo, they are much better contrived than the other, for the ſecurity of the camp. The pales uſed by the Greeks are eaſily torn out of the ground. For, as they are planted ſingly, and each of them ſtanding as it were alone, with many great branches ſpreading from the trunk, if two or three ſoldiers apply their ſtrength to the branches, the trunk is ſoon drawn from the ground, and leaves a very ſpacious opening: and the

the adjoining pales alſo are at the ſame time looſened; becauſe their branches are too ſhort to be interwoven each with the other. But it is otherwiſe in the method of the Romans. Among them, the branches are ſo twiſted together, that it is not eaſy to diſtinguiſh, what branches belong to the ſtems in the ſeveral pales, or what ſtems to the branches. Add to this, that the texture of them is ſo cloſe, as to leave no room for a hand to paſs; and that the points alſo of all the branches are very carefully ſharpened. And even when it is poſſible to lay hold on any part, it is ſtill extremely difficult to draw out any of the pales: not only becauſe they are very firmly fixed in the ground; but becauſe the force alſo, which is applied to any ſingle branch, muſt at the ſame time draw along many other branches, which are inſeparably twiſted with it. Nor is it ſcarcely ever practicable for two or three men to lay hold on the ſame pale together. And if a ſingle pale, or if two, by the efforts of continual ſhaking ſhould at laſt be removed from their place, the opening that is made is ſo ſmall that it is ſcarcely to be diſcerned. As theſe pales then have in three reſpects a very great advantage over the others;

in being found almoſt in any place; in being carried with eaſe; and in forming, when they are uſed, a rampart the moſt ſtable and ſecure; it is manifeſt, at leaſt in my judgement, that there is not any part of the Roman diſcipline, which ſo well deſerves to be approved and imitated.

Flaminius then, having ordered the ſoldiers, as we have mentioned, to cut and carry the pales with them, that they might be ready for uſe, advanced ſlowly with all the army. When he arrived at the diſtance of about fifty ſtadia from the city of Pheræ, he there encamped: and, early on the following day, he ſent out a body of his men, to diſcover, if it was poſſible, in what place the enemy lay, and what were their deſigns. Philip on the other hand, having been informed that the Romans remained ſtill in the neighbourhood of Thebes, decamped from Lariſſa at this very time with all his army, and, directing his march alſo towards Pheræ, arrived before the day was cloſed at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia from the city. In this place, he ordered the troops to take their refreſhment and repoſe: and, on the following day, having ſent forwards his advanced guard, before

it

it was light, to take poſſeſſion of the hills that were above the city, as ſoon as the day appeared, he began to draw out all his forces from the camp. The troops that were ſent forwards from both the armies had almoſt met together, as they advanced, on the top of the hills. But perceiving the approach of each other through the dawn, when there was now but a very moderate diſtance between them, they immediately halted, and ſent ſome to inform the Generals of what had happened, and to receive their orders. The Generals on both ſides reſolved to remain quiet in their reſpective camps; and recalled the troops that had advanced. On the next day, they ſent away again on both ſides about three hundred of their cavalry and light-armed troops to make diſcoveries. Among thoſe that went from the Roman camp, were two troops of Ætolians, ſelected for this ſervice by Flaminius, on account of their knowledge of the country. The two bodies met together on the road that leads from Pheræ to Lariſſa, and the engagement was begun with vigour. But ſo ſtrenuous were the efforts of Eupolemus, who headed the Ætolians, and ſo well did he animate the troops of Italy to

ſupport

ſupport the charge, that the Macedonians ſuffered very greatly in the action. When the ſkirmiſh however had continued for a conſiderable time, both parties returned back again to their ſeveral camps.

On the following day, the two Generals, being alike diſſatisfied with the ground in the neighbourhood of Pheræ, which was covered every where with plantations, gardens, and fences, reſolved both of them to change their camp. Philip therefore, having put his troops in motion, directed his march towards Scotuſſa: with deſign to draw from thence a plentiful ſupply of all proviſions, and afterwards to encamp in ſome place more commodious for his army. At the ſame time Flaminius, ſuſpecting that this was his intention, began his march alſo towards the ſame place with the greateſt haſte; that he might be able to arrive before the king, and deſtroy the proviſions through the country. Between the two armies was a chain of lofty hills, which intercepted the view of each from the other: ſo that the Romans ſaw not the courſe in which the Macedonians directed their march, nor the Macedonians that of the Romans. At the end of the day, the

the former arrived near Eretria in Pthiotis, and the latter upon the banks of the river Oncheſtus, and remained there for the night; not knowing in either army, in what place the other had halted. On the next day they continued their march forwards, and ſeverally encamped; Philip, near the place called Melambium in the diſtrict of Scotuſſa; and Flaminius in the neighbourhood of Thetidium in Pharſalia; but were ſtill alike unacquainted, each of them with the ſituation of the other. On the third day, at early dawn, came on violent ſtorms of rain accompanied with thunder; and the whole earth was covered with ſo black a ſky, that the ſoldiers were ſcarcely able to ſee a ſtep before them, Philip, however, being earneſt to accompliſh his deſign, reſolved to continue his march with all the army. But when he had advanced but a little way forwards, he found himſelf ſo incommoded by the darkneſs, that he again halted, and encamped; but ſent away a body of troops, to take their poſt upon the top of the hills that were between the two armies. Flaminius remained ſtill in his camp near Thetidium: but being ſollicitous to know in what place the enemy lay, he ſent away ten troops

troops of cavalry, together with a thouſand of the light-armed infantry, to make diſcoveries; commanding them to direct their courſe with caution through the country. As this party advanced, they were betrayed by the darkneſs, and fell, without perceiving them, among the Macedonians who had taken their ſtation upon the top of the hills. The two bodies, being alike ſurpriſed, ſtood a while in ſuſpenſe: but after a ſhort time they began to engage together in action, and ſent notice to their reſpective Generals of what had happened. As the engagement became more warm, the Romans were ſo unequally preſſed by the Macedonians, that they were forced to ſend and requeſt ſuccours from the camp. Flaminius therefore ſent away to their aſſiſtance Archidamus and Eupolemus, both of them Ætolians, and two Roman Tribunes, at the head of two thouſand foot and five hundred horſe. On the arrival of theſe forces, the face of the action ſoon was changed. The Romans, encouraged by this new ſtrength, continued the fight with double ardour. The Macedonians on the other hand, though they defended themſelves with the greateſt bravery, yet being now preſſed in their turn, and in-

incumbered with their heavy armour, were forced to retreat back again to the ſummit of the hills, and from thence ſent and deſired aſſiſtance alſo from their king. Philip, who, for the reaſons already mentioned, had formed no expectation of engaging upon this day in a general battle, had ſent out a great part of his troops to forage. But being now informed of what had happened, and as the darkneſs alſo was beginning to be diſperſed, he ordered Heraclides of Gyrtone, who led the Theſſalian cavalry, Leon who commanded that of Macedon, and Athenagoras who was at the head of all the mercenaries except thoſe of Thrace, to go and ſupport the combatants. The Macedonians, reinforced by ſo conſiderable a ſtrength, attacked the Romans with new vigour; drove them down back again from the ſummit of the hills; and would have totally diſperſed them; if the reſiſtance chiefly of the Ætolian cavalry, who maintained the fight with an aſtoniſhing impetuoſity and courage, had not prevented the diſorder from being complete. For as much as the infantry of this country, on account both of their arms and of the manner in which they are ranged in the field, falls below that of the reſt of

Greece

Greece in all general battles; ſo much on the other hand is their cavalry ſuperior to all other, when they engage in ſeparate actions, or man againſt man. At this time therefore they oppoſed with ſuch ſucceſs the efforts of the enemy, that the Romans were not driven quite into the plain; but turned their faces again, and ſtopped their flight at a little diſtance from it. Flaminius, perceiving not only that the cavalry and the light-armed forces were in this manner routed, but that their flight had ſpread a conſternation alſo through the reſt of the troops, drew his whole army out of the intrenchments, and ranged them in order of battle near the foot of the hills.

While the Romans were thus driven back, meſſenger after meſſenger, leaving the detachment upon the hills, came running to Philip, and cried aloud: The enemies, O king, are flying; loſe not the opportunity. The barbarians cannot ſtand before us. The day is now your own: the very moment of victory is in your hands." Theſe vehement cries forced the king out to engage; though he altogether was diſſatisfied with the nature of the ground. For the hills, of which we are ſpeaking, are called Cynoſcephalæ

ſcephalæ, from the reſemblance which they bear to the head of a dog: being parted, round the ſummit, into ragged clifts, and ſtretched upwards to a conſiderable height. Philip therefore, who well knew that ſuch a ground would be very diſadvantageous to his troops, had not made from the beginning any diſpoſition for a general battle. But being now ſo urged and animated by the exceſſive confidence of thoſe who brought the news of this firſt ſucceſs, he at laſt gave orders to lead the whole army out of the intrenchments.

Flaminius alſo, having drawn up all his forces, as we have mentioned, in order of battle, and being now ready to ſupport the detachment that was engaged upon the hills, at the ſame time went through all the ranks to encourage his men. The words which he employed were few, but very forcible, and ſuch as the troops might perfectly underſtand. "Are not theſe, ſaid he to the ſoldiers; as if the enemy had ſtood cloſe before their eyes; are not theſe the Macedonians, whom you attacked upon the heights of Eordæa, advancing openly up the ſides of the hills under the conduct of Sulpicius, and drove with great ſlaughter

from their poſt? Are not theſe the Macedonians, who, when they had taken poſſeſſion of the paſſes of Epirus, which were thought impoſſible to be forced, were by your courage routed and diſperſed; and, throwing away their arms, continued their flight even to their own country? And can you have any thing now to fear in engaging the ſame enemy without any diſadvantage? Does the remembrance of thoſe ſucceſſes offer any thing dreadful to your view? Ought it not rather, on the contrary, to inſpire you with the ſtrongeſt confidence? Rouſe up then your courage, and advance boldly to the fight. For I am well aſſured, that, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, the preſent action will ſoon be terminated in the ſame glorious manner as the paſt." When he had ended this harangue, he ordered the right wing of his army to remain ſtill in their poſt, with the elephants before them; and moved ſlowly with the left wing and the light-armed forces towards the enemy. The Romans that were firſt engaged upon the hills, perceiving themſelves to be now ſupported by the legions, returned back again, and renewed the fight with vigour.

At the ſame time Philip, when he had drawn up the greateſt part of his army in order of battle before the entrenchments, putting himſelf at the head of the Peltaſtæ and the right of the Phalanx, made haſte to aſcend the hills; and ordered Nicanor, ſurnamed the Elephant, to follow him without delay with the reſt of the forces. As ſoon as the foremoſt of the troops had reached the ſummit, he began to form the right of his line, upon the ground near to the top, which was now open and deſerted. For the detachment from the Macedonian army, that was firſt engaged, had driven down the Romans to the loweſt part of the hills. But while the king was ſtill forming his right, the mercenaries that were in that detachment came running towards him in diſorder, being driven back again by the Romans in their turn. For the latter, as ſoon as they were followed by the legionary troops, which were brought up, as we have ſaid, to ſupport them, were ſo ſtrengthened by that new weight, that they preſſed heavily upon their enemies, and deſtroyed great numbers of them. Philip therefore, who, at his firſt arrival upon the hills, had beheld with pleaſure that the place of the

action was at no great distance from the Roman camp, now seeing his troops forced back again, and flying towards him for support, was compelled by this accident to advance, and engage in a general action; though the greatest part of his phalanx was still in march, and had not yet reached the summit of the hills. Having received then the troops that were forced back, he collected them all together, and placed them, both infantry and cavalry, upon his right wing; and gave orders to the Peltastæ and the soldiers of the phalanx, to double their files and close their ranks upon the right. When this was done, and the Romans now were near, he commanded the phalanx to level their spears and advance; and the light-armed forces to extend themselves, and attack the enemy in their flank.

'Flaminius also, having received into the intervals of his army the troops that had been engaged, at the same time advanced against the enemy. The first shock, which was on both sides violent, was attended likewise with a very great and unusual noise. For both bodies shouted at once together. The cries also of the rest that were at a distance were joined

joined to thoſe of the combatants; and filled all around with aſtoniſhment and horror. The right wing however of Philip had from the firſt onſet very clearly the advantage. The higher ground from which they fought, the weight of their diſpoſition, and the nature of their arms, well ſituated to the preſent action, all joined to give them a manifeſt ſuperiority over the Romans. But with regard to the reſt of the Macedonian army, the troops that were next in the line to the right ſtood at a diſtance from the enemy; and thoſe of the left wing were not yet arrived, having but juſt now begun to appear upon the tops of the hills. When Flaminius therefore perceived, that his troops were not able to maintain their ground againſt the phalanx, that great numbers were already killed, and the reſt beginning to retreat; he went in haſte, and joined the right wing of his army, which was now his only reſource; and, having remarked the diviſion and diſorder of the Macedonians; that the next in the line to the troops that were engaged remained inactive at a diſtance; that ſome were juſt coming down from the tops of the hills; and others ſtanding upon the ſummit; he placed the elephants at the

head of this wing, and advanced againſt theſe ſeveral bodies. The Macedonians, not having any leader from whom they might receive the command, and being unable to form themſelves into a phalanx, both on account of the inequality of the ground, and becauſe, as they were advancing towards that part of their army that was engaged, they were ſtill rather in the order of a march, than in any order of battle, waited not to be attacked by the Romans, but were broken at once by the elephants, and immediately diſperſed. The Romans purſued them with the greateſt part of their forces, and ſlaughtered them as they fled. But one of the Tribunes, at the head of no more than twenty companies, took at this time a meaſure which the occaſion ſuggeſted to him, and which was chiefly the cauſe that rendered the victory complete. Obſerving that Philip had advanced far beyond the reſt of his army; and that he continued to preſs the left wing of the Romans with a weight which they were wholly unable to ſuſtain; he quitted the right, where the ſucceſs was clear and unconteſted, and making a circuit to one ſide, fell in behind the combatants, and charged the Macedonians in their rear

Now ſuch is the diſpoſition of the phalanx, that the ſoldiers never can turn, or engage ſingly man with man. The Tribune therefore went on, killing thoſe that were before him, till the Macedonians, having no power to defend themſelves, threw away their arms, and were forced to ſeek their ſafety in flight. For the Romans alſo, who had before begun to retreat, now turned again, and charged them at the ſame time in front. When Philip, who from his firſt ſucceſs, had flattered himſelf, as we have ſaid, with the expectation of a perfect victory, now ſaw his troops throwing away their arms, and the enemy attacking them in their rear, he retired, with a ſmall body of infantry and cavalry, to a little diſtance from the place of the action, and ſurveyed the whole ſtate of the battle. And when he perceived, that the Romans, who were purſuing his left wing likewiſe, had almoſt reached the ſummit of the hills, he collected together as many of the Thracians and the Macedonians as the time would allow, and reſolved to leave the field. Flaminius, as he arrived upon the tops of the hills, ſaw ſome troops of the left wing of the Macedonian army, which were juſt now alſo aſcending to

the ſummit from the oppoſite ſide. He was preparing to attack them, but ſtopped when he obſerved that they held their ſpears erect. This is the cuſtom of the Macedonians, when they either ſurrender themſelves, or paſs over to the ſide of the enemy. The Roman General therefore, as ſoon as he was informed of the intention of this ſignal, held back his troops from advancing. and determined to ſpare the men who had not courage to reſiſt him. But, in the inſtant when he was forming this reſolution, ſome of his foremoſt ranks ruſhed down upon them, and killed a great part of them, while a very ſmall number only threw away their arms, and eſcaped by flight.

The battle being now ended, and the Romans victorious in every part, Philip directed his flight towards Tempe. Having reſted the firſt evening in the place that is called the Tower of Alexander, he arrived on the next day at Gonni, which is ſituated in the entrance of the valley of Tempe. In this place he halted, in order to receive all thoſe that had eſcaped after the action. The Romans, having for ſome time purſued the fugitives, began ſome of them to ſtrip the dead, and ſome to bring together their priſoners.

But

But the greateſt part ran to pillage the camp of the enemy. On their arrival there, they found that the Ætolians had already pillaged it. Suppoſing themſelves therefore to have been defrauded of their juſt rights, they vented bitter complaints againſt that people, and even loaded their own General with reproaches. "You expoſe us, ſaid they, to the dangers of the war: but the booty you allot to others." They returned back however to their camp, and there paſſed the night: and on the following day, having collected together the priſoners and the reſt of the ſpoil, they continued their march towards Lariſſa. The Romans loſt in this action about ſeven hundred men. On the ſide of the Macedonians, eight thouſand were killed; and not fewer that five thouſand taken priſoners. Such was the end of the battle of Cynoſcephalæ in Theſſaly, between king Philip and the Romans.

CHAP. II.

HAVING left an aſſurance with my readers, in the ſixth book of this work, that I would chooſe ſome proper time to compare together the arms and the orders of battle of the Macedonians, and the Romans, and to ſhew in what reſpects they ſeverally have the advantage, or are inferior each to the other, I ſhall here take the occaſion which the action now deſcribed has offered, and ſhall endeavour to diſcharge my promiſe. For as the order of battle of the Macedonian armies was found, in the experience of former ages, to be ſuperior to that of the Aſiaticks and the Greeks, and the Roman order of battle in the ſame manner ſurpaſſed that of the Africans and all the weſtern parts of Europe; and as, in later times, theſe two ſeveral orders have been often ſet in oppoſition each to the other; it muſt be uſeful as well as curious, to trace out the difference that is between them, and to explain the advantages that turned the victory to the ſide of the Romans in theſe engagements. From ſuch a view, inſtead

of

of having recourſe to chance, and blindly applauding, like men of ſuperficial underſtanding, the good fortune of the conquerours, we ſhall be able to remark with certainty the true cauſes of their ſucceſs, and to ground our admiration upon the principles of ſound ſenſe and reaſon.

With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories which he obtained againſt the Romans, there is no need upon this occaſion to enter into a long diſcuſſion of them. For it was not his arms, or his order of battle, which rendered that General ſuperior to the Romans; but his dexterity alone, and his admirable ſkill. In the accounts that were given by us of thoſe engagements, we have very clearly ſhewn that this was the cauſe of his ſucceſs. And this remark is ſtill more ſtrongly confirmed, in the firſt place, by the final iſſue of the war. For as ſoon as the Romans had obtained a General, whoſe ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the conquerours. Add to this, that Annibal himſelf rejected the armour which he firſt had uſed; and having furniſhed the African troops with the arms that were taken from

from the Romans in the firſt battle, uſed afterwards no other. In the ſame manner alſo Pyrrhus employed, not only the arms, but the troops of Italy; and ranged in alternate order a company of thoſe troops, and a cohort diſpoſed in the manner of the phalanx, in all his battles with the Romans. And yet, even with the advantage of this precaution, he was never able to obtain any clear or deciſive victory againſt them. It was neceſſary to premiſe theſe obſervations for the ſake of preventing any objection that might be made to the truth of what we ſhall hereafter ſay. Let us now return to the compariſon that was propoſed.

It is eaſy then to demonſtrate by many reaſons, that while the phalanx retains its proper form and full power of action, no force is able to ſtand againſt it in front, or ſupport the violence of its attack. When the ranks are cloſed in order to engage, each ſoldier, as he ſtands with his arms, occupies a ſpace of three feet. The ſpears, in their moſt ancient form, contained ſeventeen cubits in length. But, for the ſake of rendering them more commodious in action, they have ſince been reduced to fourteen. Of theſe, four cubits are contained between the part which

the ſoldier graſps in his hands, and the lower end of the ſpear behind, which ſerves as a counterpoiſe to the part that is extended before him: and the length of this laſt part from the body of the ſoldier, when the ſpear is puſhed forwards with both hands againſt the enemy, is by conſequence ten cubits. From hence it follows, that when the phalanx is cloſed in its proper form, and every ſoldier preſſed within the neceſſary diſtance with reſpect to the man that is before him and upon his ſide, the ſpears of the fifth rank are extended to the length of two cubits, and thoſe of the ſecond, third, and fourth to a ſtill greater length, beyond the foremoſt rank. The manner in which the men are crouded together in this method is marked by Homer in the following lines:

Shield ſtuck to ſhield, to helmet helmet join'd,
And man to man; and at each nod that bow'd
High waving on their heads the glittering cones,
Rattled the hair-crown'd caſques: ſo thick they ſtood *.

* Iliad. XIII. 131.

This

This deſcription is not leſs exact than beautiful. It is manifeſt then, that five ſeveral ſpears, differing each from the other in the length of two cubits, are extended before every man in the foremoſt rank. And when it is conſidered likewiſe, that the phalanx is formed by ſixteen in depth, it will be eaſy to conceive, what muſt be the weight and violence of the intire body, and how great the force of its attack. In the ranks indeed that are behind the fifth, the ſpears cannot reach ſo far as to be employed againſt the enemy. In theſe ranks therefore, the ſoldiers, inſtead of extending their ſpears forwards, reſt them upon the ſhoulders of the men that are before them, with their points ſlanting upwards; and in this manner they form a kind of rampart which covers their heads, and ſecures them againſt thoſe darts, which may be carried in their flight beyond the firſt ranks, and fall upon thoſe that are behind. But when the whole body advances to charge the enemy, even theſe hindmoſt ranks are of no ſmall uſe and moment. For as they preſs continually upon thoſe that are before them, they add by their weight alone great force to the attack, and deprive alſo the foremoſt ranks

ranks of the power of drawing themſelves backwards or retreating. Such then is the diſpoſition of the phalanx, with regard both to the whole and the ſeveral parts. Let us now conſider the arms, and the order of battle, of the Romans; that we may ſee by the compariſon in what reſpects they are different from thoſe of the Macedonians.

To each of the Roman ſoldiers, as he ſtands in arms, is allotted the ſame ſpace likewiſe of three feet. But as every ſoldier in the time of action is conſtantly in motion; being forced to ſhift his ſhield continually, that he may cover any part of his body againſt which a ſtroke is aimed; and to vary the poſition of his ſword, ſo as either to puſh, or to make a falling ſtroke; there muſt alſo be a diſtance of three feet, the leaſt that can be allowed for performing theſe motions with advantage, between each ſoldier and the man that ſtands next to him, both upon his ſide and behind him. In charging therefore againſt the phalanx, every ſingle Roman, as he has two Macedonians oppoſite to him, has alſo ten ſpears, which he is forced to encounter. But it is not poſſible for a ſingle man to cut down theſe ſpears with his ſword, before they can take

take their effect againſt him. Nor is it eaſy on the other hand to force his way through them. For the men that are behind add no weight to the preſſure, nor any ſtrength to the ſwords, of thoſe that are in the foremoſt rank. It will be eaſy therefore to conceive, that, while the phalanx retains its own proper poſition and ſtrength, no troops, as I before obſerved, can ever ſupport the attack of it in front. To what cauſe then is it to be aſcribed, that the Roman armies are victorious; and thoſe defeated that employ the phalanx? The cauſe is this. In war, the times and the places of action are various and indefinite. But there is only one time and place, one fixed and determinate manner of action, that is ſuited to the phalanx. In the caſe then of a general action, if an enemy be forced to encounter with the phalanx in the very time and place which the latter requires, it is probable in the higheſt degree, from the reaſons that have been mentioned, that the phalanx always muſt obtain the victory. But if it be poſſible to avoid an engagement in ſuch circumſtances; and indeed it is eaſy to do it; there is then nothing to be dreaded from this order of battle. It is a well known and an acknow-

knowledged truth, that the phalanx requires a ground that is plain and naked, and free likewiſe from obſtacles of every kind; ſuch as trenches, breaks, obliquities, the brows of hills, or the channels of rivers; and that any of theſe are ſufficient to impede it, and to diſſolve the order in which it is formed. On the other hand again, it muſt as readily be allowed, that, if it be not altogether impoſſible, it is at leaſt extremely rare, to find a ground containing twenty ſtadia, or more, in its extent, and free from all theſe obſtacles. But let it however be ſuppoſed, that ſuch a ground may perhaps be found. If the enemy, inſtead of coming down upon it, ſhould lead their army through the country, plundering the cities, and ravaging the lands, of what uſe then will be the phalanx? As long as it remains in this convenient poſt, it not only has no power to ſuccour its friends, but cannot even preſerve itſelf from ruin. For the troops that are maſters of the whole country without reſiſtance will eaſily cut off from it all ſupplies. And if, on the other hand, it ſhould relinquiſh its own proper ground, and endeavour to engage in action, the advantage is then ſo great againſt

againſt it, that it ſoon becomes an eaſy prey to the enemy.

But farther; let it be ſuppoſed that the enemy will come down into this plain. Yet, if he brings not his whole army at once to receive the attack of the phalanx; or if, in the inſtant of the charge, he withdraws himſelf a little from the action; it is eaſy to determine what will be the conſequence, from the preſent practice of the Romans. For we now draw not our diſcourſe from bare reaſoning only, but from facts which have lately happened. When the Romans attack the phalanx in front, they never employ all their forces, ſo as to make their line equal to that of the enemy; but lead on a part only of their troops, and keep the reſt of the army in reſerve. Now, whether the troops of the phalanx break the line that is oppoſed to them, or whether themſelves are broken, the order peculiar to the phalanx is alike diſſolved. For if they purſue the fugitives, or if, on the other hand, they retreat and are purſued, in either caſe they are ſeparated from the reſt of their own body. And thus there is left ſome interval or ſpace, which the reſerve of the Roman army takes care to

ſeize,

ſeize, and then charges the remaining part of the phalanx, not in front, but in flank, or in the rear. As it is eaſy then to avoid the times and circumſtances that are advantageous to the phalanx; and as thoſe, on the contrary, that are diſadvantageous to it can never be avoided; it is certain that this difference alone muſt carry with it a deciſive weight in the time of action.

To this it may be added, that the troops of the phalanx alſo are, like others, forced to march, and to incamp, in every kind of place: to be the firſt to ſeize the advantageous poſts; to inveſt an enemy, or be inveſted; and to engage alſo in ſudden actions, without knowing that an enemy was near. Theſe things all happen in war: and either tend greatly to promote, or ſometimes wholly determine the victory. But, at all ſuch times, the Macedonian order of battle either cannot be employed, or is employed in a manner that is altogether uſeleſs. For the troops of the phalanx loſe all their ſtrength, when they engage in ſeparate companies, or man with man. The Roman order, on the contrary, is never attended, even upon ſuch occaſions, with any diſadvantage. Among the Romans,

every ſingle ſoldier, when he is once armed and ready for ſervice, is alike fitted to engage in any time and place, or upon any appearance of the enemy: and preſerves always the ſame power, and the ſame capacity of action, whether he engages with the whole of the army, or only with a part; whether in ſeparate companies, or ſingly man againſt man. As the parts therefore, in the Roman order of battle, are ſo much better contrived for uſe, than thoſe in the other; ſo the ſucceſs alſo in action muſt, in the ſame proportion, be greater in the one than the other. If I have been long in examining this ſubject, it was becauſe many of the Greeks, at the time when the Macedonians were defeated, regarded that event as a thing ſurpaſſing all belief: and becauſe many others alſo may hereafter wiſh to know, from what reaſons, and in what particular reſpects, the order of phalanx is excelled by the arms and the order of battle of the Romans. I now return from my digreſſion.

Philip, when he had done all that was poſſible in the battle, and had ſuffered an entire defeat, collected together as many of the troops as were able to eſcape, and directed his retreat through

Tempe

Tempe towards Macedon: but firſt ſent away one of his guards to Lariſſa, in the very night that followed the action, with orders to deſtroy and burn all the royal papers. This attention which he ſhewed, even in the very moment of his diſtreſs, not to leave ſo neceſſary a duty unperformed, was indeed highly worthy of a king. For he knew that if theſe papers ſhould fall into the hands of the Romans, they would afford many pretences that might be employed againſt himſelf and his friends. There are others perhaps to be found, who have not born the power of proſperous fortune like men; but have ſtood firm under the preſſure of adverſity, and ſupported themſelves by their caution and prudence. But this was very peculiarly the character of Philip: as it will be ſeen in the following parts of this work. For as we gave a diſtinct account of the happy diſpoſition and virtuous tendency of this prince in the beginning of his reign; and ſhewed afterwards, from what cauſes, and in what time and manner he changed his conduct, and purſued a different courſe of action; it will be no leſs our duty alſo to ſhew, in what manner he returned again to a better mind, and by what wiſe management,

when his misfortunes had inſpired him with different ſentiments, he adjuſted all his meaſures to that neceſſity, which the times, in which he found himſelf, impoſed. The Roman General, when he had made the neceſſary diſpoſition of the priſoners and the reſt of the ſpoil, continued his march with the army towards Lariſſa.

EX-

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Men who are moſt practiſed in deceit, are often deceived through want of caution.

IT is manifeſt then from this example, that, though we are all ſo liable to be deceived, both by the ſame arts and the ſame inſtruments alſo of fraud, yet we are never ſufficiently upon our guard againſt them. For this very artifice has been practiſed upon many occaſions, and by many perſons. It is not ſtrange perhaps, that mankind in general ſhould ſo often fall into the ſnare. But that thoſe men, who are as we may ſay the very ſource of all deceit, ſhould be themſelves deceived, may reaſonably be thought aſtoniſhing. But indeed this only happens to them, becauſe they do not recollect upon ſuch occaſions the wiſe admonition of Epicharmus. "Be ſober, and diſtruſtful: theſe are the nerves of the mind."

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The conference at Lyſimachia between Antiochus and the Roman deputies.

ABOUT this time, with the reſt of the ten Roman deputies, came Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, and Lucius Terentius and Publius Vilius from Thaſſus: and within a few days afterwards, notice of their arrival having been immediately conveyed to the king, they all aſſembled together at Lyſimachia. Hegeſianax alſo and Lyſias, who had been deputed from Antiochus to Flaminius, were at the ſame time preſent. In the private interviews that paſſed between the Romans and the king, nothing was to be ſeen but frankneſs and civility. But when they were afterwards all aſſembled together, and brought their buſineſs into debate, the aſpect of things was not ſo friendly. For Lucius Cornelius, as he deſired the king to deliver up thoſe cities in Aſia, which he had torn from the dominions

minions of Ptolemy, at the ſame time preſſed him alſo in the moſt peremptory terms to relinquiſh thoſe that had belonged to Philip: ſince nothing, as he ſaid, could be more abſurd, than that, when the Romans had maintained a war againſt that prince, Antiochus ſhould come afterwards and carry away the ſpoils. He exhorted him likewiſe not to aſſume any power over the cities that were free: and then added; that, upon the whole, he could not but wonder, what deſign had induced him to paſs into Europe with ſo powerful a fleet and army. That, if the thing were to be well conſidered, no other motive could indeed be aſſigned for ſuch an expedition, but an intention to make war upon the Romans.

The king replied to this diſcourſe: "That he knew not upon what grounds of reaſon his poſſeſſion of the cities of Aſia was now conteſted; and that the Romans, of all others, had certainly no right to bring his title into diſpute. That he wiſhed that they would abſtain from meddling with the affairs of Aſia; as much as he was careful, not to meddle at any time with thoſe of Italy. That his deſign in paſſing into Europe was to recover the Cherſoneſus, and the cities of

Thrace, which were properly a part of his own dominions. That thoſe places had belonged originally to Lyſimachus: and, when that prince was attacked and vanquiſhed by Seleucus, they had paſſed, with the reſt of his kingdom, to the conquerour, by the juſt rights of war. That in ſucceeding times, while the attention of his anceſtors was drawn away to other objects, Ptolemy had firſt uſurped ſome parts of the dominions that were ſo acquired, and Philip afterwards the reſt. That he did not therefore now poſſeſs them, as taking an advantage from the misfortunes of Philip; but only as improving an opportunity which was fair to himſelf, and favourable for the recovery of his own proper right. That in bringing back the inhabitants of Lyſimachia, when they had been driven out by the Thracians, and reſtoring the city to its former ſtate, he had done no injury to the Romans, nor ſhewed any intention to attack them; but deſigned only to make the place a ſeat of reſidence for his ſon Seleucus. That, with reſpect to the cities of Aſia that were free, it was fit that they ſhould owe their liberty to his grace and favour, and not to the command of the Romans. And laſtly, with regard

regard alſo to Ptolemy, that he ſhould be ready without the interpoſition of others, to adjuſt all diſputes in the manner which himſelf ſhould deſire: for he had reſolved, not only to live in friendſhip, but even to contract likewiſe an affinity with that prince."

It was then propoſed by Lucius, that the Lampſacenians and Smyrnæans ſhould be called in, and heard; and this accordingly was done. On the part of the former appeared Parmenio and Pythodorus; and on that of the latter, Cœranus. But as they were beginning to harangue with great boldneſs and freedom, Antiochus, being uneaſy that he ſhould in this manner ſeem to give an account of his conduct before the Romans, ſtopped Parmenio from proceeding in his diſcourſe, and ſaid; that it was not the Romans, but the Rhodians, that were the proper judges of the matter in diſpute. Upon this, the conference was immediately broken up; and the parties all retired, being alike diſſatisfied with each other.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The death of Scopas the Ætolian at Alexandria.

THOUGH there are many indeed who would wiſh to draw glory from hazardous actions, there are but few who have the courage to undertake them. And yet Scopas had advantages far greater than Cleomenes, if he had been willing to try the fortune of ſome bold and deſperate attempt. For the latter had been unexpectedly prevented by his enemies; and had no hope left, except in the aſſiſtance of his domeſticks and his friends. He reſolved however to make trial of that hope, and choſe rather to die with honour, than to ſurvive with diſgrace. But Scopas on the contrary, though he had a ſtrong force ready to ſupport him, and though the infancy of the king rendered the opportunity alſo highly favourable, was prevented merely through his own irreſolution and delay. For Ariſtomenes,

menes, having received notice that he had aſſembled his friends together at his houſe, and was holding a conſultation with them, ſent ſome of the guards, to require him to attend the royal council. On receiving this meſſage, Scopas was ſtruck with ſuch confuſion, that he had neither courage to carry any thing into execution, nor reſolution to obey the orders of the king. This was ſenſeleſs in the higheſt degree. Ariſtomenes therefore, being informed of his folly, ſurrounded the houſe with ſome troops and elephants, and at the ſame time ſent Ptolemy the ſon of Eumenes with a body of young ſoldiers, to conduct him to the council, if he was willing to come, or otherwiſe to bring him by force. When Ptolemy entered the houſe, and told him, that the king commanded his attendance, Scopas ſeemed not at firſt to pay any regard to what he ſaid; but, fixing his eyes ſtedfaſtly upon him, for ſome time continued to ſurvey him with a threatening air, as if he had been aſtoniſhed at his boldneſs. The other, coming nearer, roughly ſeized him by his mantle: and Scopas then called upon his friends to help him. But as many of the ſoldiers were now come in, and ſome perſon alſo informed him that the

the houſe was ſurrounded by troops, he was forced to yield to the neceſſity, and followed Ptolemy, together with his friends. As ſoon as he appeared before the council, the charge againſt him, having been opened in few words by the king, was then continued by Polycrates, who had lately arrived at Cyprus, and afterwards by Ariſtomenes. The chief heads of the accuſation were the facts which have before been mentioned. To theſe only were added, the ſecret meetings which he had held with his friends, and his refuſal to obey the orders of the king. Upon theſe facts he was condemned, not only by the council, but by the ambaſſadours alſo that were preſent. For Ariſtomenes had called together upon this occaſion, beſides many other illuſtrious men from Greece, the ambaſſadours likewiſe that had been ſent by the Ætolians to negotiate a peace. Among theſe was Dorimachus the ſon of Nicoſtratus. When the accuſers had ended, Scopas attempted indeed to ſay ſomething in his own defence: but the guilt of his actions was ſo manifeſt, that what he urged made no impreſſion. He was conveyed therefore to priſon with his friends: and in the following night, by the orders

ders of Ariſtomenes, ended his life by poiſon, together with his friends. But Dicæarchus, by the ſame orders, after he had firſt been tortured, was whipped to death with rods: and thus ſuffered the puniſhment that was both ſuitable to his crimes, and due likewiſe to the common vengeance of all Greece. For this was the ſame Dicæarchus, who, when Philip had reſolved, in contempt of treaties, to invade the Cyclade iſlands and the cities of the Helleſpont, was appointed by that prince the commander of all his fleet, and chief leader of the whole expedition. Employed in a deſign ſo manifeſtly impious, he was ſo far from being ſhocked at the injuſtice of his undertaking, that he endeavoured, by an action of the moſt abandoned profligacy, to ſtrike both the Gods and men with horror. For, when he had brought his fleet to anchor, he erected two altars, one to Impiety, and the other to Injuſtice; offered ſacrifices upon them; and adored thoſe vices, as if they had been divinities. It ſeems therefore, that both the Gods and men concurred to inflict upon him a moſt proper puniſhment. For it was reaſonable that a man, whoſe life had been ſo contrary to nature, ſhould die alſo a death that was un-

unnatural. The reſt of the Ætolians, who were willing to return to their own country, were diſmiſſed by the king, and allowed to carry with them all their goods. With regard to Scopas, that paſſion for acquiring wealth, in which he was known during his life to ſurpaſs all other men, appeared ſtill more conſpicuouſly after his death, from the great quantity of money and of valuable goods that was found in his houſe. His cuſtom was, to employ the debauched and profligate as the miniſters of his rapine: and, with the help of ſuch aſſociates, he forced his way into the ſtrongeſt places through all the kingdom, and ranſacked them in ſearch of treaſure.

When this diſorder was ſo happily compoſed, the miniſters of the court reſolved to celebrate the Anacleteria, or proclamation of the king. For though this prince had not yet arrived at the cuſtomary age, it was thought that, if he ſhould now ſeem to take the ſupreme authority into his own hands, the affairs of the kingdom would acquire a more ſettled form, and might be again brought back into a better train. The preparations upon this occaſion were very ſumptuous; and the ceremony performed with

a magnificence that was worthy of ſuch a ſovereign. It was ſuppoſed that Polycrates was the perſon, by whoſe means chiefly this meaſure was carried into execution. This Polycrates, under the reign of the father of the preſent prince, tho' he was then very young, had rendered himſelf, both by his ſervices and his fidelity, one of the moſt diſtinguiſhed perſons of the court. Nor was the credit leſs, which he had acquired in the preſent reign. For having been intruſted with the government of Cyprus, and the care of collecting the revenues of that country, in moſt difficult and unſettled times, he not only had preſerved the iſland for the infant king, but amaſſed likewiſe a very large treaſure; and now brought it with him to Alexandria, after he had firſt reſigned his government to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. On account of this important ſervice, he was received with great applauſe, and became afterwards very powerful. And yet this man, as he advanced in age, ſtarted aſide from this honourable courſe, and plunged himſelf into a life of vice and profligacy. The ſame diſhonour is ſaid alſo to have attended the old age of Ptolemy the ſon of Ageſander.

When

When we arrive at the proper time, we ſhall take care to give ſome account of the ſcandalous actions which they committed, after they had raiſed themſelves into power.

THE END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

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
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